Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In this appeal from a state employee grievance proceeding, a hearing officer’s decision upholding the termination of Nathan Osborn, a special agent with the Virginia Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC), was not contrary to law.ABC terminated Osburn’s employment after receiving a complaint that Osburn rummaged, without permission, through the business records of a business owner who had applied for a retail alcohol license. A hearing officer upheld Osburn’s termination, concluding that the warrantless search was not permissible, resulting in a violation of the applicant’s constitutional rights. The circuit court upheld the hearing officer’s determination. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s determination that Osborn violated the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Osburn’s warrantless inspection of the office of the applicant’s business was not permissible under the highly regulated industry exception to the warrant requirement and that the business owner did not consent to Osburn’s warrantless search of the office. View "Osburn v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's discrimination claims against Manheim, her employer. Plaintiff alleged that the employer discriminated against her by paying her less than her male predecessor. The court held that, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, she was entitled to proceed to trial on her Equal Pay Act and Title VII claims. In this case, a jury could conclude that plaintiff was entitled to relief under the Equal Pay Act because the evidence supported a finding that she has made a prima facie case and that Manheim failed to establish an affirmative defense in response, and that plaintiff was entitled to relief under Title VII because the evidence supported a finding that her sex "was a motivating factor for" the pay disparity between her and her male predecessor. View "Bowen v. Manheim Remarketing, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Delane Hurley appealed a judgment in her action against defendants California Department of Parks and Recreation (DPR) and Leda Seals (together Defendants) that alleged, inter alia, causes of action for sexual orientation discrimination, sex discrimination, sexual harassment, retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, all in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), and a cause of action for violation of the Information Practices Act (“IPA”) and additionally alleged causes of action against Seals only for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). Following trial, the jury returned verdicts in favor of Defendants on the FEHA causes of action, against Defendants on the IPA cause of action, and against Seals on the IIED and NIED causes of action. The jury awarded Hurley $19,200 for past economic damages and $19,200 for past noneconomic losses against both Defendants, and $28,800 in punitive damages against Seals only. The court denied Defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). On appeal, Hurley contended trial court erred by excluding evidence that was relevant to her FEHA causes of action. DPR and Seals challenged the judgment against them on the IPA cause of action and the trial court's denial of their JNOV motions. DPR contended: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the finding it violated the IPA; and (2) the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47(b), barred the IPA cause of action against it. Seals contended: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the finding she violated the IPA; (2) the litigation privilege barred the IPA cause of action against her; (3) the IPA cause of action was alleged under, and the jury was instructed on, a statute that was inapplicable to her; (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the findings against her on the IIED and NIED causes of action; (5) the workers' compensation exclusivity doctrine barred the IIED and NIED causes of action against her; and (6) the punitive damages award against her must be reversed for, inter alia, instructional error and insufficiency of the evidence to support it. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, except for the award of economic damages against DPR, and modified the judgment accordingly. View "Hurley v. California Dept. of Parks and Recreation" on Justia Law

Labor Code section 244, which does not require a litigant to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a civil action, applies only to claims before the Labor Commissioner. The Court of Appeal explained that section 244 has no effect on Campbell v. Regents of University of California, (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, which held that public employees must pursue appropriate internal administrative remedies before filing a civil action against their employer. In this case, plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, the County, in a wrongful termination action. The court held that plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies on her claims that the County terminated her job to discriminate against her; there were no triable issues of fact on plaintiff's claim that she was terminated because of her sexual orientation; and the trial court erred by awarding the County costs on the Fair Employment and Housing Act cause of action. View "Terris v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

Labor Code section 244, which does not require a litigant to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a civil action, applies only to claims before the Labor Commissioner. The Court of Appeal explained that section 244 has no effect on Campbell v. Regents of University of California, (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, which held that public employees must pursue appropriate internal administrative remedies before filing a civil action against their employer. In this case, plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, the County, in a wrongful termination action. The court held that plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies on her claims that the County terminated her job to discriminate against her; there were no triable issues of fact on plaintiff's claim that she was terminated because of her sexual orientation; and the trial court erred by awarding the County costs on the Fair Employment and Housing Act cause of action. View "Terris v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint that alleged claims related to his termination from the police department. The court held that plaintiff's retaliation claim, on its face, was outside the bounds of the Title VII statute; nothing in plaintiff's complaint or his deposition testimony indicated that he was pursuing a Title VII claim encompassing race-based discrimination and thus he could not submit a claim via an affidavit at the summary judgment stage; and the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's contract claim where the strain of public policy that plaintiff sought to invoke was simply inapposite to the facts in this case. View "Winfrey v. Forrest City, Arkansas" on Justia Law

In this case, a sheriff’s termination of a deputy sheriff was not constrained by the procedural due process protections purportedly afforded to the deputy sheriff under a now-outdated version of Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.520.Plaintiff, the deputy sheriff, sued the sheriff, alleging that the sheriff violated the due process procedures set forth in section 15.520, otherwise known as the Police Officers’ Bill of Rights. The trial court granted summary judgment for the sheriff. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that section 15.520 mandates that a sheriff who, like the sheriff in this case, elects to receive Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Program funding is bound by the due process procedures of that statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.520 was not meant to provide due process rights to sheriffs’ deputies. View "Elliott v. Lanham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging that her termination from the police department violated her constitutional rights to privacy and intimate association. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on her section 1983 claim for violation of her constitutional rights to privacy and intimate association. In this case, a genuine factual dispute existed as to whether defendants terminated plaintiff at least in part on the basis of her extramarital affair. Furthermore, these rights were clearly established at the time. Therefore, the panel reversed the district court's grant of qualified immunity on her privacy claim and remanded that claim for further proceedings. The panel affirmed summary judgment on plaintiff's due process claim because any due process rights she might have had were not clearly established at the time of the challenged action, and thus defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, the panel affirmed summary judgment on plaintiff's sex discrimination claim because the evidence indicated that defendants' disapproval of her extramarital affair, rather than gender discrimination, was the cause of her termination. View "Perez v. City of Roseville" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging that her termination from the police department violated her constitutional rights to privacy and intimate association. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on her section 1983 claim for violation of her constitutional rights to privacy and intimate association. In this case, a genuine factual dispute existed as to whether defendants terminated plaintiff at least in part on the basis of her extramarital affair. Furthermore, these rights were clearly established at the time. Therefore, the panel reversed the district court's grant of qualified immunity on her privacy claim and remanded that claim for further proceedings. The panel affirmed summary judgment on plaintiff's due process claim because any due process rights she might have had were not clearly established at the time of the challenged action, and thus defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, the panel affirmed summary judgment on plaintiff's sex discrimination claim because the evidence indicated that defendants' disapproval of her extramarital affair, rather than gender discrimination, was the cause of her termination. View "Perez v. City of Roseville" on Justia Law

A trial court that wishes to us the McDonnell Douglas framework, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (1973), as part of its jury instructions should translate it into everyday parlance and fit it to the facts and circumstances of a particular case.In this case alleging violations of federal and state law, including the Family and Medical Leave Act and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court entering a take-nothing verdict in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred in employing the McDonnell Douglas framework in its jury instructions. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court’s jury instructions as a whole were satisfactory. View "Teixeira v. Town of Coventry" on Justia Law