Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Beginning in 1972, Dinslage was employed by the San Francisco Recreation and Parks Department. As part of a large-scale restructuring, Dinslage‘s employment classification was eliminated in 2010. He was one of many employees who were laid off. Although he applied to be rehired in a newly created classification, he was not offered a position. He then retired from city employment. Dinslage sued, alleging age discrimination, retaliation, and harassment in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). (Gov. Code 12940(a), (h), (j).) The defendants claimed, with supporting evidence, that their actions were taken for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Dinslage had refused to cooperate in the implementation of a new Department policy, moving away from separate recreational events for the disabled and toward inclusion in general events. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed rejection of Dinslage‘s age discrimination and retaliation claims. Dinslage‘s opposition to Department policies and practices he viewed as discriminating against disabled members of the general public is not protected activity because his opposition was not directed at an unlawful employment practice. View "Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former building commissioner of the city, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she was fired in retaliation for engaging in protected speech. The district court granted summary judgment to the city. The court concluded that the present record does not support a conclusion that the city is liable because a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. In this case, plaintiff maintains that the city is liable because her harm stemmed from an official municipal policy or an unofficial municipal custom. The court explained that plaintiff tangentially refers to other evidence of the custom that she claims victimized her, but the materials cited reveal only unsubstantiated suspicions. Because no reasonable jury could conclude that the evidence demonstrated a reasonable dispute about the presence of a continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct that led to her termination, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bolderson v. City of Wentzville" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a union employee, filed suit alleging that his employer discriminated against him on the basis of his race and/or national origin, and retaliated against him. At issue on appeal is whether the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which requires arbitration of disputes over discrimination, requires arbitration of statutory claims. The court concluded that the CBA’s arbitration requirement does not encompass statutory discrimination or retaliation claims with wording that is “clear and unmistakable.” Therefore, the court vacated the district court's grant of defendants' motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the complaint, remanding for further proceedings. View "Lawrence v. Sol G. Atlas Realty Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, Tennial, an African-American began working as the Business Manager of a UPS Packaging Center. His supervisors noted serious performance deficiencies at that facility over the next two years. Tennial contends that his performance was on par with Caucasian managers. After moving to a new position, Tennial’s deficiencies persisted. There was one incident in which over 200 packages were not sorted in a timely manner. He refused to step down. Tennial claims that an extremely hostile work environment ensued. As a result, Tennial requested and was granted leave for stress, depression, and anxiety under the Family Medical Leave Act. He missed UPS’s peak holiday season. When he returned to work, new supervisors noted numerous service failures. Tennial was placed on a Management Performance Improvement Plan and eventually demoted to a position that he currently holds. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, Tennial argued that the Plan and his subsequent demotion were motivated by race, age, and disability discrimination, and by retaliation for taking medical leave. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Caucasian managers identified by Tennial were not valid comparators; the reasons for his demotion were not pretextual. View "Tennial v. United Parcel Services, Inc." on Justia Law

For weekday shifts, Antioch Rescue (ARS) used paid EMTs through subcontracts with private ambulance companies. For evening and weekend shifts, ARS used unpaid volunteers. Volling began as an unpaid EMT in 2008. In 2010, she transitioned to paid shifts under ARS and Metro. Springer began working for ARS and Metro in 2009. In 2011, Volling filed charges with the EEOC, alleging sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation; she later filed suit, alleging violation of the Emergency Medical Services Act, including physical abuse of patients and on-duty alcohol and drug abuse. Volling’s report to the Illinois Department of Public Health resulted in fines and EMT license suspensions. Plaintiffs also spoke at public meetings. Springer filed a supporting declaration in Volling’s lawsuit and assisted in the investigation. ARS terminated its subcontract with Metro, replacing Metro with Kurtz. Kurtz immediately began hiring former Metro EMTs, without publicizing its vacancies. ARS instructed every former Metro EMT—except plaintiffs— on how to apply under the new contract. Kurtz asked ARS for the former Metro EMTs’ contact information. ARS and Kurtz rehired every other Metro EMT. Plaintiffs filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–3(a), and the Illinois Human Rights and the Illinois Whistleblower Acts. ARS settled with plaintiffs. The district court granted Kurtz’s motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to Title VII and IHRA. Plaintiffs adequately pled both an adverse employment action and a causal link between that action and their protected activity. View "Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that her former employer, Trinity Health, and former supervisors violated her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the North Dakota Human Rights Act, N.D. Cent. Code 14-02.4-03(1). The district court granted summary judgment against plaintiff, concluding that she failed to show she was capable of performing the essential functions of her position, and that Trinity did not have a duty to reassign plaintiff to an alternate position. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff produced evidence that she could have performed the essential functions of her position with reasonable accommodation. In this case, plaintiff's written notification that she would be unable to complete the basic life support certification without medical clearance, and her statement that she required four months of physical therapy before completing the certification, could readily have been understood to constitute a request for a reasonable accommodation of her condition. Consequently, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff made a request for an accommodation sufficient to trigger Trinity’s duty to engage in the interactive process of identifying a reasonable accommodation. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kowitz v. Trinity Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, Crete, alleging it violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., by requiring a medical examination and discriminating on the basis of a perceived disability. Crete required its truck drivers with Body Mass Indexes (BMIs) of 35 or greater to get medical examinations to determine whether they had obstructive sleep apnea. When Crete ordered plaintiff to undergo an examination because his BMI was over 35, he refused. The district court granted summary judgment to Crete. The court concluded that the district court property admitted an expert's testimony regarding obesity and obstructive sleep apnea; by the undisputed facts, the sleep study requirement is job-related because it deals with a condition that impairs drivers’ abilities to operate their vehicle; the requirement is also consistent with business necessity; the district court correctly granted Crete summary judgment on the medical-examination claim where Crete carried its burden of showing it defined the class reasonably; and the undisputed evidence shows that Crete suspended plaintiff for refusing to submit to a lawful medical examination, which does not violate the ADA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Parker v. Crete Carrier Corp." on Justia Law

