Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an attorney who worked for the defendant Boston law firm, 2004-2008, complained to her superiors and, later, to the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, that she was being subjected to discriminatory treatment on the basis of her gender. After her 2007 demotion, on the advice of her attorney, the plaintiff searched the firm's document management system for items that might prove her assertions of discrimination. After these searches were made known to the firm's chairman, the plaintiff's employment was terminated "for cause." Her suit under G. L. 151B, 4 alleged gender discrimination, pregnancy discrimination, aiding and abetting discrimination, failure to investigate and remedy discrimination, and retaliation. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed dismissal of her claims, in part. Plaintiff presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that both her demotion and her termination were the result of unlawful discrimination, as well as evidence allowing an inference that both were the result of retaliation, so that summary judgment was inappropriate. An employee's accessing, copying, and forwarding of documents may, in certain limited circumstances, constitute "protected activity," but only where her actions are reasonable in the totality of the circumstances. View "Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C." on Justia Law

Robert Adair was a firefighter with the City of Muskogee, Oklahoma (the City) when he injured his back during a training exercise. As a result of his injury, Adair completed a functional-capacity evaluation that measured and limited his lifting capabilities. After two years on paid leave, Adair received a workers’ compensation award definitively stating that Adair’s lifting restrictions were permanent. The same month he received his award, Adair retired from the Muskogee Fire Department. Adair argued that his retirement was a constructive discharge: he claimed that the City forced him to choose between being fired and retiring, which, he contended, discriminated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), and retaliated against him for receiving a workers’ compensation award in violation of the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Act, Okla. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. "Unfortunately, in analyzing Adair’s discrimination claims, neither the parties nor the district court recognized the changes that Congress made to the ADA in enacting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA)." Notwithstanding this error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. "Even if the City regarded Adair as having an impairment, Adair cannot show that he was qualified to meet the physical demands required of firefighters or that the City could reasonably accommodate his lifting restrictions." View "Adair v. City of Muskogee" on Justia Law

Twenty-year-veteran Deputy Yahnke supported the Sheriff’s opponent in a 2006 election. The prior Sheriff had approved Yahnke’s request to work as the part-time Maple Park police chief. After the new Sheriff took office, Yahnke was injured while working as a Deputy Sheriff and began receiving disability benefits. The Sheriff advised Yahnke that his secondary employment was suspended until he could return to work in the Sheriff’s office. At a party, Yahnke openly discussed running for the Sheriff’s position in 2010. Based on the Sheriff’s inquiry, the Illinois Attorney General concluded that secondary employment presented a potential conflict of interest. The Sheriff initiated an investigation, which concluded that Yahnke continued to work for Maple Park while his secondary employment was suspended. The Sheriff notified Yahnke that he was seeking his removal for cause. After the Sheriff terminated Yahnke’s employment, Yahnke sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the due process claim but vacated on the political affiliation count. A process existed for Yahnke to challenge his termination: a hearing before the Merit Commission or a grievance followed by arbitration The finder of fact could conclude that the Sheriff rejected lesser sanctions in favor of termination because Yahnke expressed a desire to run against the Sheriff, which is enough to defeat summary judgment. View "Yahnke v. County of Kane" on Justia Law

Green complained to his employer, the U.S. Postal Service, that he was denied a promotion because he was black. His supervisors then accused him of the crime of intentionally delaying the mail. In a 2009 agreement, USPS agreed not to pursue criminal charges. Green agreed either to retire or to accept another position in a remote location. Green chose to retire. In 2010, 41 days after resigning and 96 days after signing the agreement, Green reported an unlawful constructive discharge to the EEOC under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act., 42 U.S.C. 2000e Green eventually filed suit, which was dismissed as untimely because he had not contacted EEOC within 45 days of the “matter alleged to be discriminatory.” The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated. Because part of the “matter alleged to be discriminatory” in a constructive-discharge claim is an employee’s resignation, the 45-day limitations period begins running after an employee resigns. Resignation is part of the “complete and present cause of action” in a constructive-discharge claim, which requires: discriminatory conduct such that a reasonable employee would have felt compelled to resign and actual resignation. Nothing in Title VII or the regulation suggests an exception to the rule. Starting the clock before a plaintiff can file suit would not further the limitations period’s goals and would negate Title VII’s remedial structure. View "Green v. Brennan" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed the district court's denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, or alternatively for a new trial under Rule 59, or relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) on plaintiff's New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) claim. Plaintiff, diagnosed with cancer, cross-appealed the dismissal of her New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) claim. Plaintiff and her husband cross-appealed the dismissal of their Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. 116(a), claims. The court held that, because plaintiff did not request a reasonable accommodation prior to her termination, the district court erred in denying defendants’ Rule 50 motion. Therefore, the court reversed that decision and vacated the jury award on the NYSHRL claim. However, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's NYCHRL claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denial of the COBRA claims on the merits. View "Vangas v. Montefiore Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Tang began working at Citizens' Boston Commercial Real Estate Group in 2007. After applying for a position as a portfolio manager in the Technology Banking Group, Tang interviewed with Nackley in 2010, who had arranged the interview at a restaurant that Tang characterized as a popular dating spot. During the interview, Tang alleges, Nackley focused on personal matters and topics not relevant to the transfer. Tang, who is Chinese, recalled that Nackley expressed his views that Asian women are obedient and mentioned live-in au pairs whom he had hired from Thailand. He told Tang that the au pairs did not wear sufficiently revealing swimsuits and offered to teach Tang to golf. Nackley asked whether Tang was married and enquired where she looked to find a boyfriend. Tang showed Nackley examples of her work. Nackley encouraged her to apply for a position as a senior portfolio manager. Tang got the position and alleges that similar incidents followed, that she reported Nackley to human resources, and that she was terminated in 2011. The district court rejected her sexual harassment and retaliation suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The First Circuit vacated, finding that Tang’s evidence was sufficient to survive summary judgment. View "Tang v. Citizens Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

