Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, CSL, alleging violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), Mo. Rev. 213.055, 213.070. The district court granted CSL's motion for summary judgment. In regard to the sex discrimination claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding the credibility of his written warnings, and plaintiff's version of the events immediately preceding his firing fails to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the credibility of CSL’s stated basis for terminating his employment. Because plaintiff admitted that he failed to comply with CSL’s policies, no genuine issue of material fact remained with respect to the credibility of CSL’s assertion that plaintiff’s failure was the basis for the termination of his employment. Because plaintiff failed to show how he and a female employee engaged in similar conduct, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether CSL treated plaintiff less favorably than similarly situated female employees. Further, no genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether CSL treated plaintiff unfavorably relative to similarly situated employees; without facts connecting the comment at issue, made by one of Denn’s peers, to CSL’s decision to fire Denn, the statement does not give rise to a genuine issue of material fact regarding Denn’s discrimination claim; and the fact that other male employees were disciplined was insufficient to render summary judgment improper. In regard to the retaliation claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to point to any evidence showing that his discrimination complaint was a “contributing factor” to any adverse action taken by CSL. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Denn v. CSL Plasma" on Justia Law

Dr. Liu, an Asian woman, began working at Stroger Hospital in 1984. Liu says that, beginning in 2003, her supervisors sent a disproportionate number of her cases to review committees as compared to white male colleagues. In 2004, Liu treated a 19-year-old with appendicitis non-operatively and the patient suffered a heart attack, resulting in a clash between Liu and administration regarding her preference for non-operative treatment. After several incidents involving her refusal to conform to policy and to treat appendicitis surgically, her supervisor suspended Liu’s surgical privileges and limited her to “low complexity” cases. The Peer Review Committee investigated several cases and recommended that the suspension continue until Liu completed counseling, “with the goals of gaining insight into her problems, accepting responsibility.” The Executive Medical Staff concurred. in 2010, Liu was terminated because, during the proceedings, she accessed patient records to try to support her position, violating HIPAA and the Hospital System Privacy Policy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Liu’s claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) & 2000e-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Liu presented only sparse evidence of animus based on her race, sex, and national origin, none of it linked to the challenged decisions, and did not create a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the stated reasons for discipline were honest. View "Liu v. Cook County, Ill." on Justia Law

In 2012, Pierce began working as a Zoetis sales representative. Pierce had several unpleasant encounters with her supervisor, Heuchert, and others. Pierce complained about Heuchert’ to Human Resources, which she alleges, prompted retaliation. Zoetis’ human resources director initiated an investigation, after which all sales representatives were notified that their sales quotas were being adjusted. Pierce alleges that her quotas were adjusted upward more substantially than those of other employees. Pierce also attributes increased difficulty in receiving expense reimbursements to retaliation. In 2013, Pierce took time off for foot surgery. Around that same time, Human Resources informed Pierce that the investigation had concluded and that Heuchert would be disciplined. Pierce returned to work, but was fired three weeks later for failure to meet the increased sales goals. Pierce sued, alleging Indiana state-law claims of wrongful termination and tortious interference with a business relationship. The district court dismissed, citing Indiana’s employment at will doctrine and noting that Pierce failed to follow prerequisites for bringing suit under the Indiana Civil Rights Law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Most of the behavior Pierce identified in her complaint was taken within the scope of Heuchert’s duties as Pierce’s manager, and could not form the basis of a tortious interference claim. View "Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose when female corrections officer, Alice Hancock, filed a charge of discrimination with the Division against her employer, Geo, alleging that she had been subjected to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of state and federal employment laws. In this appeal, the Division and the EEOC challenged the district court's summary judgment rulings in favor of Geo. The court held that the EEOC and the Division sufficiently conciliated its class claims against Geo in this lawsuit in light of Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC; assuming that exhaustion requirements from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA), Ariz. Rev. Stat. 41-1481(A), apply in this case, the court held that the EEOC and the Division may maintain their claims on behalf of aggrieved employees provided that the employee has alleged at least one act of misconduct that occurred within 300 days prior to the date the first aggrieved employee, Alice Hancock, filed her charge against Geo; in an EEOC class action an aggrieved employee is not required to file a new charge of discrimination with the EEOC if her claim is already encompassed within the Reasonable Cause Determination or if the claim is “like or reasonably related” to the initial charge; and that aggrieved employee Sofia Hines has presented material issues of fact as to her hostile work environment claim. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order. View "Arizona ex rel. Horne v. The Geo Group" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against USPS for employment discrimination based on race and age, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 and 2000e-3, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of USPS and plaintiff appealed. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that USPS has waived any timeliness arguments with regard to the denial of the non-competitive transfer at issue. On the merits, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of reverse racial discrimination where another officer's better performance in an interview is unquestionably a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis to hire one candidate over another. The court also concluded that plaintiff has developed no independent age discrimination argument in either the district court or in this appeal supporting his ADEA claims. Furthermore, plaintiff's retaliation claim fails where, plaintiff failed to present any direct or circumstantial evidence that the filing of the EEO complaint was the cause of his direct supervisor's, Captain Williams, rejection of the doctor’s note. Alternatively, a reasonable jury could not find a causal connection between the filing of plaintiff's informal EEO complaint and the activity of Captain Williams, as plaintiff's proffered pattern does not support a reasonable inference of retaliatory intent. Finally, plaintiff's retaliation claim also fails under the indirect method of proof because plaintiff failed to proffer any employees who are similarly situated for comparison purposes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Formella v. Brennan" on Justia Law

