Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Woods told a coworker at the Berwyn Fire Department that “he wanted to kill somebody, all of them” and that his children were going to “go over there” and “tune them up,” referring to his coworkers and superiors. Chief O’Halloran looked into the statements and eventually recommended termination. A three-member panel for the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners conducted a hearing. Woods was represented by counsel, who gave opening and closing statements, put on witnesses, cross-examined others, made and won objections, and presented exhibits. After the hearing, the Board voted to terminate Woods based largely on the testimony of the co-worker to whom Woods made the statement. Woods filed suit asserting discrimination and unlawful retaliation and attempted to proceed under a “cat’s paw” theory of liability, which applies in employment discrimination cases when a biased subordinate (O’Halloran) who lacks decision-making power uses the formal decision-maker (the Board) as a dupe in a deliberate scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Woods’s claims, noting the full and independent evidentiary hearing and the Board’s almost complete reliance on the co-worker’s testimony. View "Woods v. City of Berwyn" on Justia Law

The Army hired URS to destroy munitions at a facility in Arkansas. Smith, a black male, was hired by URS as a full-time temporary instructor/trainer for employees on the Arkansas project. Within months URS hired another black male and a white male (Griffin) for training positions; there were already four individual with various credentials in training positions. Smith alleges that the white man was paid more for essentially the same work and was given a favorable ranking in deciding which trainers should be terminated first, notwithstanding the fact that Griffin had a disciplinary report in his personnel files, for distributing purportedly obscene material in a class. Smith and testified that Griffin had openly conducted a side-business of selling health drinks from his office space at URS on company time without being disciplined. After being terminated during a reduction in forces, Smith sued, alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Eighth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of URS, noting “evidence of dissembling” that a jury could rely upon to discount URS's claimed rationales for its actions. View "Smith v. URS Corp." on Justia Law

Arroyo worked as a Volvo material handler, 2005-2011. Arroyo was a member of the U.S. Army Reserve. She deployed twice to Iraq and Kuwait: 2006-2007 and 2009-2010 and took leave for training and other military activities. She received more than 900 days of military leave from Volvo. There is evidence, including internal emails, suggesting that her supervisors were frustrated from the beginning about her absences. After her 2009-2010 deployment Arroyo declined a voluntary severance package and returned to work. Arroyo was diagnosed with PTSD. Arroyo took three months FMLA and disability leave. Volvo granted accommodations, including: a quiet place to meditate; a mentor; time off for counseling; and breaks and support during anxiety attacks. Other requested accommodations—a more flexible schedule, use of earplugs or headphones in both ears, day-to-day guidance, putting all communications in writing, and disability awareness training—were under review when she was terminated for violation of Volvo’s attendance policy. The district court rejected her claims for discrimination, retaliation, and failure to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791 , and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to discrimination claims under USERRA and the ADA, stating that Arroyo raised genuine, material factual issues. View "Arroyo v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC" on Justia Law

This case came to the Supreme Court on certification from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. Plaintiff sued his former employer in federal court, alleging, inter alia, that Defendants had violated Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-51q by subjecting him to discipline on account of Plaintiff’s exercise of his rights guaranteed by Conn. Const. art. I, sections 3, 4 or 14. The Supreme Court answered (1) the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos that when employees make statements pursuant to their official duties the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline does not apply to a claim that an employer violated section 31-51q by subjecting an employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such an employee of rights guaranteed by Conn. Const. art. I, sections 3, 4, or 14; and (2) under the state Constitution, employee speech pursuant to official job duties on certain matters of significant public interest is protected from employer discipline in a public workplace, and section 31-51q extends the same protection to employee speech pursuant to official job duties in the private workplace. View "Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC" on Justia Law

Employer terminated Employee for engaging in sexually inappropriate workplace conduct. Employee sued Employer and the company’s Puerto Rico Human Resources manager (collectively, Defendants), claiming unjust termination under Puerto Rico’s Law 80 and that he had been the victim of sexual harassment by the Human Resources manager in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and analogous Puerto Rico law. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants on Employee’s federal claims and correctly granted summary judgment to Defendants on the Law 80 claim. View "Perez v. Horizon Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved Barbara Johnson's claim against the City of Mobile in which she alleged retaliation based on several complaints and lawsuits she filed against the City under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("the ADA"). Johnson, an African-American woman over 40 years of age, began working for the City in 1996. Johnson previously filed several complaints and lawsuits against the City pertaining to her employment with the City. In 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2012, Johnson filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the EEOC") complaints against the City alleging various forms of discrimination. Johnson also unsuccessfully sued the City in 2007, 2008, and 2010. Johnson filed the underlying action in 2013, alleging that, in violation of Title VII and the ADA, the City retaliated against Johnson because she had filed discrimination charges against the City with the EEOC. Johnson's deposition testimony indicated that in 2008 or 2009 Johnson had surgery to correct a problem with her toe. As a result of her surgery, Johnson was "taken off of work" for what "could have been a month." Johnson's time off work to recover from her injury was preapproved by the City, and she was paid for her time off. Once Johnson returned to work, she had to wear a boot to protect her toe, and her doctor "wanted [her] on light duty." Johnson's supervisor, Terrell Washington, informed Johnson that there was no light duty available at that time so Johnson remained at home on paid leave. Once Johnson returned to work, Johnson was ordered by her physician to wear a certain kind of shoe that did not comply with the City's dress code: the City required Johnson to wear black shoes, but her physician-prescribed shoes were white. Johnson subsequently received an unsatisfactory-annual performance rating from Washington for the period ending June 8, 2010. Thereafter, Johnson used the MCPB's appellate process for review of her unsatisfactory-performance rating. Ultimately, the MCPB affirmed Johnson's rating. Johnson received a "Letter of Determination" concerning the complaint she filed against the City from the EEOC. The Department of Justice did not elect to sue on Johnson's behalf, but advised that she was free to file suit on her own. The underlying matter in this appeal is the suit Johnson filed with regard to her EEOC complaint. The matter ended with judgment entered in favor of the City. After review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment on the merits and its denial of Johnson's post-judgment motions. The Court also affirmed the trial court's decision to award the City attorney fees. However, the Court reversed the judgment insofar as it set the amount of the fees, and remanded the case for recalculation of fees with reasons supporting the recalculation. View "Johnson v. City of Mobile" on Justia Law

