Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Puerto Rico’s Insurance Commissioner (Defendant), claiming that Defendant eliminated her job as a director within the Office of the Insurance Commissioner on account of her political affiliation. The district court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as Plaintiff’s federal discrimination claims for damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. In so holding, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that her qualified immunity defense entitled her to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal damages claim. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and remanded for further proceedings, holding that a reasonable official in Defendant’s position could have understood the First Amendment not to protect Plaintiff against politically motivated removal from her job. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Lopez-Erquicia v. Weyne-Roig" on Justia Law

Semmie John Guenther, Jr., filed an administrative charge with the EEOC, alleging that his former employer, Griffin Construction, discriminated against him on the basis of his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. When Guenther passed away while his charge was pending, the special administrator of his estate filed suit on his behalf when he received the EEOC right-to-sue letter. The district court dismissed the action based on Ark. Code Ann. 16-62-101(a)(1) and found the claim had abated. The court held that federal common law does not incorporate state law to determine whether an ADA claim for compensatory damages survives or abates upon the death of the aggrieved party. The court joined its sister circuits that have allowed the individual’s estate to bring and maintain a suit for compensatory damages under the ADA in place of the aggrieved party. Therefore, Guenther’s ADA claim for compensatory damages survived his death and Griffin Construction is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Guenther v. Griffin Construction Co." on Justia Law

Janna DeWitt appealed a district court’s order granting summary judgment to her former employer, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (SWBTC) on her claims of disability discrimination and failure to accommodate her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and retaliation in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). In 2009 and early 2010, DeWitt used FMLA leave intermittently for health issues related to her diabetes. DeWitt only took FMLA leave when vacation days were not available because DeWitt believed that SWBTC “frowned upon” employees taking FMLA leave. DwWitt's employment was terminated in 2010 when she allegedly hung up on two customers during a low blood sugar episode. DeWitt explained that she did not remember taking the calls due to a severe drop in her blood sugar. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that SWBTC was entitled to summary judgment because: (1) it advanced a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for taking adverse employment action against DeWitt (i.e., DeWitt’s hanging up on customers while on a Last Chance Agreement); and (2) DeWitt failed to demonstrate that SWBTC’s stated reason for its disciplinary action was pretextual. Finding that DeWitt failed to otherwise meet her burden to overcome summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "DeWitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone" on Justia Law

David, an African-American woman over the age of 40, was an employee of the City Colleges of Chicago (CCC) from 1980-2012. She announced in 2011 that she planned to retire in 2012. She then requested a change in title and an increase in salary because she was performing additional responsibilities related to the implementation of a software system; she was not awarded either. CCC characterized her additional responsibilities as “lateral,” not requiring a change in title. Giving David a raise a raise over a certain amount would have resulted in a fine by the State University Retirement System. Following her retirement, her responsibilities were performed by an Asian man under the age of 40, who was paid substantially more than David. David sued, alleging that she was denied a pay increase on the basis of her race, sex, and age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d). The district court granted CCC summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the record, assessed in its entirety, does not contain sufficient evidence to permit a verdict for David on any of the counts. David’s “comparator” employees performed functions she could not perform and her announcement of her intent to retire left CCC with little motivation to respond. View "David v. Board of Trustees of Community College District 508" on Justia Law

During an investigation into alleged misconduct at the Bay County jail, union president Gillis received complaints that the jail’s staff felt intimidated by management’s tactics. Gillis worked with Sergeant Walraven to draft a memorandum informing staff of their rights. The memo stated “I am in no way advising you not to cooperate with management, just advising you of your rights. It is your responsibility to ask for the representation.” Sheriff Miller summoned Gillis the day after Gillis posted the memorandum, asked who wrote it, and declared: “I can have you prosecuted for interfering with an ongoing investigation.” The investigation into Walraven began in January with an anonymous note, suggesting that administrators review security camera footage from shifts when Walraven was the supervisor. The footage showed officers playing cards, damaging jail property, conducting outside business, not monitoring security cameras, and other violations of department policy. Walraven was placed on administrative leave. His employment was terminated in April. An investigation into Gillis began in February. A former inmate alleged that Gillis engaged in a sexual relationship with her during her time in custody and under court supervision. Gillis ultimately admitted involvement and resigned. The district court rejected the officers’ First Amendment retaliation claims on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Regardless of whether the memorandum was protected speech on matters of public concern, plaintiffs’ speech interests were outweighed by defendants’ interest in obtaining compliance from the correctional officers with their investigation. View "Gillis v. Miller" on Justia Law

