Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, employed as a juvenile detention officer, filed suit against the County, alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 12 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. Plaintiff also alleged that the County retaliated against her in violation of the ADA, Section 504, Arkansas law , and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The County terminated plaintiff's employment because she could not meet the job requirement of lifting 40 pounds. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claims of discrimination under the ADA and Section 504 because plaintiff was not a qualified individual where she could not perform the essential functions of her position with or without reasonable accommodation. Even if the court were to find that extending plaintiff's FMLA leave was a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, plaintiff failed to carry her burden of showing that she could perform the essential functions of her job with that accommodation. Likewise, the court agreed with the district court that the County was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's discrimination claim. The court further held that plaintiff failed to present a submissible case of retaliation under the ADA where plaintiff's request for additional time to obtain a new FMLA certification was not a reasonable accommodation, and therefore it was not protected activity. And because plaintiff still was unable to perform an essential function of her job at the end of her FMLA leave period, the County did not violate FMLA by terminating her after her FMLA expired. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Scruggs v. Pulaski County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wal-Mart, alleging disability discrimination, failure to continue to accommodate, retaliation, and harassment. After being diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, plaintiff was transferred to a new position at Wal-Mart. The district court granted summary judgment to Wal-Mart on all claims. Plaintiff has conceded that the new overnight cashier position is less physically strenuous than stocking, and her acceptance of that position was accompanied by a $.20/hour raise. The court concluded that, because plaintiff failed to show she suffered an underlying adverse employment action, she has not made out a prima facie case of discrimination, and she cannot prove her claim that Wal-Mart failed to accommodate her disability; with temporal proximity alone to support her argument for pretext, plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue for trial on her retaliation claim; in regard to her workplace harassment claim, plaintiff failed to identify any discriminatory statements made to her or any evidence sufficiently severe to affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment; and plaintiff failed to successfully establish that she faced a hostile work environment where plaintiff offers no examples or evidence of an increased workload beyond stating that she had four pallets to stock one night. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kelleher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Hill and Roberts applied for firefighter positions with the Chicago Fire Department in 1995, but were not hired because of their scores on a pre-employment examination. They joined a class of roughly 6,000 similarly-situated applicants who argued that the hiring process had an unjustified adverse impact on African-American applicants. In 2011, the court ordered the city to hire 111 class members who were denied employment based on examination scores and to provide compensation to others. The court specified a hiring process with strict deadlines. In October 2011, plaintiffs were notified that they would need to complete a physical abilities test, a drug screening, and a background check. By January 5, 2012, both successfully completed these requirements. On February 22-23, they were notified—allegedly for the first time—that they also needed to pass a medical screening and received offers of employment conditioned on medical screening. Both men complied with the city’s requests concerning identified medical conditions, but they were not hired. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued right-to-sue letters. Their complaint alleged discrimination against Roberts because of his bronchitis and against Hill because of his asthma and past problems with a hernia and kidney stones. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that plaintiffs did not adequately allege violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. View "Hill v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a discrimination and retaliation suit against his Employer, alleging illegal harassment, discrimination and retaliation. Employer filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it did not employ the minimum number of employees necessary to qualify as an “employer” under either the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to Employer’s motion for summary judgment, attaching a post-discovery sworn statement in support of his opposition. Employer requested that the district court strike the sworn statement. The district court granted Employer’s motions for summary judgment and to strike Employer’s sworn statement under the sham affidavit doctrine. The district court then sanctioned Plaintiff’s counsel for filing the sham affidavit after he received repeated warnings in earlier cases not to do so. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) striking Plaintiff’s sworn statement; (2) granting summary judgment to Employer on the basis that Plaintiff did not meet his burden of showing that Employer had enough employees to qualify as a covered employer under either the ADA or ADEA; and (3) ordering sanctions. View "Escribano-Reyes v. Prof’l HEPA Certificate Corp." on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against Farmers, contending that as a district manager for Farmers he had been wrongfully classified as an independent contractor rather than an employee, that he had been wrongfully terminated, and that Farmers had failed to pay wages due during and at the termination of his employment. Appellant asserted a common law claim, but did not assert a claim under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, 12940 et seq. While this case was pending, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in Harris v. City of Santa Monica. Harris held that where an employee supports a FEHA claim by establishing that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the adverse employment decision at issue, the employer may avoid liability for damages by establishing that it would have made the same decision without the wrongful motivation. However, other remedies might be available to a plaintiff, such as declaratory relief, injunctive relief and attorney fees. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in giving the Harris instructions in this case or in denying appellant alternative relief when the jury rejected his claim for damages. The court concluded, however, that appellant presented sufficient evidence to allow his wage claim to go to the jury. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for retrial. The court otherwise affirmed. View "Davis v. Farmers Ins. Exchange" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the District and two of its administrators, alleging that she had been wrongfully discharged under Washington law, that her First Amendment rights were infringed, that she was retaliated against for exercising such rights, and that she was entitled to recovery under a variety of other state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, her speech to the school and District administrators is made up of the complaints or concerns raised up the chain of command at plaintiff's workplace about her job that are generally not protected. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the scope of her duties, and the evidence indicates that her communication with District staff fell within her job duties. Further, plaintiff's speech to parents was within the scope of her duties and is not protected by the First Amendment. Therefore, plaintiff failed to meet her burden to show that the relevant speech was made in her capacity as a private citizen, and that the district court’s judgment with respect to plaintiff’s First Amendment claim was proper. The court must vacate the district court’s judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge under Washington law because an intervening authority has overruled the Washington state decision upon which the district court’s analysis was based. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court for consideration of the wrongful discharge claim in light of Rose v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co. However, because the court affirmed with respect to the federal claim, the district court should first consider whether to continue to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. View "Coomes v. Edmonds Sch. Dist. No. 15" on Justia Law

