Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant appealed from a district court order granting summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees on his claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court erroneously held that he lacks RICO standing to sue for his lost earnings because those losses flowed from, or were derivative of, an antecedent personal injury.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that RICO’s civil-action provision, 18 U.S.C. Section 1964(c), authorizes a plaintiff to sue for injuries to “business or property.” While that language implies that a plaintiff cannot sue for personal injuries, that negative implication does not bar a plaintiff from suing for injuries to business or property simply because a personal injury was antecedent to those injuries. The court explained that it is simply wrong to suggest that the antecedent-personal-injury bar is necessary to ensure “genuine limitations” in Section 1964(c), or to give restrictive significance to Congress’s implicit intent to exclude some class of injuries by the phrase “business or property”’ when it enacted RICO. View "Horn v. Medical Marijuana, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's order entering summary judgment in favor of Defendant with respect to Plaintiff's assertion that he was wrongfully deprived of thousands of dollars in commissions he alleged he was due, holding that there was no error.After he resigned, Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant, his former employer, asserting claims for nonpayment of wages under the Act, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. Defendant successfully removed the action to federal district court, which granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in granting in part Defendant's motion to strike certain portions of his response to the summary judgment motion; and (2) did not err in granting summary judgment against Plaintiff on his claims. View "Klauber v. VMware, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that an employer's business entity agents can be held directly liable under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov. Code 12900 et seq., for employment discrimination in appropriate circumstances when the business entity agent has at least five employees and carries out activities regulated by FEHA on behalf of an employer.Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and an alleged class, brought this action alleging claims under the FEHA, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, unfair competition law, and the common law right of privacy. Plaintiffs named as a defendant U.S. Healthworks Medical Group (USHW), who was acting as an agent of Plaintiffs' prospective employers. The district court dismissed all claims, concluding, as relevant to this appeal, that the FEHA does not impose liability on the agents of a plaintiff's employer. The federal district court of appeals certified a question of law to the Supreme Court, which answered that FEHA permits a business entity acting as an agent of an employer to be held directly liable as an employer for employment discrimination, in violation of FEHA, when the business entity has at least five employees and carries out FEHA-regulated activities on behalf of an employer. View "Raines v. U.S. Healthworks Medical Group" on Justia Law

Nine female detention service officers sued Dallas County, alleging that this sex-based scheduling policy violates Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination. Constrained by our decades-old, atextual precedent, a panel upheld the dismissal of the officers’ complaint, ruling that the discriminatory scheduling policy did not amount to an “ultimate employment decision.”   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that a plaintiff plausibly alleges a disparate-treatment claim under Title VII if she pleads discrimination in hiring, firing, compensation, or the “terms, conditions, or privileges” of her employment. She need not also show an “ultimate employment decision,” a phrase that appears nowhere in the statute and that thwarts legitimate claims of workplace bias. Here, giving men full weekends off while denying the same to women—a scheduling policy that the County admits is sex-based—states a plausible claim of discrimination under Title VII. View "Hamilton v. Dallas County" on Justia Law

Hambrick, a black woman born in 1970, has worked at the Social Security Administration (SSA) for nearly 35 years. In 2016, her supervisor reassigned her. Hambrick remained a manager at the same pay scale and grade. Since her transfer, Hambrick alleges she has endured constant negative treatment from her supervisors and peers, amounting to harassment based on her age and race. Hambrick unsuccessfully applied for other roles. For one position, her supervisor hired a younger, white man, explaining that her collaborative skills needed work and her direct supervisor recommended her “with reservations.” Hambrick also complained of her heavy workload, and the quick rise of younger, non-black SSA employees and that her supervisors did not celebrate her lowering the backlog of cases. Hambrick filed Equal Employment Opportunity complaints that were resolved in the SSA’s favor.The district court determined that Hambrick had administratively exhausted the SSA’s failure to promote Hambrick; Hambrick’s lowered performance evaluation; and Hambrick’s non-selection to positions in 2021 as retaliation for her EEO complaints, then concluded that she failed to show unlawful discrimination. The court concluded that the “totality of undisputed facts … consisted of unremarkable workplace disagreements.” Hambrick’s “dissatisfaction with her supervisors, heavy workload, and lack of recognition,” did not create a hostile work environment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. None of the incidents that Hambrick challenged were severe or pervasive, nor does she show how they relate to the protected characteristics of her race or age. View "Hambrick v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Noncitizens can qualify for employment-based U.S. visas by investing in designated commercial enterprises that create jobs in the United States. After making a qualifying investment, a noncitizen must petition the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for the visa. In these two consolidated appeals, investors who have waited several years for USCIS to approve their petitions sue the agency for what they see as unreasonably delayed action in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The district courts in both cases granted USCIS’s motions to dismiss, holding that the investors’ allegations do not show USCIS’s delay to be unreasonable under the circumstances.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs do not state a claim of unreasonable delay. The availability-screened queue is a rule of reason, and the complaints do not allege that USCIS follows a process other than its officially stated policy. Ruling in favor of Plaintiffs would require USCIS to process Plaintiffs’ petitions ahead of those of other petitioners who have been waiting as long or longer for their EB-5 petitions to be adjudicated. Congress did not set a deadline for agency action, Plaintiffs allege primarily financial harm, and the allegations do not point to government impropriety. View "Adrian Da Costa v. Immigration Investor Program Office" on Justia Law