Firma Helget worked for the City of Hays, Kansas, as the administrative secretary for the Hays Police Department. In 2012, the City terminated Helget, and she initiated this 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the City, City Manager Toby Dougherty, and Police Chief Donald Scheibler, alleging they violated her First Amendment rights. Helget claims they terminated her in retaliation for her voluntarily providing an affidavit in support of a former police officer's wrongful-termination litigation against the City. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Helget's First Amendment retaliation claims, concluding the City's interest as a public employer outweighed Helget's interest in her speech regarding a former employee's litigation. The court also granted qualified immunity to Dougherty and Scheibler. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Helget v. City of Hays" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Matthew Vogt was employed as a police officer with the City of Hays. In late 2013, Vogt applied for a position with the City of Haysville's police department. During Haysville's hiring process, Vogt disclosed that he had kept a knife obtained in the course of his work as a Hays police officer. Notwithstanding this disclosure, Haysville conditionally offered Vogt the job only if he reported his acquisition of the knife and returned it to the Hays police department. Vogt satisfied the condition, reporting to the Hays police department that he had kept the knife. The Hays police chief ordered Vogt to submit a written report concerning his possession of the knife. Vogt complied, submitting a vague one sentence report. He then provided Hays with a two-week notice of resignation, intending to accept the new job with Haysville. In the meantime, the Hays police chief began an internal investigation into Vogt's possession of the knife, including requiring a more detailed statement to supplement the report. Vogt complied, and the Hays police used the additional statement to locate additional evidence. Based on Vogt's statements and the additional evidence, the Hays police chief asked the Kansas Bureau of Investigation to start a criminal investigation, supplying Vogt's statements and the additional evidence. The criminal investigation led the Haysville police department to withdraw its job offer. Vogt was ultimately charged in Kansas state court with two felony counts related to his possession of the knife. Following a probable cause hearing, the state district court determined that probable cause was lacking and dismissed the charges. This suit followed, with Vogt alleging his constitutional rights were violated because his statements were used: (1) to start an investigation leading to the discovery of additional evidence concerning the knife; (2) to initiate a criminal investigation; (3) to bring criminal charges; and (4) to support the prosecution during the probable cause hearing. Vogt argued that these uses of compelled statements violated his right against self-incrimination. Based on the alleged Fifth Amendment violation, Vogt also invoked 42 U.S.C. 1983, suing: (1) the City of Hays; (2) the City of Haysville; and (3) four police officers. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, reasoning that: the right against self-incrimination was only a trial right, and Vogt's statements were used in pretrial proceedings, not in a trial. The Tenth Circuit, after review, concluded: (1) the Fifth Amendment is violated when criminal defendants are compelled to incriminate themselves and the incriminating statement is used in a probable cause hearing; (2) the individual officers were entitled to qualified immunity; (3) the City of Haysville did not compel Vogt to incriminate himself; (4) Vogt stated a plausible claim for relief against the City of Hays. The Court therefore affirmed dismissal of claims against the four officers and Haysville, and reversed dismissal against the City of Hays. View "Vogt v. City of Hays" on Justia Law

After he was terminated, Employee sued Employer, alleging, inter alia, disability discrimination. After a trial, the jury trial returned a verdict in favor of Employee and awarded him, inter alia, $500,000 in statutory punitive damages. Employer moved to set aside the award of punitive damages. The trial court granted the motion, determining that Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-104 does not provide for an award of statutory punitive damages as a remedy for discriminatory practices under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 46a-104 does not authorize punitive damages in employment discrimination cases. View "Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Eight police officers, a police cadet, and a provisionally hired 911 operator (collectively, the Officers) alleged that they suffered adverse employment actions by the Boston Police Department as a result of a racially discriminatory hair drug test. The Officers advanced a “disparate impact claim” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court concluded that there was no actionable disparate impact. The first time on appeal, the First Circuit held that the Officers prevailed as a matter of law under the first prong of the three-prong disparate impact inquiry of that inquiry and remanded the case to the district court to consider the next two prongs. On remand, the district court again summary judgment for the Department. On appeal for the second time, the First Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Department on the third prong of the disparate impact inquiry, holding that a material dispute of fact existed preventing summary judgment on this matter. Remanded. View "Jones v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Hansen filed suit against his former employer, Defendant SkyWest Airlines, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. sections 2000e–2000e–17, for sex-based hostile work environment, disparate treatment, quid pro quo harassment, coworker harassment, retaliation, and for intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law. The district court granted summary judgment for SkyWest with respect to all of his claims. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded. The Court found that viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Tenth Circuit found that reasonable persons could differ with respect to Plaintiff's claims for sexual harassment, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. View "Hansen v. Skywest Airlines" on Justia Law