Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's partial grant of summary judgment to his former employer, Rockbestos, on his claims of hostile work environment and discriminatory discharge. The court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review so much of the district court's judgment as involves plaintiff's claim under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a‐60. In regard to plaintiff's discriminatory-discharge claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., the court concluded that, although the district court's explanation of why plaintiff was judicially estopped from asserting that he was qualified for his position was erroneous, the decision was nevertheless correct because plaintiff failed to proffer a sufficient explanation in light of the record why his assertion that he was qualified for his position was consistent with his earlier sworn statement to the SSA that he was “unable to work.” Therefore, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge on summary judgment under the ADA, Title VII, and the ADEA. Finally, the court held that to the extent plaintiff pleaded hostile-work-environment claims in his amended complaint, he has subsequently abandoned these claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and dismissed for want of appellate jurisdiction in regard to the CFEPA claim. View "Kovaco v. Rockbestos-Surprenant Cable Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, alleging that the company terminated his position and then refused to rehire him because of his age, in violation of federal and Minnesota law. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer where plaintiff has not presented a submissible case of age discrimination under Minnesota law. It follows that plaintiff’s claim under the more demanding federal standard fails as well. In this case, plaintiff is understandably frustrated that the employer deviated from written guidelines under which he likely would have been retained as a pharmacist. But plaintiff cannot prevail in this lawsuit by showing sloppy management or arbitrary decisionmaking. The company’s regular practice of ranking all pharmacists together and terminating those with the lowest score is not sufficient evidence of age discrimination to defeat summary judgment. The balance of the evidence does not establish a submissible case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Noreen v. PharMerica Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after the District of Columbia Lottery and Charitable Games Control Board terminated his employment, alleging in part that his termination violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process. At issue is the district court’s most recent dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint, as well as its denial of his motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that plaintiff has shown that his due process rights were violated and that this violation caused his alleged damages. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the District and, in part, its denial of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The court remanded to the district court to address whether the District can be held liable under section 1983 for this violation and, if it can, for a determination of the amount of damages to which defendant is entitled. View "Thompson v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the school district under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging, inter alia, that the non-renewal of her teaching contract was in retaliation for expressing her First Amendment support for a candidate for school superintendent. The district court granted summary judgment for the school district. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to show that her protected speech was the cause of her discharge. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to show that she was denied adequate pre-termination process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim and procedural due process claims in all respects. View "Dearman v. Stone Cnty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2011, city officials of West Valley City terminated Plaintiff Karen Bird from her position as manager of the city’s Animal Shelter. During the latter half of Plaintiff’s employment, the environment of the Animal Shelter was toxic. Plaintiff was one of the biggest contributors to this tumultuous environment. During the high point of what staffers at the shelter dubbed "the little war," the Salt Lake Tribune published an article about a cat that had survived two euthanization attempts in the Animal Shelter’s gas chamber. A reporter called a West Valley City official and informed the official that he (the reporter) had received an anonymous telephone call alleging that the shelter had ordered a mass execution of animals due to overpopulation. Other shelter managers were under the impression that Plaintiff, who was notoriously against using the gas chamber to euthanize animals and who was one of the few individuals privy to the meeting discussing the shelter’s overpopulation, was the source of these leaks. Around the same time as the anonymous phone call to the press, Plaintiff finally decided she "had enough" and filed the formal complaint that belied this lawsuit before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Tenth Circuit could not find that Plaintiff had been fired because of her gender, any hostile work environment she experienced, and West Valley City did not form any contract with her that mandated it would protect her from workplace violence or prevent her from being retaliated against. The Court did find, however, that the district court did not determine whether Plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material fact that this belief substantially motivated West Valley City officials’ decision to terminate Plaintiff. Nor did it determine whether the leaks to the press qualified as “constitutionally protected activity.” The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bird v. West Valley City" on Justia Law

After her employment was terminated, Employee filed sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and retaliation claims under federal and Puerto Rico law against her former employer (Employer) and its co-owners and administrator. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer on Employee’s federal claims and dismissed Employee’s remaining claims. The district court later awarded attorneys’ fees to the defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in holding Employee to the local rules’ ordinary page limits; (2) acted within its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees to the prevailing defendants; and (3) did not err in rejecting Employee’s motions to set aside the summary judgment order and the fees award. View "Fontanillas-Lopez v. Morel Bauza Cartagena & Dapena" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City for retaliation, alleging that he was terminated for planning to testify against the City in a lawsuit relating to age discrimination. Plaintiff alleged that his termination violated both the First Amendment and the retaliation provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623(d). The court rejected the City's argument that plaintiff's speech was not speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern and so fell outside the First Amendment's protections. In this case, plaintiff's sworn statement and imminent testimony were outside the scope of his ordinary job duties, which means that he was engaged in speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes. The court also concluded that the retaliation provision of the ADEA does not preclude a plaintiff such as the one in this case from bringing a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Given the substantial difference between the level of scrutiny afforded age discrimination equal protection claims and First Amendment retaliation claims, the court cannot assume that Congress intended the ADEA to affect the availability of section 1983 claims in the same manner in both subject areas. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stilwell v. City of Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against the Department, alleging a sexual harassment claim based on hostile work environment and a retaliation claim. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b). In support of her sexual harassment claim based on hostile work environment, plaintiff alleges seven incidents of harassment by two different men over a nearly three-year period. The court found as a matter of law that plaintiff's complaint failed to show harassment so severe or pervasive that they satisfy the high threshold for a sexual harassment claim based on hostile work environment. The court also found that plaintiff's purported "direct evidence" of retaliation fails as a matter of law for lack of causation where she failed to plausibly allege that the retaliation was a but-for cause of the Department's adverse action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blomker v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former police captain, filed suit against the City and city officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the City violated her constitutional right to due procedural process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by terminating her employment. The district court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion for summary judgment. The district court denied the defense of qualified immunity asserted by Chief Burton in response to plaintiff's procedural due process claim. Chief Burton appealed. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Chief Burton's role in the termination of plaintiff. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Bramblet v. City of Columbia, MO" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against HUD, alleging discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to HUD. Under Circuit precedent the action complained of must be “materially adverse” to support a discrimination claim. In this case, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the denial of plaintiff's requests for lateral transfers on the basis of race and/or national origin was not cognizable under Title VII because it did not constitute an adverse employment action. View "Ortiz-Diaz v. HUD" on Justia Law