Drew Bowers (Ward) sustained a traumatic brain injury in 1981. As a result of the injury, he required 24-hour care. His mother, Patricia Bowers Edwards (Guardian) was appointed guardian of her son's person and property in 2004. As guardian, she was responsible for hiring approximately ten caretakers for Drew in his private residence. Two of the ten caretakers contracted to provide services for Drew were domestic workers, Deborah Sizemore and Brad Garrett. In 2013, Sizemore filed a "charge of discrimination" pursuant to the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act, with the Attorney General's Office of Civil Rights Enforcement, claiming that her hours were dramatically reduced when she told the guardian she suffered from narcolepsy. Sizemore also claimed that she was sexually harassed at work by a male co-worker. She identified co-worker Garrett as a supporting witness in her complaint. The Guardian terminated the employment of both Sizemore and Garrett when she received the complaint from the Attorney General. The Guardian admitted she discharged Sizemore and Garrett from employment because the complaint was "the straw that broke the camel's back." Guardian moved for summary judgment arguing that Drew was the actual employer and that under section 1301 of the Act, a natural person did not meet the definition of "employer." Guardian further argued that under section 1302(B) of the Act, the prohibition of discriminatory practices did not apply to " . . .employment in the domestic service of the employer." The trial court denied Guardian's motion for summary judgment and Guardian brought this original action asserting immunity under the Act. Finding that indeed, Guardian was immune from suit under the Act, and that the trial court erred by not dismissing this case, the Supreme Court remanded the matter for the trial court to vacate its judgment and dismiss the case. View "Edwards v. Andrews" on Justia Law

Williams, an African-American began working for the Cook County Probation Department in 1995. In 2008, Williams reported an incident of racial intimidation. The co‐workers were counseled not to make such remarks again. In 2010, Williams reported that a supervisor was making phone calls about union matters. The supervisor was disciplined. In 2010, Williams was injured at work by a co‐worker, who yanked a door open while Williams was holding it, injuring her shoulder, and yelling, “report this too, b**ch?” She took a medical leave, filed a workers’ compensation claim, and received temporary total disability benefits. In December 2010, an independent medical evaluation determined she was capable of returning to work. No one noticed the report until June 2011. Human Resources asked her to return to work on August 2 and directed her to obtain releases, warning that failure to return to work would be considered an implied resignation. The county doctor approved her return to work, but noted that her personal physician stated that she was not able to return to work. The attorneys negotiating Williams’s disability benefits disputed the consequences of the disagreement. Williams was sent a termination letter on August 30, citing failure to communicate any intent to return to work, and the apparent expiration of her workers’ compensation benefits. The agreement ultimately reached concerning benefits listed Williams’s return to work date as September 6. Williams sued under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation and Whistleblower Acts, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, with breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, finding no disputes regarding material facts. View "Williams v. Office of the Chief Judge of Cook Cnty." on Justia Law

Kristina Hartley filed a gender discrimination action against Metropolitan Utilities District of Omaha (MUD) under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA), alleging that she was not promoted because of gender discrimination and that MUD’s stated reasons for promoting a male colleague instead of her were pretextual. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Hartley. The district court awarded Hartley $56,800 for attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in excluding post promotional performance evaluations of Hartley; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict; and (3) the attorney fees awarded to Hartley were not excessive. View "Hartley v. Metropolitan Utilities District of Omaha" on Justia Law