Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After William Gault terminated plaintiff from her position as deputy clerk, plaintiff filed suit challenging her termination on First Amendment grounds. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that plaintiff occupied a confidential or policymaking position and was subject to termination for campaigning against her boss. The court reversed the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to Gault based on the Elrod-Branti exception, determining that it could not, as a matter of law, conclude that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of plaintiff's former position as a deputy clerk; Gault has not established the defense of qualified immunity; the court found unpersuasive Gault's contention that the Eleventh Amendment immunizes him from suit for monetary damages in his official capacity; and the history of this case does not present the court with an adequate Pickering record to review. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lawson v. Union County Clerk of Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against NYCHA, alleging that its decision not to hire her as a bricklayer was sex-based and thus violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL); and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). The district court granted summary judgment to NYCHA as to the Title VII and NYSHRL claims. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NYCHRL claim and dismissed it without prejudice. The court concluded that the district court erred when it failed to view plaintiff’s evidence as a whole and instead set aside each piece of evidence after deeming it insufficient to create a triable issue of fact that NYCHA’s refusal to hire her was based in part on the fact that she is female. In this case, plaintiff has proffered evidence that - when viewed as a whole - is sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that NYCHA’s decision not to hire her was more likely than not motivated in part by sex-based discrimination. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Walsh v. NYCHA" on Justia Law

Felix suffers from mental health disabilities, including PTSD, major depressive disorder, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and phobia. She takes prescribed medication and attends counseling. Felix was employed from 1998 to 2013 in the Appleton Division of Motor Vehicles customer service facility, administering road tests, performing clerical duties, and collecting fees. She “was punctual, reliable, friendly with customers, and patient with new drivers.” She excelled in administering road tests, but did not meet expectations in financial accountability. A 2011 rule change precluded an overall rating of satisfactory if the employee did not meet expectations in specified areas, including financial accountability. Felix was given an overall evaluation of unsatisfactory and was placed on probation. Her difficulties persisted. Her employer's procedures called for a final performance improvement plan which, if not completed successfully, would result in her discharge. Felix began to experience panic attacks and notified her supervisor of her anxiety disorders. One panic attack included hysterical screaming and self-harm. Her co-workers called 911. She did not return to work. An independent medical examiner concluded that she “remains at increased risk for potentially violent behavior toward self and others within the workplace.” Her employment was terminated. She sued under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Felix, reasoning that she was discharged not solely because of her disabilities but based on workplace behavior that indicated that she posed a safety risk to herself and others. View "Felix v. Wis. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Arab-American Muslim woman from Morocco, filed suit against Fairview, alleging claims, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1981, for race discrimination (Count I), hostile work environment (Count II), and retaliation (Count III); and pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) et seq., claims for discrimination based on religion, national origin, and pregnancy (Count IV), hostile work environment (Count V), and retaliation (Count VI). The district court granted summary judgment for Fairview on all six counts. In regard to the discrimination and retaliation counts, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to meet plaintiff's burden to show pretext. In this case, the evidence supports plaintiff's argument that when she complained to her supervisor, who was also her alleged harasser, the supervisor decided to terminate her and immediately got the decision approved. Furthermore, the absence of any evidence to support Fairview’s lack-of-work explanation is also important. Although Fairview claims that there were discussions of eliminating plaintiff's position in the past, there is no record evidence to support that claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated as to Counts III and VI. Likewise, the court reversed as to the remaining counts. By failing to address numerous comments that were open to a racially motivated interpretation, and by circumscribing its analysis to just one comment without reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the district court committed reversible error in its grant of summary judgment for Fairview. View "Guessous v. Fairview Property Investments" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former police officer for the town, filed suit against the town and several individual defendants, alleging that defendants violated his First Amendment rights when they terminated him for cooperating with an FBI investigation of public corruption. Plaintiff also asserted a claim under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h), alleging that he was fired in violation of the Act’s whistleblower protections. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing his First Amendment retaliation claims against all defendants and dismissing his FCA claims against the individual defendants. The town cross-appealed the denial of summary judgment with respect to the FCA claim against it. The court found that the district court erred in holding that plaintiff’s involvement in the FBI investigation was not entitled to First Amendment protection. Although the court held that plaintiff asserts a violation of his right of free speech, the court held that the right at issue was not “clearly established” at the time of his discharge. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the individual defendants on the basis of qualified immunity. However, the court reversed and vacated the grant of summary judgment for the town because plaintiff has demonstrated a viable claim of municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services. The court also dismissed the town's cross-appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the FCA claims against the individual defendants. View "Howell v. Town of Ball" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Town and Mayor Ragusa, alleging a claim of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court held that plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination where plaintiff has offered no evidence that the comparator, or any other employee, was retained despite performance concerns. To the extent that the Sixth Circuit’s requirement that the differences between a plaintiff and proffered comparators be relevant to the challenged employment action differs from the law in this circuit, about which the court expressed no opinion, plaintiff has not made the requisite showing. The court also concluded that to the extent plaintiff's claims are intended to support a failure-to-train or failure-to-promote cause of action, they are deemed abandoned. Plaintiff has failed to identify any Town employees that received training or promotions while plaintiff did not. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Morris v. Town of Independence" on Justia Law

Simpson, a registered nurse, began working at St. James Health in 2008 and was not reprimanded until after 2009 when Kelly, a Caucasian woman, became the manager of Simpson’s department. From October 2010 through September 2011 Kelly disciplined Simpson four times. The discipline was progressive. The fourth incident resulted in termination of Simpson’s employment. After the EEOC issued a right‐to‐sue letter, Simpson filed suit, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The employer claimed that she had not been performing up to expectations and could not identify a similarly situated co-worker who was treated more favorably, noting that Simpson was not disputing the existence of the complaints from patients and their families. The district court granted St. James summary judgment, reasoning that Simpson had established a prima facie case of discrimination under the indirect method, but lacked evidence that the explanation for firing her was pretextual. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Simpson did not even establish a prima facie case of discrimination, let alone that the proffered explanation was pretextual. View "Simpson v. Franciscan Alliance, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent, a former police officer with the Saint Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD), filed a complaint against SLMPD, the Saint Louis Board of Police Commissioners (Board), and related individuals, alleging that Defendants retaliated against her in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Respondent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in tendering Instruction No. 8 to the jury because the instruction confused the facts regarding Respondent’s disability claim and misdirected the jury about the Board’s legal authority to refuse Respondent’s disability pension application, and Defendants were prejudiced by the instruction’s submission. Remanded. View "Ross-Paige v. Saint Louis Metro. Police Dep’t" on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff was diagnosed with an eye disease. In 2010, Plaintiff’s contract with her employer expired and was not renewed. Plaintiff filed discrimination and retaliation claims against Defendants. The district court awarded summary judgment to Defendants, concluding (1) Plaintiff was not an Americans with Disabilities Act “qualified individual”; (2) Defendants’ denial of Plaintiff’s request for reasonable accommodations did not constitute discharge; and (3) Defendants’ decision not to rehire Plaintiff was for a non-discriminatory reason. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendants acted for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, and therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants failed. View "Velez-Ramirez v. Commonwealth of P.R." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, formerly employed at UICSM as a physician assistant, filed suit alleging violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601. The district court granted summary judgment to UICSM. The court noted that 29 C.F.R. 825.311(a) inarguably permitted UICMS to contact plaintiff to inquire about her "status and intent to return to work." The court concluded that UICMS was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's interference claim where plaintiff has not presented evidence that UICMS's requests for her to work from home when she had a broken foot were a condition of her employment nor that her compliance with them was anything but voluntary. The evidence does not permit a reasonable jury to find that UICMS interfered with plaintiff's right to FMLA leave. In regard to plaintiff's discrimination claim, the court concluded that the sequence of events alone does not give rise to a causal link between UICMS's alleged discriminatory motive and its decision not to renew plaintiff's contract strong enough to permit her to forgo the burden-shifting framework; applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the court concluded that UICMS has proffered plaintiff's tardy charting as a nondiscriminatory justification for deciding not to renew her contract; and plaintiff has not created a dispute as to pretext. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Massey-Diez v. UICMS" on Justia Law