Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Phillips worked at the MGM Detroit casino from 1999-2015. Beginning in 2001, she belonged to Local 7777, a UAW International affiliate. In 2002, she became the Local’s chairperson. Phillips, an African-American, claims that UAW employees Johnson and Kagels, created a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII and the Michigan Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. Phillips described “a smattering of offensive conduct” from 2012-2014, including an alleged statement that the “problem with the Union was that there are too many blacks” and speaking “in a condescending tone when dealing with black union members as compared to white members.” Phillips claims that, in a 2013 meeting, Johnson demanded to know the race of each grievant and then separated the grievances into piles based on whether they were filed by “white” or “black” union members and said he intended to withdraw the grievances filed by African-American union members. Johnson and Kagels denied all of the alleged misconduct. The district court dismissed the case. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that no matter who can be held liable for hostile work environment claims under Title VII, Phillips fails to create a genuine issue of material fact that she was subjected to one. View "Phillips v. UAW International" on Justia Law

Kent Duty filed suit against BNSF Railway Company (“BNSF”), after he applied to work there as a locomotive electrician. Duty had an impairment that limits his grip strength in his right hand. Fearing that Duty would fall from ladders, BNSF revoked his offer for employment. Duty and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “Commission”) sued BNSF for employment discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”). The ADA limits its protection by recognizing that not all impairments are disabilities. Applying the ADA’s definition of “disability,” the district court found that Kent Duty was not disabled and granted summary judgment to BNSF. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "EEOC v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a GM employee, filed suit against GM for interference and retaliation under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.; for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; and for violation of Texas law. The district court granted summary judgment for GM. The court concluded that the FMLA and accompanying regulations require employees to follow their employer's "usual and customary" procedures for requesting FMLA leave absent "unusual circumstances." In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that there were unusual circumstances arising from his condition that prevented him from complying with GM's call-in policy. Therefore, plaintiff failed to raise a fact issue for FMLA interference. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation where he has not shown how his disciplinary leave was caused by his attempts to seek protection under the FMLA instead of his failure to follow GM's attendance and absence approval process; plaintiff failed to demonstrate that GM denied him a reasonable accommodation under the ADA; and plaintiff's Texas law claim also failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Acker v. General Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Mexican-American in his mid-40's, filed suit against the Postal Service under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of his Title VII retaliation claim. Plaintiff claimed that the Postal Service suspended him for two days because he complained of workplace discrimination and harassment. In this case, because the order granting partial summary judgment was interlocutory, the district court should have analyzed the motion for reconsideration under Rule 54(b) instead of Rule 59(e), which applies to final judgments. The court concluded that the procedural error was harmless. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to state a claim for retaliation because his two-day suspension did not constitute a materially adverse action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cabral v. Brennan" on Justia Law

Appellant was employed by Appellees as a social worker when she suffered a work-related injury. Appellant sued Appellees, alleging that they failed to accommodate her disability in violation of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, concluding that Appellant did not qualify as a disabled individual under the ADA and that she was one responsible for the breakdown in communications concerning her accommodations. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly found that Appellees could not be held liable for their failure to accommodate because Appellant was responsible for the breakdown in communications. View "Ortiz-Martinez v. Fresenius Health Partners PR, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a 53-year-old garbage truck driver, filed suit against USA Waste, his employer of 32 years, alleging wrongful termination based on age discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for USA Waste. The court held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of USA Waste because plaintiff established a prima facie case under both his age discrimination and retaliation theories, and USA Waste failed to introduce any evidence that it had a legitimate reason for firing him. In this case, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub.L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, did not require proof of employment eligibility from plaintiff, and USA Waste could not make plaintiff's reinstatement contingent on verification of his immigration status because doing so would violate California public policy. Furthermore, plaintiff's use of an attorney was activity protected by California public policy, USA Waste fired plaintiff because he was represented by his attorney at the Settlement Agreement negotiations, and the district court erred by holding that USA Waste provided a legitimate reason for firing plaintiff. Therefore, the court concluded that USA Waste failed to meet its burden as to plaintiff's claim based on retaliation discrimination. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiff's oral request for leave to amend the complaint eight months after the filing deadline. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Santillan v. USA Waste of California" on Justia Law

Plaintiff bid on the position “mechanic trainee” at a mine owned by Eastern Associated Coal (Defendant). In July 2012, Plaintiff learned of Defendant’s decision not to hire him. He did not learn until January 2014, however, that the basis for the employment decision may have been his age. Plaintiff instituted a civil action in the circuit court, asserting that Defendant had committed age discrimination in violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act (HRA). Defendant moved to dismiss the civil action for failure to institute the suit within two years of the alleged discriminatory act underlying Plaintiff’s complaint. The circuit court certified two questions to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered (1) for discriminatory hiring causes of action filed pursuant to the HRA, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date that the plaintiff learns of the adverse employment decision; and (2) for discriminatory hiring causes of action filed pursuant to the HRA, the discovery rule does not toll the statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers the alleged discriminatory motive underlying the employment decision. View "Metz v. Eastern Associated Coal, LLC" on Justia Law

After Nicole LaPoint applied for a job with Family Orthodontics, the company’s owner, Dr. Angela Ross, offered LaPoint a job as an orthodontic assistant. When LaPoint told Dr. Ross that she was pregnant, Family Orthodontics rescinded its job offer. LaPoint sued the company for sex discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The district court entered judgment in favor of Family Orthodontics. The court of appeals reversed, ruling, as a matter of law, that Family Orthodontics had discriminated against LaPoint because of her pregnancy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) to the extent the court of appeals applied an incorrect legal standard to evaluate LaPoint’s claim, it erred; and (2) the district court’s findings were reasonably supported by the evidence, but it was unclear whether the district court would have made the same findings had it applied the correct law regarding animus. Remanded. View "LaPoint v. Family Orthodontics, P.A." on Justia Law

Hively, who is openly lesbian, began teaching as a part‐time adjunct professor at Ivy Tech in 2000. In 2013, she filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming that she had been discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation, having been blocked from full-time employment “without just cause.” After exhausting EEOC procedural requirements, she filed suit, pro se, under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (Title VII). The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed, holding that Title VII did not apply to claims of sexual orientation discrimination. On rehearing, the court reversed, interpreting the Act’s prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sex as including sexual orientation; “the essence of the claim is that the plaintiff would not be suffering the adverse action had his or her sex” been different. The court noted “the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s decisions, not only in the field of employment discrimination, but also in the area of broader discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.” View "Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was injured as a delivery driver for UPS and UPS failed to offer him another full time position that he was able to perform, plaintiff filed suit for disability discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to UPS. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded as a matter of law that plaintiff was not qualified to perform the essential job functions for the delivery driver position; however, the district court erred by determining as a matter of law that defendant was unable to perform the essential job functions of the feeder driver position; there was sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on his claim that he was qualified to perform the essential functions of the position; plaintiff presented evidence that UPS expected that feeder driver positions would become open in the near future; and thus defendant provided sufficient evidence to support his 2012 disability discrimination claim. In regard to the 2013 discrimination claim, plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence that he was qualified to perform the essential job functions of any available job; plaintiff failed to show that UPS failed to make a good faith effort to help him in seeking an accommodation; and thus summary judgment for UPS was appropriate as to this claim. Finally, the court concluded that defendant waived his 2013 accommodation claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Faidley v. United Parcel Service" on Justia Law