Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2013 the Sheriff of Whitley County, Indiana hired the county’s first black police officer, McKinney. Nine months later, McKinney was fired. He sued for race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2. The district court granted summary judgment for the Sheriff. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, his extensive evidence adds up to a strong case of race discrimination. The Sheriff “has offered an ever-growing list of rationales for firing McKinney that fall apart in the face of his evidence.” The Sheriff’s termination letter provided three reasons for his discharge. Four days later, the Board of Commissioners sent McKinney another letter that added two more reasons. After McKinney brought suit, the defense added three more reasons. McKinney presented evidence that he was treated differently than his similarly situated colleagues who are not black. He also presented substantial evidence that the many rationales offered for firing him were baseless and pretextual. The district court erred by disregarding most of McKinney’s evidence, improperly discounting his testimony as “self-serving,” and misreading the circuit’s precedent on the “common actor” inference that is sometimes argued in discrimination cases. View "McKinney v. Sheriff's Office of Whitley County" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was raped by a co-worker at the Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC), she filed suit against the IDOC and others. The Ninth Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's Title VII hostile work environment claim. The panel held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the IDOC's actions were sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. The panel noted that if the jury finds that the IDOC supervisors created a hostile work environment, the IDOC would also be liable. View "Fuller v. Idaho Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Aram Bonni, a surgeon, sued St. Joseph Hospital of Orange (St. Joseph), Mission Hospital Regional Medical Center (Mission), and other defendants for, inter alia, retaliation under Health and Safety Code, section 1278.5 (the whistleblower statute). Plaintiff alleged defendants retaliated against him for his whistleblower complaints by summarily suspending his medical staff privileges and conducting hospital peer review proceedings. In response to plaintiff’s complaint, defendants filed a special motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute) to strike plaintiff’s retaliation cause of action, asserting his claim arose from the protected activity of hospital peer review proceedings. The court granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion as to both St. Joseph and Mission. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded plaintiff’s retaliation claim under the whistleblower statute arose from defendants’ alleged acts of retaliation against plaintiff because he complained about the robotic surgery facilities at the hospitals, and not from any written or oral statements made during the peer review process or otherwise. “Discrimination and retaliation claims are rarely, if ever, good candidates for the filing of an anti-SLAPP motion. This case is no exception.” Defendants’ motion to strike failed on prong one of the anti-SLAPP test (probability to prevail), and the Court reversed the order granting defendants’ motion on that basis. View "Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System" on Justia Law

Lake County had cash flow of $51 million in 2007. In 2009, it was operating at a deficit; by 2013 its general fund was more than $1 million in the red. The county’s self-insurance fund had a balance of $10 million in 2007; that balance was wiped out by 2013. The county offered retirement incentives to employees age 65 or older. Under one package, retirees were entitled to five years of supplemental health insurance (secondary to Medicare coverage) through Aetna and could return to work, part-time, as at-will employees. In 2013, Aetna informed the county that if retirees working as part-time employees remained on the plan, the plan would no longer qualify for special exemptions under federal law and the county’s costs would skyrocket. The county notified all rehired retirees who were covered by the Aetna supplement that their employment would end. Some sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Equal Protection Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the county. The key criterion that distinguished the terminated employees from other county employees was not their age but rather their participation in the Aetna plan. The county’s action was rationally related to a legitimate state interest: preserving supplemental insurance coverage for its retirees while avoiding further financial hardship. View "Carson v. Lake County" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ third amended complaint in this federal-sector employment discrimination case in which Plaintiffs invoked “extravagant” theories of liability. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged deprivations of their First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and sought damages under the Bivens doctrine, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of FBN, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). The complaint also proffered claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The district court dismissed the complaint and entered judgment in Defendants’ favor, ruling that Plaintiffs could not dodge the preclusive effect of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) and Title VII by “creatively” pleading causes of action. The First Circuit agreed with the district court, holding that Plaintiffs’ theories ran “headlong into an impenetrable barrier” forged by the CSRA and Title VII. View "Gonzalez v. Otero" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, alleging claims of discrimination and retaliation leading to wrongful termination. The Eighth Circuit rejected plaintiff's claim that the district court failed to consider her status as a pro se litigant; sovereign immunity barred plaintiff's claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 83; assuming that plaintiff met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of race and gender discrimination under Title VII, the university has offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her (failure to report for work and the need to fill her position); and plaintiff's claim of discrimination was rejected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Bunch v. University of AR Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the school district, alleging that the district and others violated his due process rights by declining to renew his coaching contract solely on the basis of parental complaints. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the due process claims. The court held that the 2013 amendment to Minnesota Statue 122A.33 did not grant plaintiff a property interest in the renewal of his coaching contract. View "McGuire v. Independent School District No. 833" on Justia Law

Alamo worked for the Chicago Fire Department. He alleges that in 2009, after a transfer, other firefighters began harassing him, calling him “spic” and “f--king Puerto Rican,” and stealing Alamo’s food. Alamo also alleges that the number of times he was assigned to work at different locations was excessive when compared to assignments given to non-Latino colleagues. His supervisor, Lieutenant Bliss, did not remedy the behavior. At one point, Alamo called 911 about a “chest bump” incident but did not press charges because of pressure from the Chief. The next day, Alamo experienced chest pain, dizziness, and a migraine. A physician diagnosed him with a work-related chest contusion, work-related stress, and possibly post-traumatic stress disorder and ordered medical leave. The Medical Section Chief stated the Department would not pay for treatment. After Alamo had been on medical leave for six months, he obtained written authorization to return to work without restrictions, but the Department required additional documentation. Alamo filed a charge with the EEOC. The Department continued to request additional records. Alamo filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and against Bliss, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of his hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation claims. The complaint describes an investigation into his fitness to work that was so onerous that it could not be completed in four months and sufficiently alleged retaliation. View "Alamo v. Bliss" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former jail administrator, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Peace Officer Discipline Procedures Act (PODPA), alleging claims related to his termination. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County and held that, regardless of whether plaintiff held a constitutionally protected interest in his employment, the process surrounding his termination satisfied the Due Process Clause. The court also held that plaintiff was not entitled to the additional protections of PODPA given his actual duties as Assistant Jail Administrator and given the fact that the County neither charged him with the duties of general law enforcement nor utilized his services for those purposes. View "Pena v. Kindler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a registered nurse, filed a complaint alleging that Mercy Hospital discriminated against her in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) by terminating her employment because of her alleged disability and refusing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation. The superior court entered summary judgment for Mercy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim because there was no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff was not a “qualified individual with a disability” as defined by the MHRA. View "Carnicella v. Mercy Hospital" on Justia Law