Plaintiff painted two large murals directly onto the walls inside a building on the campus of Defendant-Appellee Vermont Law School, Inc. The work stirred controversy, which eventually prompted the law school to erect a wall of acoustic panels around the murals to permanently conceal them from public view. Kerson brought suit against the law school, alleging that obscuring his work behind a permanent barrier violated his rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), which creates a cause of action for artists to prevent the modification and, in certain instances, destruction of works of visual art.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that merely ensconcing a work of art behind a barrier neither modifies nor destroys the work, as contemplated by VARA, and thus does not implicate VARA’s protections. The court explained that this case presents weighty concerns that pin an artist’s moral right to maintain the integrity of an artwork against a private entity’s control over the art in its possession. On the facts presented here, the court resolved this tension by hewing to the statutory text, which reflects Congress’s conscientious balancing of the competing interests at stake.  Because mere concealment of the Murals neither “modifies” nor “destroys” them, the Law School has not violated any of VARA’s prohibitions. As such, VARA does not entitle Plaintiff to an order directing the Law School to take the barrier down and continue to display the Murals. View "Kerson v. Vermont Law School, Inc." on Justia Law

The district court dismissed with prejudice a suit brought by Plaintiff against the Louisiana Twenty-First Judicial District and its former Chief Judge Robert Morrison, concluding that: (1) the Twenty-First Judicial District lacked the capacity to be sued; (2) McLin failed to plausibly allege that she was treated differently from anyone else; and, (3) Chief Judge Morrison was entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in dismissing her Section 1981 and Title VII claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff sought to meet the racial causation element with the comments made by Brumfield that her “hands are tied” as well as the Chief Judge’s tone and comment stating, “in today’s world that we live in, I have no other choice but to terminate you. You need to watch what you say and do.” The court wrote that these speculative allegations do not carry the day. Plaintiff issued the public statement “#IWillrunYouOver” in reference to driving her truck over peaceful protestors. Taking all the factual allegations as true, a more reasonable and obvious interpretation than the one put forth by Plaintiff is that her termination had to do with her public threat to run over people. While the district court erred in requiring Plaintiff to make allegations that satisfy the McDonnell Douglas standard, Plaintiff still failed to plead one ultimate element a plaintiff is required to plead: that the termination was taken against her because of her protected status. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not asserted plausible facts meeting the elements of this claim. View "McLin v. Twenty-First Judicial Dist" on Justia Law

While working an IT position at Enterprise Services LLC, Plaintiff said he was discriminated against because he has disability—an arthritic big toe. The company says the issues arose because Plaintiff didn’t work well with others, and actually, didn’t work much at all. Plaintiff says the issues arose because of his alleged disability. After he was fired, he brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act asserting that Enterprise Services discriminated against him because of his toe and retaliated against him for seeking toe-related accommodations. For the retaliation claim, the district court held that Enterprise Services’ only potentially retaliatory act was firing Plaintiff and allowed him to take that claim to trial. But Enterprise Services moved to strike Plaintiff’s jury-trial demand. The district court granted the motion. Following the bench trial, the district court entered judgment for Enterprise Services on the remaining claim because Plaintiff failed to prove he was fired because he asked for disability accommodations.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. First, while the district court did cite an outdated EEOC regulation when determining he is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, he is not disabled under any reasonable reading of the ADA. So that disposes of every claim except retaliation. Second, Burlington Northern makes clear that only “significant” harm to an employee constitutes retaliatory adverse action. And only his termination met that threshold. Third, a straightforward reading of Section 1981a(a)(2) shows that an ADA-retaliation plaintiff is not entitled to legal damages and, therefore not guaranteed a jury trial by the Seventh Amendment. View "Jeffrey Israelitt v. Enterprise Services LLC" on Justia Law

Cenikor Foundation brought an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court’s determination that collective action of its drug rehabilitation patients may proceed under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or “the Act”).  Cenikor argued that the district court applied the wrong legal standard to determine whether Cenikor’s patients were FLSA “employees.” Appellees argue that the district court properly applied binding Supreme Court precedent to the facts of this case in finding that the employment question may be decided on a collective-wide basis.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because the district court utilized Alamo in reaching its decision, it relied on the appropriate legal standard. Its threshold determination that the rehabilitation patients constitute “employees” under the Act because they worked in expectation of compensation was not an abuse of discretion. Further, the court wrote that the district court needed to consider the evidence relating to this threshold question in order to determine whether the economic-realities test could be applied on a collective basis. The court wrote that the district court properly did so based on ample evidence in the record from preliminary discovery. View "Klick v. Cenikor Foundation" on Justia Law