Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Lane hired Connelly as one of seven union truck drivers at its Pittsburgh facility. Connelly ranked fifth in seniority and was the only woman. In 2007, allegedly because Connelly had ended a romance with a co-worker (Nogy), her male co-workers began “curs[ing] ... and belittl[ing] her." Connelly notified supervisors. Lane suspended Nogy for three days but did not discipline or warn any other employees, who continued to harass Connelly. In 2009, Connelly learned about the company’s “Ethics Line,” which she called multiple times to report further harassment and make complaints about her male co-workers drinking on the job. In 2010, a Lane foreman made an unwanted physical advance to Connelly, which she reported to the Ethics Line and to her supervisor. In October 2010, a Lane supervisor became “incensed” at Connelly when she refused to drive a truck that had a flat tire and steering problems. Soon after, Connelly was laid off before the end of the construction season and before any other union truck driver. She was never recalled her to work. Lane did recall male truck drivers in 2011 and continues to employ them. The Third Circuit vacated dismissal of Connelly’s suit, which alleged disparate treatment, sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 2000e, finding her claims plausible. View "Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Metrocare and others, alleging various federal and state law claims. The district court dismissed plaintiff's Texas Health & Safety Code claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and granted summary judgment for defendants on all other claims. The court concluded that plaintiff has failed to offer sufficient evidence that Metrocare’s articulated reason for firing him is a pretext for discrimination and therefore the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Metrocare on plaintiff's claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.; Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.; and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's procedural due process claim because he received an adequate name-clearing hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Miller v. Metrocare Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination suit against the Commission. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commission and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that most of plaintiff's various retaliation claims are unsupported by the record and are without merit. In regard to the claims that merit further discussion, the court concluded that plaintiff's mere assignment of janitorial duties, without further description or detail about what those duties actually were, does not state a materially adverse action; plaintiff produced no evidence to show that the delay in her evaluation or the failure to grant her 4% step increase - accompanied by a right of appeal that she did not exercise - constituted a materially adverse action; and the denial of a reassignment was not, as a matter of law, an adverse action. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Commission with respect to these retaliation claims. In regard to plaintiff's retaliatory termination claim, the court concluded that - based on the record before the court indicating that the Commission discharged some employees for excessive force, but not others - the mixed record constitutes substantial evidence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff’s discharge would have occurred “but for” exercising her protected rights. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the Commission on this issue. The court vacated as to the retaliatory termination claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Wheat v. Florida Parish Juvenile Justice Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against TNI, alleging that TNI discriminated against her on the basis of race, terminated her in retaliation for her complaints, and violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681. Plaintiff also filed suit against a fellow truck driver, James Paris, for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim and in analyzing plaintiff's sexual harassment claim by not considering all that had occurred during the 34 hour rest period in Pharr, Texas; the record contains genuine issues of material fact about all that happened on the trip and whether plaintiff subjectively perceived Paris' actions as offensive; and the district court erred in finding that plaintiff did not report Paris' conduct to TNI in a timely manner. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's sex discrimination claims under Title VII and Arkansas' civil rights statute because genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether plaintiff subjectively felt abused by Paris, that TNI was aware of his conduct, and that TNI failed to take appropriate action. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Nichols v. Tri-National Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791 et seq., alleging that the District: (1) unlawfully refused to accommodate her disability, and (2) retaliated against her for requesting an accommodation by terminating her employment. The district court granted summary judgment to the District. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment against plaintiff's refusal-to-accommodate claim because she was not a qualified individual. The court also concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment against plaintiff's retaliation claim because she did not proffer any evidence proving that the actual reason for her termination was retaliatory. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Minter v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s late father was formerly employed as a mechanic by the City of Boston. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit on behalf of her father’s estate, alleging that the City and her father’s supervisors discriminated against her father on the basis of race and retaliated against him by terminating his employment. Plaintiff’s federal claims appeared to arise under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint, concluding that Plaintiff had not pled facts sufficient to support her section 1983 claim and had failed to timely exhaust the administrative prerequisites necessary to bring suit on her section 1981 claim. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the dismissal of the section 1983 claim, holding that this claim was properly dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); but (2) reversed the dismissal of the section 1981 claim, holding that the district court erred by imposing an administrative exhaustion requirement where none exists. View "Buntin v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

