Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Higgins and the Union filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Missouri law against the District, alleging violations of the United States and Missouri Constitutions and state law. The district court dismissed the federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and declined to exercise jurisdiction as to the state law claims. The court concluded that the Union does not have standing in this case to pursue its claims on behalf of its members. In regard to Higgins, the court concluded that Higgins failed to state an equal protection claim where the District explicitly reserved the right to award the contract at issue in its best interest, and to select a bidder other than the lowest. The court also concluded that Higgins failed to state a claim for deprivation of due process where, under Missouri law, an unsuccessful bidder obtains no property right in the award of a construction contract, and Higgins failed to state a violation of the First Amendment where it does not provide any plausible account of how the District interfered with Higgins's ability to associate with the Union or with its employees who are members of the Union. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Higgins Electric, Inc. v. O'Fallon Fire Protection Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985 against the City, code inspector Peterson, and chief code inspector Denker, and various other defendants, alleging federal and state constitutional violations, and that defendants conspired to deter her from seeking judicial relief from their conduct and to deprive her of equal protection of the law and equal privileges and immunities under the law. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that plaintiff's allegations of sexual harassment against Peterson failed to state a claim of municipal liability under section 1983; plaintiff failed to state a claim with respect to the alleged actions of Denker and the unidentified Jane and John Does - either in connection with her sexual harassment claim against Petersen or as an independent claim that these defendants violated her federally protected rights; and plaintiff failed to state a claim independent of Petersen’s alleged sexual harassment. Because plaintiff’s complaint contained no facts showing that Denker or any unnamed City employee violated her constitutional rights, the court did not reach whether Denker, as chief code inspector, was a policymaking official or whether his role in the alleged conduct permits an inference that the City adopted a policy targeting plaintiff. Further, plaintiff failed to allege a conspiracy under section 1985 because the City could not conspire with itself through its agents acting within the scope of their employment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kelly v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Laul Deng (“Aker”) sued his former employer, Norton Healthcare, Inc., for racial discrimination in terminating his employment. Specifically, Aker alleged that Norton’s failure to reinstate him after termination of his employment was retaliation for filing a pro se discrimination complaint. The trial court granted Norton summary judgment on all of Aker’s claims. Despite acknowledging that Aker never applied for any position with Norton, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the futile-gesture doctrine excused the requirement that Aker show that he applied for a position in order to establish a prima facie claim for employment discrimination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in invoking the futile-doctrine theory sua sponte; and (2) the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Norton as a matter of law. View "Norton Healthcare, Inc. v. Deng" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that she was terminated by her former employer, the Hospital, based on racial discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted summary judgment to the Hospital. The court concluded that, by providing evidence that similarly situated non-black nurses were treated more favorably, plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding her termination, which ought to be resolved by a jury. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wheeler v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp." on Justia Law

In 2010, plaintiff started work at defendant’s Murfreesboro plant and was informed about the company’s sexual harassment policy. Plaintiff observed Leonard “come up behind” another man, “grab[] him in the butt,” and then sniff his finger. Twice, Leonard came up behind plaintiff and touched him inappropriately; both times plaintiff warned him. A month later, Leonard came up behind him again, “grabbed [him] by [the] hips and started hunching on [him]” so that Leonard’s “privates” were “up against [Plaintiff’s] tail.” Plaintiff confronted Leonard, then reported the incident. Although there had been other incidents, Leonard was suspended for two days and given a form, stating, “No contact with any employees that would be interpreted as sexual harassment.” Plaintiff did not return to work. He suffered anxiety attacks. His short-term disability insurance ran out. Plaintiff’s licensed clinical social worker diagnosed him with post-traumatic stress disorder. Leonard was fired after he admitted in a deposition that he had “mooned” or touched other men in the workplace. