Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission found reasonable cause to believe that Chicago Police Department violated Title VII by harassing Officer Sommerfield based on his national origin, German, and religion, Jewish. Sommerfield alleged that his complaints led to retaliation. He filed another EEOC charge alleging retaliation. The agency again found reasonable cause. After years of litigation in his subsequent 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983 suit, a jury awarded Sommerfield $30,000, rejecting his retaliation claim. Sommerfield’s lawyer requested $1.5 million in attorney’s fees, which the district court reduced to $430,000. The attorney claimed to have worked 3,742 hours at an hourly rate of $395; the judge reduced the hours to 2,878 and the rate to $300, which yielded a lodestar of $863,000. The judge took into account the modest degree of success Sommerfield had achieved and halved the lodestar. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s decisions to grant partial summary judgment for the city by confining the discrimination counts to the question whether a fellow officer’s statements had created a hostile work environment; eliminating two counts for lack of any evidence that would permit a finding that Sommerfield’s injury resulted from an express policy, a widespread practice, or a policymaker’s final action; and restricting the retaliation claim period. View "Sommerfield v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Vidmar, Manney, and Gomez were discharged from the Milwaukee Police Department, for cause, by Police Chief Flynn. Their benefits and pay stopped immediately. They appealed their terminations to the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, which rejected their appeals. They were permanently discharged. The former officers claimed that their employment did not end when they were discharged by the chief because they were entitled to employment until the conclusion of their appeals. They alleged that they were denied constitutional due process and wages. The district court rejected their claims and granted judgment on the pleadings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under Wisconsin law, the former officers had no property interest in employment once they were discharged for cause by Chief Flynn. They were provided a full and adequate appellate process, and their discharges were upheld in accordance with Wisconsin law. They were not entitled to wages for the period of time between their discharge and the conclusion of their appeal under Wisconsin law as they were not employed during that time. View "Milwaukee Police Association v. Flynn" on Justia Law

This case involved claims brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) by a temporary employee whose assignment by a staffing agency to work as the receptionist for another business was terminated after she missed a significant amount of work while being tested for breast cancer and informed the agency that, due to her cancer, she needed to take a full week plus an additional unknown amount of time off for more tests, appointments, and radiation treatments. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the staffing agency and the business on both of these claims. The employee appealed that ruling, and finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Punt v. Kelly Services" on Justia Law

Genovese v. Gallo Wine Merchants, Inc., 628 A.2d 946 (Conn. 1993), which held that, under Con. Gen. Stat. 31-51bb, a factual determination made in a final and binding arbitration conducted pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement does not have a preclusive effect in a subsequent action claiming a constitutional or statutory violation, is still good law.Plaintiff brought the present action alleging that her termination was in retaliation for bringing a previous action against Defendant alleging sex discrimination and for engaging in protected speech. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the factual underpinnings of the claims had been decided against her by the board of mediation in arbitration proceedings. The trial court denied the motion, citing Genovese. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, thus declining Defendant’s invitation to overrule Genovese. View "Spiotti v. Wolcott" on Justia Law

This case involved claims brought against various state officials for damages related to public employment. Plaintiff was an Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commissioner. At issue in this interlocutory appeal were four counts alleging violation of due process and equal protection provisions of the Iowa Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on these claims finding that there are no private causes of action for violations of the Iowa Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on Counts VI and VII where (1) the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution is self-executing; (2) classic preempt doctrine does not apply to the question of whether a Bivens-type damage remedy is available through the Iowa Constitution; and (3) the different nature of the interests protected weighs in favor of allowing a Bivens-type claim to go forward against Defendants. View "Godfrey v. State" on Justia Law

In a suit for alleged age discrimination brought by plaintiff, James Robinson against his employer, the Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System (ULL), the Louisiana Supreme Court granted review of the district court’s judgment on a jury verdict finding that ULL discriminated against Robinson based on his age and awarded him damages. After reviewing the record of these proceedings, as to liability, the Supreme Court found no legal or manifest error in the jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff; thus, the Court affirmed the jury’s finding of age discrimination in favor of Robinson. However, as to damages, the Court found that the amount of the jury’s damage award of $367,918.00 was not supported by the record. Therefore, the Court amended the judgment in part and affirmed the jury’s damage award as amended herein. View "Robinson v. Bd. of Supervisors University of Louisiana System" on Justia Law

De Ritis became an Assistant Public Defender for Delaware County in 2005. After being promoted to the “trial team,” De Ritis was told, in 2012, that he would be transferred back to the juvenile court unit. De Ritis contends that others told him that he was transferred because De Ritis’s clients were not pleading guilty fast enough. De Ritis assumed the information was accurate. He informed judges, private attorneys, and his colleagues that he was “being punished” for “taking too many cases to trial.” De Ritis did not discuss the issue with his supervisor, Roger. Denied a transfer back to the trial team, De Ritis contacted the County Solicitor, who contacted Roger and was told that De Ritis “was not performing well.” Roger learned of De Ritis’s allegations and fired him. De Ritis brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the termination violated De Ritis’s First Amendment rights. The district court denied the Public Defender’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. The First Amendment does not protect the speech at issue: statements made while performing official job responsibilities, speculative comments about the reason for a perceived demotion, and recklessly false rumors circulated to government officials. View "De Ritis v. McGarrigle" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the union had violated the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) by failing to accommodate his disability, by discriminating against him based on his disability, and by retaliating against him for reporting his disability and seeking accommodation. The district court determined that the claims were preempted under section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) and section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and that the statute of limitations had expired on those federal claims. The Eighth Circuit held that, because plaintiff's state-law claims were not completely preempted by section 301(a) of the LMRA or section 9(a) of the NLRA, the district court lacked removal jurisdiction over this case. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Markham v. Wertin" on Justia Law

The passage of Assembly Bill 97, a massive reform package designed to streamline public education financing and decentralize education governance, did not abrogate the Ninth Circuit's decisions in which the panel held that California school districts and county offices of education (COEs) are "arms of the state" entitled to state sovereign immunity. Applying the factors set forth in Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College District, 861 F.2d 198, the panel held that school districts and COEs in California remain arms of the state and cannot face suit. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's lawsuit against the Orange County Department of Education where plaintiff alleged claims related to his termination with the Department. View "Sato v. Orange County Department of Education" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's employment claim alleging retaliatory termination. The court held that a reasonable jury could conclude that her protected action was the but-for cause of her termination. In this case, it was undisputed that plaintiff's letter complaining of unequal pay based on her sex was a protected act and that she suffered an adverse employment action. View "Donathan v. Oakley Grain, Inc." on Justia Law