Brian Wade, in the course of servicing a well situated under a high voltage line owned by Flowell Electric Association and Dixie Escalante Rural Electric Association, Inc. (collectively, Flowell), came into contact with the line, resulting in serious injuries to Wade. Wade was acting on behalf of Rhodes Pump II, LLC, his employer, at the time of the accident. Wade received workers’ compensation benefits from Rhodes and also filed a tort action against Flowell. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Wade and awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. Flowell subsequently brought this action for High Voltage Overhead Lines Act (HVOLA) indemnification against Rhodes. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Flowell, concluding that Rhodes had failed to give Flowell adequate notice of its “intended activity.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Flowell timely filed its HVOLA indemnification action; (2) the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusive remedy provision does not preclude liability under the HVOLA; (3) HVOLA does not violate due process or equal protection as applied to Rhodes; and (4) a genuine issue of material fact remains regarding whether Rhodes adequately notified Flowell of its intended activity. View "Flowell Elec. Ass’n v. Rhodes Pump, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Karry Thomas worked for Defendant-Appellee Berry Plastics Corporation from 2003 to 2010. Over the course of Thomas’s seven-year employment, eight different Berry supervisors initiated at least thirteen disciplinary actions against him. These actions ranged in severity from verbal coaching and written warnings to suspensions and final warnings. Thomas initially challenged his termination through Berry’s Termination Review Process, arguing that his termination was not warranted because he was not at fault for the reason given, a print-quality issue. After meeting with Thomas and reviewing his full disciplinary history, the Termination Review Panel (comprised of two independent Berry managers) affirmed the termination decision. Thomas thereafter filed suit for wrongful discharge, alleging, inter alia, that he was terminated in retaliation for opposing race discrimination in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Berry moved for summary judgment. Although Thomas initially argued his Printing Manager possessed retaliatory animus that infected his termination decision, Thomas eventually invoked the “cat’s-paw” theory of recovery, arguing that it was an intermediate supervisor who reported to the Printing Manager, who possessed the retaliatory animus that infected the termination decision. The district court ultimately granted Berry’s motion for summary judgment, and Thomas appealed. Finding that Thomas failed to meet his burden of proof, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Berry. View "Thomas v. Berry Plastics Corporation" on Justia Law

Boutros worked for Avis Rent A Car as a courtesy bus driver at O’Hare Airport. He had worked for Avis before a short stint in the military. After he was honorably discharged for unsatisfactory performance, Avis did not want to rehire him, but did so. One night in May 2008, Boutros informed his supervisor that the fire extinguisher on his bus inexplicably discharged, spraying fire retardant near the driver’s seat. He reported no injury at the time, but the next morning he claimed that chemicals from the discharge had harmed him. Avis launched an investigation and eventually fired Boutros for dishonesty and insubordination in connection with his shifting accounts of the fire-extinguisher accident. Boutros sued, claiming that Avis fired him because of his race and subjected him to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and retaliated against him for exercising his rights under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301. A jury rejected his claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the appeal was frivolous and issuing an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules. View "Boutros v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

Rahn, a white male who earned a PhD in Industrial Engineering from the University of Illinois, was hired as a visiting professor at NIU. His wife, Regina, was hired as a tenure-track assistant professor in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering for that same school year. During that year, a tenure-track assistant professor position opened up in the Department. Rahn applied. Despite her husband’s status as an applicant, Regina was a voting member of the search committee. She claims that one committee member stated that he would not hire a white man into the department if qualified minority candidates were available. After another applicant was hired, the Rahns alleged reverse discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 701 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and copyright infringement, based on use of teaching notes and slides. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. That testimony did not support indicate that an evaluation metric was a subterfuge for eliminating Rahn on racial grounds. A university employer may properly preference academic experience; Rahn did not present evidence that such a preference was inconsistent with the initial description of the position and the preferred qualifications. View "Rahn v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law