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging sexual harassment, wrongful termination, and retaliation under the Tennessee Human Rights Act and hostile work environment and constructive discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2. The court granted partial summary judgment, rejecting the retaliation and constructive discharge claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict and award of $300,000 on his Title VII claim. View "Smith v. Rock-Tenn Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former police officer, filed suit after he was terminated without notice or a hearing, alleging that the councilmembers’ actions violated state law and denied him constitutional due process. The district court dismissed the suit. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claims for lack of jurisdiction because he stated a claim for relief under a federal statute and the claim was not frivolous. The court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim because Texas Government Code Section 614.023 is analogous to the charter provision in Henderson v. Sotelo. Both laws require some action to be taken before termination of employment can occur, but no property right is created by that requirement. The court further concluded that plaintiff's claims against the City and the mayor in his individual and official capacity were properly dismissed. Finally, the court reversed the district court's denial of leave to amend, remanding for an explanation of the district court's exercise of discretion. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Stem v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were family child care providers who were considered public employees for purposes of the statute authorizing employees in public service to organize for collective bargaining. A majority of the class of such providers as Appellants chose Service Employees International Union, Local 509 as their exclusive agent for bargaining collectively with the Department of Early Education and Care. No provider was required to become a Union member or to contribute money to the Union for any purpose. Appellants declined to join the Union. Appellants subsequently brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging the statutory scheme that authorizes the selection of an exclusive bargaining agent to “agree on terms that affect their relationships with their clients and the government.” The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit affirmed based on established precedent, holding that Appellants were free from enforced association with the Union. View "D'Agostino v. Baker" on Justia Law

In November 2010, Board of Education Chief Area Officer Coates sent Bordelon , the long-tenured principal of the Kozminski Academy, notice of a pre‐discipline hearing based on insubordination in failing to respond to a parent issue; failing to arrange a requested meeting regarding the arrest of Kozminski students; and failing to respond to Coates’s email. Bordelon received a five‐day suspension without pay, which he never served. In December 2010, Coates evaluated Bordelon as needing improvement, noting that Kozminski was on academic probation for a second year with test scores trending downward. Coates reassigned Bordelon to home with full pay pending an investigation into improperly replacing asbestos‐containing tile at Kozminski; purchasing irregularities; and tampering with school computers in a manner that impeded Board access to Kozminski’s records. In early 2011, Kozminski's Local School Council voted to not renew Bordelon’s contract. Bordelon, age 63, believed that Coates, exercised undue influence over the decision, based his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Board, stating that that Bordelon did not prove discrimination and that there was substantial evidence of independent reasons for not renewing Bordelon’s contract, making it unlikely that Coates influenced the Board. View "Bordelon v. Bd of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The 1983 Shakman Accord resulted from resolution of political patronage litigation; to eliminate political considerations in employment decisions the city agreed to create and implement a hiring plan to effectuate the goal of eradicating political patronage. Shakman “adds speech and political affiliation to the list” of impermissible bases of employment discrimination delineated by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Eight applicants for the position of police officer with the Chicago Police Department, disqualified from consideration, sued the city, claiming violations of the city’s 2011 Hiring Plan, violation of the Shakman Accord, and equal protection violations under the Illinois Constitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals of the Shakman claims, which were filed beyond the 180-day time limit and were, therefore, barred by the statute of limitations.. View "Bonnstetter v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Deets, a white construction worker, worked for MTA on a federally assisted project to build a bridge (the Stan Musial Veteran’s Memorial Bridge) across the Mississippi River. MTA’s collective bargaining agreement defined seniority for purposes of layoffs and recalls. The Missouri Department of Transportation’s contract with MTA contained federally mandated goals for participation by minorities (14.7%) and women (6.9%) on the project. Deets claimed racial discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2, and 42 U.S.C. 1981, asserting that he was laid off because management was concerned about meeting minority participation goals. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendants, finding material disputes concerning the basis for the layoff: statements to Deets about “minority numbers” and the immediate hiring of a replacement. View "Deets v. Massman Constr. Co." on Justia Law