Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Nine employees of Western State Hospital (WSH) claimed that the hospital illegally took race into account when making staffing decisions in response to patients' race-based threats or demands. After a six-day bench trial, the trial court found that WSH managers issued a staffing directive that prevented African-American staff from working with a violent patient making threats over the course of one weekend in 2011. Despite this race-based staffing directive, the trial court entered a verdict for the State and dismissed Employees' employment discrimination claims. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State's racially discriminatory staffing directive violated the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). View "Blackburn v. Washington" on Justia Law

Hively began teaching as a part‐time adjunct professor at Ivy Tech in 2000. In 2013, she filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming that she had been “discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation” as she had been “blocked from fulltime [sic] employment without just cause.” After exhausting the procedural requirements in the EEOC, she filed suit, pro se, under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (Title VII). The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Title VII does not apply to claims of sexual orientation discrimination. The court relied on precedent, but acknowledged the EEOC’s criticism of its position and that “It seems unlikely that our society can continue to condone a legal structure in which employees can be fired, harassed, demeaned, singled out for undesirable tasks, paid lower wages, demoted, passed over for promotions, and otherwise discriminated against solely based on who they date, love, or marry.” View "Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, the Department, alleging racial discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, 12900 et seq. The trial court dismissed the complaint after sustaining a demurrer on the statute of limitations ground. The court agreed with plaintiff that the order sustaining the demurrer must be reversed because the complaint sufficiently alleges that the FEHA one-year limitations period was equitably tolled during the period of the EEOC investigation. Accordingly, the court reversed the dismissal and reinstated the first amended complaint. View "Mitchell v. Dept. of Public Health" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether one of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s special-purpose public corporations, the Puerto Rico Ports Authority (PRPA), is an arm of the Commonwealth that enjoys sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Daniel Grajales and his family alleged that PRPA subjected Daniel to political discrimination and unlawfully terminated his employment for reasons related to political discrimination and retaliation. After many procedural “twists and turns,” the district court granted PRPA’s motion to dismiss, concluding that PRPA was an arm of the Commonwealth and thus immune from suit under Eleventh Amendment immunity principles. The First Circuit reversed, holding that PRPA was not entitled to claim the Commonwealth’s immunity as an arm of the Commonwealth. Remanded. View "Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth." on Justia Law

Eugene Foster appeals from a district-court order granting summary judgment in favor of Mountain Coal Company, LLC (Mountain Coal) on his retaliation claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Foster injured his neck while working for Mountain Coal. Mountain Coal terminated Foster several months after the injury, citing that Foster “gave false information as to a credible Return To Work Slip.” After Mountain Coal terminated his employment, Foster filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Colorado Civil Rights Division. Ultimately, the EEOC issued Foster a right-to-sue notice; armed with the notice, Foster filed a complaint against Mountain Coal, seeking relief under the ADA and Colorado law. On the briefs, the district court entered summary judgment for Mountain Coal on Foster’s ADA and state-law discrimination claims and on Foster’s ADA retaliation claims. Foster appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court erred in granting Mountain Coal’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Foster’s ADA retaliation claims. "We conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Foster established a prima facie case of retaliation with respect to both his April 3 and April 11 purported requests for accommodation." The Court further concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Mountain Coal’s asserted basis for terminating Foster’s employment was pretext. Therefore the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Mountain Coal’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Foster’s ADA retaliation claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Foster v. Mountain Coal Company" on Justia Law

Elkhart Community Schools (ECS), has employed Riley, an African‐American female, as a teacher since 1980. She has an administrator’s license and is pursuing her doctorate in education. In 2010, she was named the ECS Teacher of the Year. From 2005-2013, Riley unsuccessfully applied for 12 different administrative positions with ECS. Riley filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge, claiming that race, sex, and age discrimination were the reasons that ECS had not promoted her. The EEOC sent Riley a right to sue letter. Riley filed suit, alleging race, sex, and age discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment for ECS on all counts, dismissing some claims on procedural grounds, and dismissing the remaining claims because Riley had failed to produce sufficient evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Of the positions for which action was not time-barred, one was given to an African-American woman; Riley did not apply for two; and one position was a lateral move so that Riley did not suffer an adverse employment action. Riley did not produce evidence of pretext with respect to other positions. ECS produced the list of factors that the screening committee considered in recommending candidates. View "Riley v. Elkhart Cmty. Schs." on Justia Law

Since 2004, Poullard, an African-American man, has worked at the North Chicago Veterans Affairs Medical Center as a training specialist. He received a promotion to the GS‐11 pay grade in 2006, but since then, has received neither a permanent promotion nor a raise. He filed suit, alleging that the refusal to promote him or increase his salary constituted discrimination based on sex and race and that he was subjected to unlawful retaliation and a hostile work environment based on the same lack of pay and recognition, and other incidents. The court rejected the claims on summary judgment, concluding that some claims were time‐barred based on Poullard's failure to timely exhaust administrative remedies under 29 C.F.R. 1614.105(a). On the timely claims, the court held that Poullard had not suffered an adverse employment action and that a reasonable jury could not find that the alleged harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile work environment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While it appears that Poullard may not have been managed well or fairly, three arguably race‐tinged remarks, even in combination with the pay disparity and a letter of admonishment, did not show that the alleged harassment was severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment. View "Poullard v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Siemens, her former employer, alleging unlawful discrimination based on race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. Plaintiff, an African American, was terminated as part of a reduction in force. The district court granted summary judgment to Siemens. The court concluded that the district court did not err by proceeding to the McDonnell Douglas analysis because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, does not show a genuine issue of material fact as to Siemens’ liability under a cat’s paw theory. Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the court concluded that there is no evidence in the record to support a finding of pretext as to the actual decisionmaker. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cherry v. Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of the School Board, filed suit alleging that she was sexually harassed by Timothy Graham, another board employee, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted the board’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the School Board is entitled to immunity under the Ellerth/Faragher defense. Therefore, the court reversed as to this issue. In this case, the district court erred in holding that the board’s efforts to prevent sexual harassment were reasonable as a matter of law. Plaintiff produced evidence that, if believed, would show that employees at the central office were not trained on sexual harassment, were not informed of the existence of a policy, were not shown where to find it, and were not told whom to contact regarding sexual harassment. The court concluded that this would be a sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find that the company did not take reasonable steps to prevent and remedy sexual harassment. The court also concluded that, because plaintiff did not show the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Graham was her supervisor in the third harassment period, the district court was correct to conclude that he was not; the court rejected plaintiff's argument that using different liability standards for the distinct periods of harassment would unduly confuse the jury; and, because plaintiff does not have any properly presented and preserved argument for why the board knew or should have known about the harassment, she cannot make out a prima facie case under the standard for coworker sexual harassment. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Pullen v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Puerto Rico Police Department law enforcement officer, filed a complaint alleging that Defendants, his superior officers, violated the Establishment Clause by holding a group prayer while on duty and punishing Plaintiff for his non-conformance. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint failed to allege plausibly a constitutional violation, and invoking qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion on both grounds. Appellants filed this interlocutory appeal to challenge the court’s denial of qualified immunity. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in rejecting Defendants’ qualified immunity defense. View "Marrero-Mendez v. Calixto-Rodriguez" on Justia Law