Tate filed suit pro se, claiming that his former employer, which provides non‐emergency medical transportation, discriminated against him and then having retaliated against him for complaining about the discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; 42 U.S.C. 12101 (Americans with Disabilities Act). The court dismissed, without allowing amendment, citing 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which requires dismissal of a complaint seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis if it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” The judge stated that Tate’s complaint contained “little more than conclusory legal jargon.’” The Seventh Circuit reversed. The plaintiff was not required to plead more elaborately, except with regard to his claim of disability discrimination. Tate used a complaint form supplied by the district court. The form does not require, nor permit, extensive factual detail; it provides six lines for listing facts. Plaintiff’s only seriously deficient allegation concerns the disability, which is not named or otherwise identified. The court dismissed the suit before expiration of the 21‐day period during which a plaintiff may file an amended complaint without the court’s approval. The judge should not only have complied with the rule; he should have told the plaintiff what is required to allege disability discrimination. View "Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was employed as an engineer and paramedic for the City of Clinton fire department, requested light-duty assignments when she became pregnant. The fire chief denied Plaintiff’s request, determining that she was not entitled to light duty under the city administrative policy because she did not have a disabling injury that occurred on the job. When Plaintiff’s pregnancy had advanced, she took a leave of absence by using accrued vacation and sick leave time. Once she exhausted the vacation and sick leave, her leave of absence was unpaid. After Plaintiff gave birth, she brought a lawsuit against the City of Clinton and three of its employees, alleging pregnancy discrimination under Iowa Code 216.6(2) and violations of her equal protection and due process rights under the Iowa Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the Court’s test for the evaluation of pregnancy discrimination claims is hereby adapted in this opinion; and (2) the material facts of this case do not support equal protection and due process claims under the Iowa Constitution. Remanded for consideration of the statutory civil rights claim under the new standard. View "McQuistion v. City of Clinton" on Justia Law

Willis worked as a Neonatal Nurse Practitioner at Children’s from August 1993 until her termination in January 2012. From 2001 until 2011, Willis served as co-lead NNP. Lamouree, the nurse manager for the newborn intensive care unit was Willis’s supervisor. Lamouree’s supervisors were Valenta and Hupp. Starting in August 2011, Children’s issued Willis disciplinary warnings for three distinct incidents, all involving communications Willis was 61 years old at the time of her termination. After the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission closed Willis’s case, Willis sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, stating that Willis was unable to provide specifics to establish that this other employee was in fact not disciplined, and if so, any reason why she was not disciplined. In the pretext context, this type of second-hand, general rumor regarding a single substantially younger employee is insufficient as a matter of law to show pretext. While evidence demonstrating that a single member of a non-protected group received more favorable treatment can be relevant, “[a] decision adversely affecting an older employee does not become a discriminatory decision merely because one younger employee is treated differently.” View "Willis v. Childrens Hosp. of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Shawron Lounds appealed a district court's order granting summary judgment to her former employer Lincare, Inc. on her claims of a hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Lounds began working at that office as a customer-service representative in September 2011. She is African-American and, throughout the duration of her employment with Lincare, was the Wichita office’s only African-American employee. The record reflects Lounds recounting specific discussions with her co-workers and direct supervisors that Lounds alleged were racially and culturally insensitive, to the extent that she felt "bombarded" by them. Lounds notified her human resources department. Twenty days after she sent notice of her grievances to HR, she was disciplined for "excessive absenteeism." Lounds believed the discipline was in retaliation for her complaints regarding her co-workers. She would ultimately be fired a little over a year after she was hired. Lincare cited absenteeism as its grounds for termination. After the close of discovery and a full round of briefing, the district court granted summary judgment to Lincare. The court first determined that no reasonable jury could have found the alleged race-based harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive to sustain a hostile work environment claim under section 1981. It then opined, concerning the retaliation claim that “the alleged retaliatory actions against [Ms. Lounds] either were not ‘materially adverse’ or were not caused by [her] protected activity.” The Tenth Circuit reversed in part, finding Lounds carried her burden on summary judgment to create a jury question relating to whether the alleged harassment was sufficiently pervasive or severe. Further, the Court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Lincare on the hostile work environment claim. The Court concluded the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Lincare on the retaliation issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lounds v. Lincare" on Justia Law