Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff filed an administrative complaint claiming disability discrimination by the Postal Service, the Postal Service and EEOC determined that her case was subsumed within a pending administrative class action. Plaintiff then filed suit against the Postmaster General. On remand, the magistrate judge subsequently determined that plaintiff's claim was properly subsumed within the class action and dismissed plaintiff's case for failure to exhaust. The court concluded that the district court properly determined that plaintiff's claims were subsumed within the McConnell v. Potter class action; the EEOC's notice of plaintiff's right to sue did not establish that she exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to the merits of her disability discrimination claims; the court rejected plaintiff's contention that the magistrate judge erred in dismissing her complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6); and, even if the magistrate judge had dismissed plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the dismissal would have been without prejudice and the court's review would remain unchanged. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ruiz v. Brennan" on Justia Law

Teresa Jones filed claims against Truman Arnold Companies (TAC) for negligent supervision, retention, and hiring of a store manager, claiming that she was a victim of sexual assault and harassment while employed by TAC and that she was exposed to this harm due to TAC’s negligence. TAC moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Jones’s sole remedy was through the Workers’ Compensation Act and that the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission had the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Act. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the Act did not provide coverage for Jones’s claims because her alleged injuries amounted to “mental injury or illness,” which is not compensable under workers’ compensation. The TAC subsequently filed a petition for writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the issue of jurisdiction resided exclusively with the Workers’ Compensation Commission because the facts, as presented in the complaint, could not be determined to fall outside the Act as a matter of law. View "Truman Arnold Cos. v. Miller County Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Patricia Adams filed claims against Truman Arnold Companies (TAC) for negligent supervision, retention, and hiring of a store manager, claiming that she was a victim of sexual assault and harassment while employed by TAC and that she was exposed to this harm due to TAC’s negligence. TAC moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Adams’s sole remedy was through the Workers’ Compensation Act and that the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission had the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Act. The circuit court denied TAC’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the allegations fell outside of the Commission’s jurisdiction. TAC then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to preclude the circuit court from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over Adams’s claims against TAC. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition, holding that the writ was warranted for the reasons stated in Truman Arnold Cos. v. Miller County Circuit Court, handed down this same date. View "Truman Arnold Cos. v. Miller County Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against her employer, alleging that she was discriminated against because of her sexual orientation and gender non-conformity, and retaliated against after she lodged a complaint with her employer's human resources department. The district court dismissed her pro se complaint. The court held that discrimination based on failure to conform to a gender stereotype was sex-based discrimination. In this case, a gender non-conformity claim was not "just another way to claim discrimination based on sexual orientation," but instead constituted a separate, distinct avenue for relief under Title VII. Therefore, the court vacated the portion of the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's gender non-conformity claim with prejudice and remanded with instructions to grant plaintiff leave to amend such claim. The court concluded that binding precedent, Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., foreclosed plaintiff's argument that she had stated a claim under Title VII by alleging that she endured workplace discrimination because of her sexual orientation. The Blum court held that discharge for homosexuality was not prohibited by Title VII. Therefore, the court affirmed the portion of the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's sexual orientation claim. Finally, the court considered any challenge to the district court's treatment of plaintiff's retaliation claim as waived. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that BNSF violated the Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20109, when it terminated his employment for harassing a co-worker and threatening a supervisor. The district court ultimately granted BNSF summary judgment on the merits and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's retaliation claim because he failed to submit evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to infer that his FRSA-protected activities were a contributing factor in BNSF's decision to discharge him for harassing and intimidating a co-worker. Because BNSF did not sufficiently develop its alternative waiver argument, did not raise a laches or estoppel defense in the district court or on appeal, and presented insufficient proof (if any) on these fact intensive issues, the court left these questions for another day. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gunderson v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law