Boss, an African-American engineer for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from 2002 to 2011, sued HUD under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging workplace discrimination; retaliation for a prior EEOC discrimination complaint; and hostile work environment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Boss, first rejecting a challenge to the district court’s application of Local Rule 56.1, which requires a summary judgment movant to submit a statement of material facts consisting of enumerated, short, numbered paragraphs with specific references to the record. The court’s discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1 has been repeatedly upheld. Boss could not identify any fact that the court ignored that would have materially altered the Title VII analysis. The court noted that Boss’ arguments and evidence were impermissibly relied upon the conclusions of an ALJ who, in 2009, held a hearing on Boss’ 2007 EEOC complaint; the ALJ had no personal knowledge of this case. Boss failed to prove a materially adverse employment action. He was assigned tasks he did not prefer, but there was no evidence of comments meant to intimidate him, threaten him, or which would be so severe or persuasive as to alter his work environment. View "Boss v. Castro" on Justia Law

Boss, an African-American engineer for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from 2002 to 2011, sued HUD under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging workplace discrimination; retaliation for a prior EEOC discrimination complaint; and hostile work environment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Boss, first rejecting a challenge to the district court’s application of Local Rule 56.1, which requires a summary judgment movant to submit a statement of material facts consisting of enumerated, short, numbered paragraphs with specific references to the record. The court’s discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1 has been repeatedly upheld. Boss could not identify any fact that the court ignored that would have materially altered the Title VII analysis. The court noted that Boss’ arguments and evidence were impermissibly relied upon the conclusions of an ALJ who, in 2009, held a hearing on Boss’ 2007 EEOC complaint; the ALJ had no personal knowledge of this case. Boss failed to prove a materially adverse employment action. He was assigned tasks he did not prefer, but there was no evidence of comments meant to intimidate him, threaten him, or which would be so severe or persuasive as to alter his work environment. View "Boss v. Castro" on Justia Law

After she was denied tenure, Plaintiff, a former faculty member of Northern Kentucky University, filed suit, alleging violations of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act for discriminatory employment practices on the basis of her gender. The trial court granted summary judgment for the University, concluding that Plaintiff failed to raise a prima facie claim for gender discrimination because she could not prove she was qualified for tenure and she failed to present evidence that she was treated differently from similarly situated male comparators. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the court of appeals employed an erroneous standard for reviewing Plaintiff’s claim. View "Bd. of Regents of N. Ky. Univ. v. Weickgenannt" on Justia Law

Deborah Powell, the former women’s basketball coach at Asbury University, filed suit against the University, asserting claims of defamation, gender discrimination, and retaliation. The jury returned a verdict in the University’s favor on the defamation and discrimination claims but in Powell’s favor on the retaliation claim. The trial court awarded Powell damages and attorney's fees and costs. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a claim of unlawful employer retaliation under Ky. Rev. Stat. 344.280(1) does not require an underlying violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act; (2) there was sufficient evidence to find unlawful retaliation; (3) the admission of opinion testimony by a former employee of the university that Powell’s conduct had been “wholly innocent” was harmless; (4) the University was not entitled to an employment-at-will jury instruction; (5) the University was not entitled to a new trial for alleged defects in the jury’s damages verdict; and (6) the award of attorneys’ fees and costs was not unreasonable. View "Asbury University v. Powell" on Justia Law