CRST trucking company requires its drivers to graduate from its training program before becoming certified drivers. In 2005, new driver Starke filed an EEOC charge, alleging that she was sexually harassed by male trainers during her training (42 U.S.C. 2000e–5(b)).The Commission ultimately informed CRST that it had found reasonable cause to believe that CRST subjected Starke and “a class of employees and prospective employees to sexual harassment.” In 2007, having determined that conciliation had failed, the Commission filed suit. During discovery, the Commission identified over 250 allegedly aggrieved women. The district court dismissed, held that CRST was a prevailing party, and awarded the company over $4 million in fees. The Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of two claims and vacated the award. On remand, the Commission settled Starke’s claim and withdrew the other. The district court again awarded more than $4 million, finding that CRST had prevailed on more than 150 claims because of the Commission’s failure to satisfy pre-suit requirements. The Eighth Circuit reversed, stating that dismissal was not a ruling on the merits. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated. A favorable ruling on the merits is not a necessary predicate to find that a defendant is a prevailing party. A plaintiff seeks a material alteration in the legal relationship between the parties; a defendant seeks to prevent that alteration, and that objective is fulfilled whenever the plaintiff ’s challenge is rebuffed, irrespective of the precise reason for the decision. Title VII’s fee-shifting statute allows prevailing defendants to recover whenever the plaintiff ’s “claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.” Congress must have intended that a defendant could recover fees expended in such litigation when the case is resolved in the defendant’s favor, whether on the merits or not. View "CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n" on Justia Law

The City of Boston and other Massachusetts communities and state employers, in selecting police officers for promotion to the position of sergeant in 2005 and 2008, adapted a test developed by a Massachusetts state agency. The test was the result of an effort to eliminate the use of race and other improper considerations in decisions involving public employment. Some of the Black and Hispanic applicants who were not selected for promotion filed suit, claiming that the use of the test resulted in an unjustified “disparate impact” in violation of Title VII. The district court entered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the test was a valid selection tool and that Plaintiffs failed to prove that there was an alternative valid selection tool available that would have resulted in the promotion of a higher percentage of Black and Hispanic officers. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court applied correct legal standards and that the record contained sufficient support for the court’s findings. View "Lopez v. City of Lawrence, Massachusetts" on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought a civil enforcement action against three Papa John’s entities for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by denying a reasonable workplace accommodation to the appellant. Scott Bonn, and firing him for requesting this accommodation. Bonn moved to intervene, but the district court determined that Bonn’s claim was subject to arbitration under an agreement that Bonn’s mother had executed. Based on this determination, the district court denied the motion to intervene and ordered Bonn to arbitrate his claim. Bonn appealed the denial of his motion to intervene and the order compelling arbitration. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the arbitration agreement did not curtail Bonn’s unconditional statutory right to intervene. Accordingly, the Court reversed the denial of the motion to intervene. Furthermore, the Court concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the order compelling arbitration. "Although the district court ordered Mr. Bonn to arbitrate his claim, that order did not affect the EEOC’s claim against Papa John’s, which remains pending. Because that claim remains, the order compelling arbitration did not constitute a 'final decision,' which is necessary for appellate jurisdiction over an order compelling arbitration. Therefore, we dismiss this part of Mr. Bonn’s appeal." View "EEOC v. PJ Utah, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Brentwood after he was terminated, alleging race discrimination. A jury awarded plaintiff $1 in nominal damages. Plaintiff then sought equitable relief in the form of reinstatement and front pay. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that reinstatement was neither possible nor practical where the jury made no findings as to whether plaintiff had in fact violated the safety rules or whether his plant manager's trust concerns were genuine, and that plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence that he was entitled to front pay. View "Olivares v. Brentwood Indus." on Justia Law