Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was employed by Securitas, a security staffing company, and was placed as a receptionist at a company called Fidelity. Plaintiff filed suit against Securitas and Fidelity, alleging that they terminated her due to her age - she was 83-years-old. Plaintiff also alleged that Securitas terminated her in violation of Section 623(a) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621−34, and sought liquidated damages, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees. The court concluded that the district court erred as to the identity of the employer where Securitas has admitted that it was plaintiff's employer; there was some evidence which created a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Securitas should have known of discrimination by Fidelity and the court reversed the grant of summary judgment as to this issue; and, depending on the outcome of the district court’s re-evaluation of whether Securitas did enough once learning Fidelity wanted plaintiff removed, the district court should also consider whether that re-evaluation affects its earlier analysis of Securitas’s decision to terminate her. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Nicholson v. Securitas Security" on Justia Law

Brenda Puryear filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities on behalf of her minor daughter, Sarah, alleging that Echo Hose Ambulance and the city of Shelton had discriminated and retaliated against Sarah on the basis of her race and color in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Commission’s human rights referee struck the complaint on the ground that Sarah was not an employee under the “remuneration test” used to resolve similar federal causes of action. The trial court dismissed the Commission’s appeal, concluding that the referee properly applied the remuneration test. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Commission appealed, arguing that the Appellate Court erred in applying the federal remuneration test rather than Connecticut’s common-law “right to control” test to determine whether an unpaid volunteer is an “employee” under the CFEPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court did not err in concluding that the remuneration test is the appropriate test for determining whether a volunteer is an employee under CFEPA. View "Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an African American man, filed suit against his employer, John Deere, alleging race discrimination and harassment in employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965 (ICRA), Iowa Code 216.1 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to John Deere. The court concluded that, even if the court assumed that plaintiff ultimately suffered an adverse employment action, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any evidence that race was a motivating factor in John Deere's decision to discipline plaintiff. In this case, strong evidence supported John Deere's conclusion that plaintiff failed to follow instructions and ran scrap. Therefore, plaintiff's race discrimination claim failed. In regard to the race harassment/hostile work environment claim, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to John Deere in light of plaintiff's reliance on incompetent and inadmissible evidence. The unsworn and unattested statements purportedly from plaintiff’s co-workers and plaintiff’s related interrogatory answers do not meet the standards of FRCP 56(c)(4). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Banks v. John Deere & Co." on Justia Law

