Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought an employment discrimination suit against her former employers, alleging that she had been unlawfully terminated in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA). The district court granted partial summary judgment for Pierce on the issue of whether the employers were “integrated” for purposes of the FMLA. After an ensuing trial, the jury returned a verdict on both the FMLA and the ADAAA claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in granting partial summary judgment and finding as a matter of law that the employers were integrated for purposes of the FMLA; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on Plaintiff’s motions in limine; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. View "Pierce v. Landmark Mgmt. Group" on Justia Law

Since 1938, the City of Milwaukee has required its city employees to comply with a residency requirement. The residency requirement is set forth in section 5-02 of the City’s charter. In 2013, the Legislature enacted Wis. Stat. 66.0502, which bans residency requirements. Despite enactment of the statute, the City continued to enforce its residency requirement, claiming it had the authority to do so under the state Constitution’s home rule amendment. The Milwaukee Police Association sought relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the City can no longer enforce its residency requirement because section 66.0502 trumps section 5-02 of the City’s charter. With respect to Association’s section 1983 claim, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision not to award relief or damages, concluding that because section 66.0502 did not involve a matter of statewide concern and did not affect all local government units uniformly, it did not trump the City’s ordinance. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) section 66.0502 precludes the City from enforcing its residency requirement; and (2) the Police Association is not entitled to relief or damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 because the Association failed to meet the requirements necessary to prevail on a section 1983 claim. View "Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, DSU, alleging a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The district court granted DSU's motion fro summary judgment, concluding that plaintiff suffered no adverse employment action by being exposed to floor-stripping and waxing products while employed as a custodian at DSI. In this case, plaintiff asserts facts that allegedly contradict DSU's argument, but many of those facts are not supported by the record, support claims plaintiff did not appeal, or reference incidents of alleged adverse action that are barred by the statue of limitations. Other facts, such as plaintiff's insistence that she had in fact previously applied for office jobs at DSU, while disputed, would not affect the outcome of the suit and as such, are not material. Accordingly, there are no genuine disputes of material fact preventing the district court from granting summary judgment in favor of DSU. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Dick v. Dickinson State Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Deborah Moore appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendant The Regents of the University of California. Moore sued Defendant for claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the California Family Rights Act (CFRA). Moore began working in UCSD's Marketing and Communications Department (the Department) in 2008. In early September 2010, Moore was diagnosed with idiopathic cardiomyopathy. On or around September 10, 2010, Moore was prescribed and began wearing a heart monitor called a "LifeVest," a monitor and external defibrillator. Moore had to wear the "LifeVest" for two to three weeks. Moore testified that her relationship with the Department's new Executive Director, Kimberly Kennedy changed after Kennedy became aware of Moore's heart condition. Based on this perceived change, Moore believed that Kennedy did not like the fact that Moore had a heart condition. In approximately mid-November 2010, Kennedy demoted Moore, through a Department restructuring, to a new classification. Moore's new title became "Director of Marketing and Brand Management." Moore's salary did not change, but certain other benefits were reduced. On February 2, 2011, Kennedy sent an e-mail to Courtney Morris, a Director of Compensation and Benefits in the Human Resources Department, indicating that she wanted to eliminate Moore's position, effectively terminating Moore's employment, as of February 15, 2011. According to Kennedy, the job functions that Moore was performing had decreased to such a point that Kennedy could assume them, and therefore, Kennedy decided to eliminate Moore's position. Kennedy did not ask Moore if she would accept a pay reduction, nor did Kennedy consider Moore for a freelance position. There is no evidence that Kennedy offered Moore any of the positions that were filled around the time of, or after, her termination. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that summary judgment was improperly granted with respect to Moore's first, second, third, fifth and sixth causes of action. Summary adjudication in favor of Defendant was appropriate, however, with respect to Moore's fourth cause of action. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings in the trial court. View "Moore v. Regents of the University of Calif." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against J.B. Hunt, alleging that he was terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The district court dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that no statute requires that an ADA plaintiff exhaust the 49 C.F.R. 391.47 process before filing a lawsuit and thus the district court should not have dismissed this ADA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal on alternative grounds, concluding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of disability. At the time he was terminated, plaintiff was not certified under DOT medical standards; therefore, he was not qualified for his job under the ADA and summary judgment is appropriate. View "Williams v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

