Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Carothers, an African-American woman, was hired by Cook County Juvenile Detention Center (JDC) in 2005 as an Administrative Assistant-Hearing Officer, inputting data and creating reports, and serving as a hearing officer for juvenile detainee grievances. In 2009, Carothers had a physical altercation with a detainee during a riot. Carothers injured her hands, went on a leave of absence, and obtained a worker’s compensation settlement. HR acknowledged that Carothers had been released to return with a restriction precluding her from interacting with the detainees, which her job required, and suggested that Carothers review available positions. Carothers replied that she could not find a position that accommodated her restriction. HR replied that she should apply for disability benefits. In March, 2010, Carothers returned to her job. She had to be taken from work in an ambulance following Physical Restraint Techniques training and Deescalation training. In 2011, HR submitted a “Disciplinary Recommendation” because Carothers refused to file for disability and could not obtain a release to return to full duty. A Hearing Officer recommended discharge due to more than 10 unauthorized absences, and failure to follow instructions. The JDC discharged Carothers, who sued, alleging that she had developed an anxiety disorder and that termination constituted discrimination on account of disability, race, and sex, and retaliation for her EEOC claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Carothers v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought an enforcement action under Section 707(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e‐6, claiming that CVS Pharmacy violates Title VII by offering a severance agreement, with waivers of claims against CVS, that could deter terminated employees from filing charges with the EEOC or participating in EEOC proceedings. The district court granted summary judgment for CVS, interpreting Title VII as requiring the EEOC to conciliate its claim before bringing a civil suit. The EEOC had refused to engage in conciliation. The court was also skeptical that an employer’s decision to offer a severance agreement to terminated employees could serve as the basis for a “pattern or practice” suit under Title VII, without any allegation that the employer engaged in retaliatory or discriminatory employment practices. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under Section 707(e), the EEOC is required to comply with all of the pre‐suit procedures contained in Section 706 when it pursues “pattern or practice” violations. Because the EEOC has not alleged that CVS engaged in discrimination or retaliation by offering the Agreement to terminated employees, the EEOC failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law

Michael worked as a Troy patrol officer since 1987. In 2000-2001 he had partially successful surgeries to remove a non-cancerous brain tumor and returned to the force. In 2007, Michael’s then-wife Jamie found a box of empty steroid vials—some labeled for veterinary use and all belonging to Michael—which she gave to then-Chief of Police, Craft. Michael conducted a two-year campaign to get them back, secretly recording and suing Craft. Michael secretly recorded Jamie during marriage-counseling sessions and family gatherings, and asked the prosecutor to charge Jamie with perjury. The new Chief, Mayer, received reports that Michael had accompanied a cocaine dealer to drug deals. Mayer suspended Michael from active duty pending investigation, but tabled that investigation when Michael needed another brain surgery. After Michael’s surgeon cleared him for work, the city requested a psychological evaluation. A neuropsychologist concluded that Michael “may be a threat to himself and others.” The city placed Michael on unpaid leave. Another neuropsychologist pronounced him fit for duty. A third found him unfit. Two others, who reviewed Michael’s file (but did not examine him), concluded that he could return to work. Michael saw a professor of neuropsychology at the University of Michigan, who concluded that Michael has weak “executive functioning,” and that “[s]afety with use of weapons and high-speed driving would be in question.” Michael kept that report to himself and sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the city, holding that Michael was not qualified for the position of patrol officer. View "Michael v. City of Troy Police Dep't" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Sage, alleging racial discrimination, wrongful termination, and retaliation, in violation of Title VII as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981, as well as comparable Texas law and other state law claims. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of her retaliation claims. The court affirmed the judgment because plaintiff, who was a supervisor familiar with company employment policies, has not created a genuine material fact issue that she suffered an adverse employment action. View "Brandon v. Sage Corporation." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was formerly employed by the Civilian Health Promotion Services Program at Hanscom Air Force Base in Bedford, Massachusetts. After the government contractor that employed Plaintiff terminated her employment, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the government contractor that employed her, her supervisor, and several government agencies and officials that Plaintiff believed were involved in her termination. Plaintiff asserted a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics for violation of her First Amendment rights and a claim of gender discrimination under Title VII. Plaintiff’s Bivens claims was dismissed, and summary judgment was granted against Plaintiff on her Title VII claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s Bivens claim failed to plausibly demonstrate her right to recover against any of the defendants it named, and therefore, its dismissal was proper; and (2) the entry of summary judgment against Plaintiff on her Title VII claim was proper. View "Casey v. Dep’t of Defense" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, six homecare providers, filed suit challenging Minnesota's Individual Providers of Direct Support Services Representation Act, Minn. Stat. 179A.54, 179A.06. The Act allows homecare providers for Medicaid program participants to unionize. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' Supremacy Clause claim because the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 152, does not preempt Minnesota's regulation of domestic service workers; plaintiffs' state preemption argument against the SEIU failed because even if the state laws conflict irreconcilably, the law passed most recently by the legislature controls and thus the Act trumps the older statute's definition of "employees;" the district court properly dismissed the providers' tortious interference claim against the state defendants because federal courts are unable to order state officials to conform their conduct to state law; and the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' Contract Clause claims where plaintiffs did not have authority to negotiate compensation or benefits terms with program participants. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Greene v. Dayton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for United Airlines as a ramp serviceman at O’Hare International Airport. Plaintiff twice injured his back at work. When he returned for the second time, he had several permanent work restrictions. United subsequently assigned Plaintiff to the Matrix position as part of the Product Sort work area. United later placed Plaintiff on extended illness status. Plaintiff filed suit against United for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Thereafter, Plaintiff returned to work for United in the Matrix position. Plaintiff then waived his retaliation claim and focused instead on whether United discriminated against him by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of United. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that United did not fail to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disability. View "Dunderdale v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Lori Yahna appealed from a summary judgment dismissing her complaint against Altru Health System for age discrimination and for wrongful termination of employment. In 1984, Yahna began working for the Grand Forks Clinic, the predecessor to Altru, as a licensed practical nurse. She received additional training in vascular technology to work with Dr. Rolf Paulson in the ultrasound department and by 1986 she was working solely as a vascular technologist. According to Yahna, she was the technical director of the vascular lab, she developed the vascular medicine practice at Altru. She initially worked full time as a vascular technologist with on-call responsibilities, but she received approval to work three days per week in 2001 with no on-call responsibility. According to Yahna, she became coordinator and technical director of the vascular lab in 2006. In February 2012, Altru created a new position for an education and quality assurance coordinator, and hired Derek Todd for that full-time position. According to Yahna, she did not apply for that position because it was full time. She claimed, however, she maintained her position as technical director of the vascular lab and understood she would still be doing quality assurance and reviewing other technologists' films. Yahna claimed Altru required her to work full time with on-call responsibilities in July 2012, and she was terminated on July 2, 2012, after she informed Altru "she would not be able to take call at this time." Yahna was forty-eight years old when she was terminated. The district court granted Altru's motion for summary judgment, concluding there were no disputed issues of material fact that Altru's employment policies and procedures did not abrogate Yahna's at-will employment status with Altru and that her termination did not constitute age discrimination. The court explained the provisions in Altru's employment policy manual unambiguously preserved the presumption of at-will employment and did not evidence an intent that the manual created a contractual right to employment. In rejecting Yahna's age discrimination claim, the court cited the requirements for a prima facie age discrimination claim and said that because Yahna refused to take required on-call responsibilities for an ultrasound technologist she failed to satisfactorily perform the duties of her position and she failed to establish employees outside her protected age class were treated more favorably than her. The court ruled Altru established it terminated Yahna because she refused to take on-call responsibilities for her job and granted summary judgment dismissing her complaint. On appeal, Yahna argued there were disputed issues of material fact on her claims that her termination constituted age discrimination and violated Altru's employment policies and procedures. Finding no error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Yahna v. Altru Health System" on Justia Law

In 2013, former employees of two in-home personal care companies sued their former employers, asserting that they had not been paid the minimum wage to which they were entitled under the Georgia Minimum Wage Law (GMWL). The employers removed the case to a federal district court, which certified two questions to the Georgia Supreme Court: (1) whether, under Georgia law, an employee that falls under an FLSA [Fair Labor Standards Act] exemption is effectively “covered” by the FLSA for purposes of OCGA 34-4-3 (c) analysis, thereby prohibiting said employee from receiving minimum wage compensation under the GMWL; and (2) whether an individual whose employment consisted of providing in-home personal support services was prohibited from receiving minimum wage compensation under the GMWL pursuant to the “domestic employees” exception in OCGA 34-4-3 (b)(3). After review, the Georgia Supreme Court answered both questions "no." View "Anderson v. Southern Care Home Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Michael Aronow, an orthopedic surgeon at the University of Connecticut Health Center, filed a grievance with the Health Center Appeals Committee against Jay Lieberman, the chairman of the orthopedic surgery department at the Center, accusing Lieberman of attempted intimidation and harassment. Aronow requested copies of the Committee’s report of its findings regarding Aronow’s grievance as well as the report written by the president emeritus of the University, but the Center denied Aronow’s request, concluding that the reports were exempt from disclosure pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 10a-154a. The Freedom of Information Commission, however, concluded that the reports were not exempt from disclosure under the statute and ordered the center to provide Aronow with a copy of the reports free of charge. The trial court dismissed Lieberman’s appeal, concluding that the Commission properly determined that the reports did not constitute a “record of the performance and evaluation” of a faculty member under section 10a-154a and were therefore not exempt from disclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the reports in this case did not constitute a “record of the performance and evaluation” of a state university faculty or professional staff member within the exemption created by section 10a-154a. View "Lieberman v. Aronow" on Justia Law