Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Trigg seeking rescission of the settlement agreement in Suarez I based on Trigg’s fraudulent concealment of the prospects for sale of the company, and quantum meruit. Trigg filed a special motion to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, Civil Procedure section 425.16, asserting that plaintiff's claims arise out of communications that occurred during the course of Suarez I. The trial court dismissed the action without leave to amend. The court agreed with the trial court's finding that plaintiff's causes of action arose from litigation activities protected by the anti-SLAPP statute - the right of free speech - and that he failed to make a showing of likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Suarez v. Trigg Labs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff - a former police officer with the City of Quincy, Massachusetts - brought this action against the City, its chief of police, and a police captain, (collectively, Appellees), alleging, among other claims, that Appellees retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights by making statements to various news organizations regarding a dog ordinance issue. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to proffer sufficient facts to survive a motion for summary judgment on his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim; (2) Plaintiff’s Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim also failed at the summary judgment stage; and (3) Plaintiff’s defamation claim was properly subjected to summary judgment. View "McGunigle v. City of Quincy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the New Your State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law 290 et seq., alleging that she was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment. The district court dismissed the claims, holding that plaintiff's employer could not have engaged in retaliation because it could not be held responsible for the retaliatory animus of plaintiff's co-worker, a low-level employee with no decisionmaking authority. The court held, however, that an employee’s retaliatory intent may be imputed to an employer where, as alleged here, the employer’s own negligence gives effect to the employee’s retaliatory animus and causes the victim to suffer an adverse employment decision. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, DHE, alleging causes of action for disability discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Gov. Code, 12900 et seq., as well as wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Plaintiff alleged that, when DHE hired him to work as a truck driver in 2010, he told DHE he had a disabled son who required dialysis on a daily basis and he (plaintiff) was responsible for administering the dialysis. Plaintiff requested work schedule accommodations that his supervisor initially granted, permitting him to attend to his son in the evening. Plaintiff was terminated in 2013 when a new supervisor took over and fired plaintiff for refusing to work a shift that did not permit him to be home in time for his son's dialysis. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff’s motion to tax costs. The court reversed the judgment and the order denying the motion to tax costs, concluding that plaintiff has demonstrated triable issues of material fact on his causes of action for associational disability discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. View "Castro-Ramirez v. Dependable Highway Express" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a retired criminal investigator with the Cobb Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, filed suit against the county, alleging discrimination on the basis of sex after he learned that a less-experienced female in the office was earning a substantially higher salary for the same job. The district court granted summary judgment to the county. The court affirmed, concluding that the county is a legally separate and distinct entity that did not control the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship between the office of the District Attorney and its criminal investigators, nor did it act as a joint employer with the District Attorney. Because its role as paymaster is wholly insufficient to establish that the county was plaintiff's employer, he could not sue the county under the federal antidiscrimination laws. View "Peppers v. Cobb County" on Justia Law

Lane, an African-American, began working as a hospital security guard in 1999. He had an unblemished employment record until August 2012, when a 17‐year‐old male autistic patient started hitting and kicking his caregivers. Health care professionals, afraid to approach the patient or enter the room, summoned security. Lane responded and saw the patient kick a staff member in the back. Lane tried to restrain the patient, who tried to bite him and spit in Lane’s mouth. Lane slapped him in the face. The patient settled down. Lane filed reports explaining why he thought the slap was justified with the hospital and with the Sheriff’s Department, where he had status as a special deputy as a condition of his job. The recipients concluded he had shown poor judgment. The hospital’s director of human resources recommended that Lane’s employment be terminated. After a consultation with the Sheriff’s Department, the hospital told Lane that if he did not resign, he would be fired. He resigned. After exhausting EEOC remedies, Lane filed suit for race discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the hospital. Lane intentionally struck a patient; termination was a reasonable response. “Lane’s effort to put together a mosaic of circumstantial evidence of race discrimination” did “not hold together sufficiently to present a genuine issue of material fact.” View "Lane v. Riverview Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that she was terminated for exercising her First Amendment right to free speech when she spoke to local leaders about what she saw as a "scam" occurring in the police department. The district court held that the officials had not shown entitlement to summary judgment of qualified immunity because, accepting plaintiff's facts as true and drawing all permissible factual inferences in her favor, she had shown that they had violated her clearly established constitutional rights. The court concluded that, under plaintiff's version of the facts, there was no doubt that under the prevailing decisions, plaintiff's speech was not made "pursuant to" her official duties as a patrol officer. Therefore, defendants failed to show entitlement to fire plaintiff or entitlement to qualified immunity under her version of the facts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ricciuti v. Gyzenis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against against her employers (Defendants), alleging that she had been subject to a sexually hostile or offensive work environment. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, finding that Defendants were liable for $40,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. The superior court judge granted Defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in part, allowing the motion as to the award of punitive damages but denying it with respect to the award of compensatory damages. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the award of compensatory damages, reversed the judge’s order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the punitive damages award, and reinstated the jury’s verdict, holding that, based on the evidence, the jury could have found that Defendants failed to take adequate remedial measures after being put on notice of a sexually hostile or offensive work environment and that the failure was egregious or outrageous. Remanded for calculation of Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and consideration of Defendant’s motion for remittitur as to the punitive damages award. View "Gyulakian v. Lexus of Watertown, Inc." on Justia Law

Hillmann began working for the Chicago Parks District in 1973. Later he became a Department of Streets and Sanitation truck driver. In 1984 he developed cervical radiculopathy, a work-related injury. In 1995 he entered into an accommodation agreement with the city and was reassigned as chief timekeeper. He never performed all of the duties required by the job description, but he performed the essential functions and other tasks as directed by his supervisor. In 2000 a new supervisor gave Hillmann duties that required use of his injured arm.. Hillmann experienced various difficulties until his position was eliminated in 2002, in a city-wide reduction in forces. He sued, alleging that he was targeted because he asserted his rights under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. A jury found in Hillmann’s favor on the IWCA claim and awarded damages. The judge rejected the ADA claim. The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the city; neither claim should have been tried. To prevail on his claim that he was discharged for exercising his rights under the IWCA, Hillmann needed to prove causation. No evidence suggests that the RIF decision-maker knew about Hillmann’s claim. The ADA claim likewise fails for lack of proof of causation. Hillmann has no evidence that the city withheld raises or targeted him for the RIF based on his ADA accommodation. View "Hillmann v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former graduate student intern at the John A. Volpe National Transportation System Center, sought access to the Volpe Centers propriety data through a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) to continue her thesis, but the CRADA was never executed. Plaintiff brought an employment discrimination suit against the Secretary of Transportation, alleging that, by failing to execute the CRADA, the Secretary discriminated against her on the basis of her sex, race, or national origin. The district court granted summary judgment against Plaintiff on the CRADA claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that summary judgment was proper. View "Tyree v. Lahood" on Justia Law