In 2010, Renee Richardson-Powers (Powers) was hired to work at an office of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV). At the time she was hired, Powers did not disclose the existence of a traumatic brain injury she suffered when she was eight years old. Powers’s employment with the DMV was terminated later that year. Powers filed a grievance with regard to her termination. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found in favor of Powers, concluding that Powers demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the DMV breached its duty to provide her with a reasonable accommodation. The Human Rights Commission adopted the decision of the ALJ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Powers failed to meet the initial burden of demonstrating that she was a “qualified person with a disability.” View "West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles v. Richardson-Powers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a math professor at Southern University's New Orleans campus, filed suit against the University, alleging that plaintiff's supervisor engaged in a campaign of harassment that has continued through the filing of this lawsuit. Plaintiff sued the University under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the supervisor individually under section 1983. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment for defendants. Principally at issue on appeal was whether the continuing violation doctrine required consideration of a lengthier period of time in evaluating the merit of plaintiff's claims. Like the Tenth Circuit, the court expressly recognized that the court's post-National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan test for the continuing violation doctrine has long implicitly acknowledged: Morgan overruled the court's prior cases to the extent they held that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply when an employee was or should have been aware earlier of a duty to assert her rights. Therefore, the magistrate judge erred by using this factor to prevent plaintiff from showing a continuing violation that would enable her to support her harassment claim with conduct occurring more than 300 days before she filed her EEOC charge. The court further concluded that Morgan's disclaiming of an "on notice" inquiry should also apply to section 1983 hostile work environment claims; concluded that plaintiff has alleged a continuing course of conduct dating back to her return from leave in 2011; remanded for the magistrate judge to evaluate the full scope of the allegedly harassing conduct; and affirmed the dismissal of the Title VII retaliation claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Heath v. Southern University System" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were employed by Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc. when their employment was terminated as part of a reduction in force. The reduction in force affected more older employees than younger employees. Plaintiffs filed complaints with the Maine Human Rights Commission alleging age discrimination in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA). A Commission investor applied the “business necessity” framework to analyze Plaintiffs’ allegations before recommending that the Commission find reasonable grounds to believe that Shaw’s had impermissibly discriminated based on age pursuant to a disparate impact theory. The Commission voted unanimously to adopt the investigator’s analysis and recommendations. Plaintiffs then filed a complaint alleging unlawful employment discrimination based on age pursuant to the MHRA. The federal district court certified to the Supreme Court the question of what framework of proof applies to a claim of disparate impact age discrimination brought pursuant to the MHRA. The Supreme Court answered that a claim for disparate impact age discrimination pursuant to the MHRA is evaluated according to the “business necessity” standard, rather than the “reasonable factor other than age” standard or some other standard. View "Scamman v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated by his employers, he filed suit against them, alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for defendants on the ADA claim because plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reasons defendants gave for terminating him - a reduction in force - were pretextual. Because the pretext arguments plaintiff raised with respect to the ADA apply equally to the FMLA, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the FMLA claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Caldwell v. KHOU-TV" on Justia Law

McGreal began working as an Orland Park police officer in 2005. Conflict between McGreal and the department arose in 2009, which culminated in McGreal’s firing in 2010. McGreal alleges that he was fired because of his exercise of protected speech at a village board meeting on November 2, 2009, concerning a proposal to lay off as many as seven full‐time police officers. McGreal, the elected secretary of the local police union, allegedly presented three alternative solutions; he claims the defendants retaliated by accusing, interrogating, and ultimately firing him under the pretext of unsubstantiated violations of department policy. The defendants deny knowing that McGreal even attended the board meeting and claim that McGreal was legitimately fired because of misconduct, including an improper traffic stop; two unauthorized, unnecessary, dangerous high‐speed chases; McGreal’s behavior at and after an awards banquet; reckless driving while off-duty; and violation of a no-contact order during the ensuing investigation. The defendants allege that McGreal lied during questioning about each of those incidents. An arbitrator and a state court sustained McGreal’s termination. McGreal filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that McGreal offered no admissible evidence supporting his claims for relief. View "McGreal v. McCarthy" on Justia Law