Witham claims she was fired from her position as a Louisville hotel general manager because she sought workers’ compensation after sustaining injuries on the job during a confrontation with a non-guest visitor to the hotel lobby. The hotel claims it fired her because she engaged in a heated verbal exchange with that man, followed by a physical confrontation. Video footage of the incident validated the company’s version of what happened, including Witham’s taunting of the man and attempt to block his retreat. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the hotel. View "Witham v. Intown Suites Louisville NE" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a high school JROTC instructor, filed suit against the School Board and two school employees, alleging claims of retaliation under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733; 42 U.S.C. 1983; and state law. The court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's section 1983 and state law claims where plaintiff was not prejudiced because the suit was still in its infancy when defendants raised the time-bar defense. In this case, plaintiff had notice and opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss and he does not challenge the conclusion that his claims are time-barred. In regard to the FCA claim, plaintiff's primary theory of liability against the School Board is that the School Board's agents opposed plaintiff's protected actives and they used pretext to convince the Marine Corps to remove plaintiff from the school. Plaintiff also argued that the agents retaliated against him directly for engaging in protected activity, and that the School Board is liable for their conduct. The court concluded that plaintiff has pled enough facts to state a claim under this latter theory. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded as to the FCA claim. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Bias v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

After being terminated by Logansport when he was 61-years-old, plaintiff filed suit against the company under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The district court granted Logansport's motion for summary judgment. The ADEA defines “employer” as someone who has twenty or more employees for each working day, in each of twenty or more calendar weeks, in the calendar year of (or in the year preceding) the discriminatory act. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Logansport was not an "employer" under the ADEA because it did not have twenty or more employees. View "Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an independent lease truck driver for FMC Transport, filed suit against FMC Transport, alleging racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of FMC Transport. FMC Transport's accident review board had concluded that plaintiff's accident was preventable and the company later terminated him. Although plaintiff is a member of a protected class and he did suffer an adverse employment action, and even if he did meet FMC Transport's legitimate expectations, the court concluded that he failed to present evidence that supports an inference of discrimination. Further, plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework, because he has not shown that the circumstances of his termination gave rise to an inference of discrimination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Macklin v. FMC Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit after her termination against her former employers for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), and for other violations of state and federal law. The jury found in favor of plaintiff on certain state law claims and in favor of the employers on all other claims. The court concluded that the district court correctly applied a but-for causation standard to plaintiff's ADA claim; the court rejected plaintiff's claim that the district court erred in instructing the jury where the "prevents or significantly restricts" standard is too demanding under the ADA Amendments Act, Pub. L. No 110-325, section 5; even if the court assumes that the district court’s instruction was erroneous and that the error was plain, plaintiff has not shown that it affected her substantial rights; and the court rejected plaintiff's contention that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the “regarded as” prong of the definition of disability because she failed to show how she was prejudiced. Therefore, the court found no abuse of discretion and no serious prejudice to plaintiff that warrants vacating the verdict on her disability discrimination claims. Further, the court rejected plaintiff's challenge to the district court’s instruction on “record of” disability where she did not object to the instruction and on appeal did not explain how the omitted language applies to her case. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's challenges to the damages the jury awarded on her state law claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gentry v. East West Partners Club" on Justia Law