In 2006, Southern Illinois University (SIU) hired Dr. Hatcher as an assistant professor of political science. In 2010 Hatcher assisted a graduate student in making a sexual harassment complaint about a faculty member. Hatcher was up for tenure and promotion to associate professor in 2011. Hatcher had received positive annual evaluations. Her external reviewers all recommended tenure.The political science department voted in favor of promotion and tenure. The College of Liberal Arts committee voted 5‐4 in favor of tenure and 5‐4 against promotion, noting Hatcher’s success in teaching and service, but expressing concern about her lack of academic publications in prestigious journals. The dean recommended that she receive neither tenure nor promotion. The provost agreed. Hatcher was denied tenure and, later, fired. Two male professors in Hatcher’s department were promoted and awarded tenure. The Review Board found that the provost did not sufficiently explain his decision; the Chancellor agreed, but declined to reverse the denial. Hatcher filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Her subsequent suit was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Hatcher did not produce evidence from which a jury could conclude that SIU was lying about its reason for denying her tenure; she was not engaging in speech protected under Title VII or by the First Amendment when she assisted the student with the sexual harassment report. The court reversed dismissal of her claim of retaliation for filing a charge with the EEOC. View "Hatcher v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated from UPS, he filed suit alleging race discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to UPS. The court affirmed, concluding that the totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding of unlawful discrimination. Plaintiff has not put forth evidence to rebut UPS's contention that it fired him due to his conduct. The record shows that plaintiff cursed in the workplace, arguably threatened his supervisor, had multiple conflicts with other employees, and disagreed with company efforts to address the problems. Because plaintiff failed to present any evidence to establish that UPS's given reason for his termination was pretextual, the district court did not commit reversible error by concluding that plaintiff failed to show that a material question of fact remains as to pretext. View "Smith v. UPS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Mark Kilcrease was a commercial truck driver temporarily unable to work due to the effects of cancer. After his cancer went into remission, plaintiff applied for a truck-driving position with Domenico Transportation Company. Domenico rejected plaintiff's application, and he filed suit, alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted summary judgment to Domenico on both claims, and plaintiff appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on both claims. With respect to his discrimination claim, the Court agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to demonstrate he was a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA and therefore could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination. With respect to his retaliation claim, the Court concluded plaintiff could not show the requisite nexus between his ADA complaints and an adverse employment action. View "Kilcrease v. Domenico Transportation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former employee of the Transportation Security Administration, filed suit against David Johnson, the Supervisory Air Marshal in Charge at the Boston Field Office of the Federal Air Marshals Service where Plaintiff worked, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), alleging sex discrimination and sex harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed Johnson from the suit and subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of DHS. The Supreme Court reversed the entry of summary judgment, holding (1) the district court erred by requiring Plaintiff to present direct evidence to establish sex discrimination under the mixed-motives theory; (2) the district court erred by requiring Plaintiff to show that Johnson’s conduct was both severe and pervasive to establish sex harassment; and (3) there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in Plaintiff’s favor on both of her claims. Remanded. View "Burns v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 1994, Shott, a tenured associate professor of biostatistics at Rush University, sued, claiming discrimination by refusing to make reasonable accommodations for her religion (Orthodox Judaism) and disability (rheumatoid arthritis). A jury rejected Shott’s claim of religious discrimination but awarded her $60,000 for disability discrimination. She sued Rush again in 2011, alleging that Rush refused to increase her salary or promote her in retaliation for her earlier lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Rush. While that lawsuit was pending, Shott sued Katz (42 U.S.C. 1981), whom she had occasionally helped with statistical analysis, alleging that, in retaliation for her litigation Katz impeded her career advancement by rebuffing her invitations to collaborate. Katz was also Shott’s treating rheumatologist; she claimed he failed to timely respond to requests for prescription refills, requiring her to have an examination every six months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting that Shott had not alleged that Katz’s medical care affected Shott's employment. Nor did the examination requirement amount to a material adverse action. “If she was not willing to comply with that obviously reasonable condition, she should have tried to find a new doctor, not filed a federal civil rights lawsuit.” Shott failed to allege a sufficient “nexus” between Katz’s refusal to collaborate and her career advancement; Katz’s decisions about what research to pursue, and with whom, are protected by the First Amendment. View "Shott v. Katz" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated from his position as a police officer, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging retaliatory discharge in violation of the First Amendment based on the comments he made as a candidate for town council that were critical of his employer. The district court denied Police Chief Rob Hall qualified immunity. The court concluded, however, that Hall is entitled to qualified immunity because it was debatable at the time of plaintiff's dismissal that his speech interests as a citizen outweighed Hall’s interests as a public employer. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Brickey v. Hall" on Justia Law

In 2011 UJC private jet charter services hired Plaintiff as a co-pilot. After altercations between Plaintiff, a woman, and male pilots, which Plaintiff perceived to constitute sexual harassment, Plaintiff wrote an email to UJC management. About three weeks later, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. Plaintiff sued, alleging retaliation. Defendants’ answer stated that UJC had converted from a corporation to an LLC. Plaintiff did not amend her complaint. Defendants’ subsequent motions failed did not raise the issue of UJC’s identity. UJC’s CEO testified that he had received reports that Plaintiff had used her cell phone below 10,000 feet; that once Plaintiff became intoxicated and danced inappropriately at a bar while in Atlantic City for work; that Plaintiff had once dangerously performed a turning maneuver; and that Plaintiff had a habit of unnecessarily executing “max performance” climbs. There was testimony that UJC’s male pilots often engaged the same behavior. The jury awarded her $70,250.00 in compensatory and $100,000.00 in punitive damages. When Plaintiff attempted to collect on her judgment, she was told that the corporation was out of business without assets, but was offered a settlement of $125,000.00. The court entered a new judgment listing the LLC as the defendant, noting that UJC’s filings and witnesses substantially added to confusion regarding UJC’s corporate form and that the LLC defended the lawsuit as though it were the real party in interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating it was unlikely that UJC would have offered a generous settlement had it genuinely believed itself to be a victim of circumstance, or that it would be deprived of due process by an amendment to the judgment; the response indicated a litigation strategy based on “roll[ing] the dice at trial and then hid[ing] behind a change in corporate structure when it comes time to collect.” View "Braun v. Ultimate Jetcharters, LLC" on Justia Law