McCurdy, a Williamson County Sheriff’s Department patrol deputy, applied for a job with the Southern Illinois Enforcement Group, which investigates drug crimes. She was selected, subject to a background check. While that check was conducted, she remained in her deputy’s post. Agent Braddy, who conducted the check, recommended that she not be hired after discovering that McCurdy had recently filed for bankruptcy and was in a long-term relationship with Mohring, who belonged to a biker gang associated with criminal activity. The Group had previously hired a male who was in financial difficulty and had some criminal associates; he was fired for stealing drugs and money from the unit. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, McCurdy alleged that she would have been promoted immediately had she been a man and that the Group gave her more scrutiny than it does male applicants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting McCurdy’s hiring theory, but vacated with respect to her delay theory. Agent Braddy testified that she investigated McCurdy exactly the same way as she investigates other applicants. Employers are entitled to learn from their errors. Braddy’s findings constituted sex-neutral reasons for not hiring McCurdy. The district court did not resolve disputes concerning the delay theory. View "McCurdy v. Fitts" on Justia Law

After his employment with Scenera Research LLC ended, Robert Morris (Plaintiff) sued Scenera and its CEO (collectively, Defendants), alleging Defendants owed him $210,000 in bonuses and that he was fired in retaliation for threatening to bring a lawsuit. Defendants filed a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that Scenera owned all inventions Plaintiff developed during his employment and that Plaintiff was not entitled to bonuses for patent applications filed or patents issued after a certain date. The trial court court granted Defendants’ motion for a directed verdict with respect to the issue of patent ownership. The jury then awarded patent bonuses under the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act (WHA) and damages for violations of the North Carolina Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act (REDA). The trial court awarded attorneys’ fees and liquidated damages for patents that have already issued. The Court of Appeals largely affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court properly submitted to the jury the issue of whether Plaintiff was entitled to issuance bonuses and properly denied Defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (2) calculability of wages under the WHA is a question of fact to be submitted to the jury; (3) Plaintiff was not entitled to liquidated damages based on the WHA or treble damages based on REDA; and (4) Plaintiff may pursue rescission. View "Morris v. Scenera Research LLC" on Justia Law

Civil Beat requested the disciplinary records of twelve Honolulu Police Department (HPD) officers who were suspended for various types of misconduct. HPD denied the request in its entirety. Civil Beat then filed a complaint seeking an order directing HPD to disclose the information Civil Beat sought. The circuit court ruled in favor of Civil Beat, concluding that police officers have a “non-existent” privacy interest in their disciplinary suspension records. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment, holding that police officers have a significant privacy interest in their disciplinary suspension records, and disclosure of the records is appropriate when the public interest in access to the records outweighs this privacy interest. Remanded for a determination of whether the public interest outweighs the officers’ significant privacy interests. View "Peer News LLC v. City & County of Honolulu" on Justia Law

Maggie Petaja was terminated from her position with Lewis and Clark County when she was age fifty-nine. After unsuccessfully pursuing relief on the administrative level, Petaja, a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the Montana Public Employees’ Association (MPEA), filed a discrimination claim against the County. Petaja also filed suit against MPEA, alleging breach of the duty of fair representation. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the County on the discrimination claim and against MPEA on the breach of the duty of fair representation claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the jury verdict finding MPEA breached its duty of fair representation; (2) the jury verdict was not contrary to the instructions and law; and (3) the district court correctly found that it had no legal authority to award attorney fees. View "Petaja v. Mont. Pub. Employees’ Ass’n" on Justia Law

Eugene Butler brought this suit against the Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas, alleging that the University violated the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act (AWBA) upon terminating Appellant from his job as a police officer at the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff. The University filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that Butler’s complaint failed to state a cause of action that was not barred by sovereign immunity. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that the University was entitled to sovereign immunity because the complaint failed to state a factual basis for Butler’s claim under the AWBA. View "Johnson v. Butler" on Justia Law