Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's due process claim, which alleged that plaintiff was deprived of his property interest in his job as superintendent. The court held that plaintiff has adequately stated a procedural due process claim because he did not receive a pre-termination hearing. The court affirmed with respect to plaintiff's remaining claims and remanded as to the property-based procedural due process claim. View "Greene v. Greenwood Public School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Carl Taswell, M.D., who is certified in nuclear medicine, filed a complaint against the Regents of the University of California (the Regents). Taswell alleged he was retaliated against for his whistleblowing activities regarding patient safety at the brain imaging center during his employment by the University of California, Irvine. Taswell appealed after the trial court granted the Regents’ motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed, finding that, following an administrative hearing, Taswell was not required to exhaust his judicial remedies (by seeking a writ of mandamus) to challenge the University’s rejection of his claims of retaliation. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Taswell was statutorily authorized to file this civil action and seek damages based on his statutory whistleblower retaliation claims; the administrative decision had no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on this action. Also, a triable issue of material fact existed as to whether the University’s decisions to place Taswell on an investigatory leave of absence and to not renew his contract had a causal connection to Taswell’s whistleblowing activities. Therefore, summary judgment and/or summary adjudication should not have been granted on the theory that no triable issue of fact existed. View "Taswell v. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal." on Justia Law

Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA) investigated complaints against police, including domestic violence, excessive force, and death in custody, and made disciplinary recommendations: allegations were “sustained,” “not sustained,” “exonerated,” or “unfounded.” Investigators interviewed witnesses and procured evidence to draft reports. IPRA’s Administrator retained final responsibility for making recommendations and establishing “rules, regulations and procedures for the conduct of investigations.” Davis became an IPRA investigator in 2008. Davis alleges that in 2014-2015, his supervisors ordered Davis to change “sustained” findings and make his reports more favorable to the accused officers. Davis refused and was allegedly threatened to with termination. Davis alleges that they requested Word versions of Davis’s reports to alter them to look like Davis had made the changes. The administrator then implemented a policy requiring his approval for all “sustained” findings: if an investigator refused to make a recommended change, he would be disciplined for insubordination. Davis again refused to change “sustained” findings and was fired. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his First Amendment claims. That an employee may have good reasons to refuse an order, does “not necessarily mean the employee has a cause of action under the First Amendment when he contravenes that order.” Because IPRA required Davis to draft and revise reports, his refusal to revise those reports was speech “pursuant to [his] official duties.” He spoke as a public employee, not a private citizen. The First Amendment does not protect this speech. View "Davis v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants - the Town of Abington, Massachusetts and leaders of the Abington Police Department (Department) - on Plaintiff’s federal and state law claims in which he alleged that Defendants retaliated against him while he was an officer in the Department.The Court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to (1) Plaintiff’s claims that he brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for retaliation against him for exercising his First Amendment rights; (2) Plaintiff’s other section 1983 claim that Defendants impermissibly retaliated against him for his protected union activity; and (3) Plaintiff’s pendent Massachusetts law claims. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Massachusetts Office of Attorney General’s motion to quash a deposition subpoena. View "Delaney v. Town of Abington" on Justia Law

Employee’s failure to accommodate claim and retaliation claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) failed.Employee, who was previously employed by Employer as an assistant manager of a Burger King, was attacked during the course and scope of his employment. In response to his diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder and major depression disorder, Employee requested that Employer provide him with a fixed work schedule and move him to a Burger King location in an area not prone to crime. When Employer did not comply, Employee brought this action alleging failure to accommodate under the ADA and hostile work environment. The district court concluded that Employee was not a qualified individual under the ADA and that the acts comprising his hostile work environment claim were insufficient to support his claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly concluded that being able to work rotating shifts was an essential function of the assistant manager job; and (2) Employee did not demonstrate from an objective standpoint that Employer’s actions were sufficiently severe or pervasive to sustain a retaliatory work environment claim. View "Sepulveda-Vargas v. Caribbean Restaurants, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that he was improperly rejected for the position of Criminal Investigator with the USPS in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., and that he should have been given preference for the position due to his status as a veteran. The district court granted the Postmaster General’s motion to dismiss the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Eighth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the ADEA claim because plaintiff alleged a prima facie case of discrimination where he demonstrated that he had the educational and professional experience required for the position. Accordingly, the court reversed as to the ADEA claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "McPherson v. Brennan" on Justia Law

The 90-day period referenced in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) begins when the aggrieved person is given notice of the right to sue by the EEOC. Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, GME, ultimately alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff's Title VII claims may be based on alleged acts occurring after she filed her first administrative charge only to the extent such acts are part of a single unlawful employment practice. In this case plaintiff's claims based on her first administrative charge were timely, but claims based on a second administrative charge were untimely. The panel explained that plaintiff could base her Title VII claims on GME's alleged acts occurring after she filed her first administrative charge to the extent she could show such acts were part of a single hostile work environment claim. The panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment only as to claims based on discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts occurring after plaintiff filed her first administrative charge. The panel otherwise reversed and remanded. View "Scott v. Gino Morena Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court affirming a school board’s cancellation of the contract of a certificated employee after holding a formal hearing, thus rejecting the employee’s arguments regarding notice and due process in addition to his challenges to the merits of the cancellation. Specifically, the Court held (1) the school board’s notice regarding a hearing on whether to cancel the employee’s employment contract was proper; (2) the school board’s use of an attorney to preside over the employee’s hearing was not improper; (3) the school board was impartial; (4) the admission of evidence related to the employee’s conduct outside the contract period was admissible; and (5) there was sufficient evidence to support the cancellation of the employee’s contract. View "Robinson v. Morrill County School District #63" on Justia Law

Haw. R. Civ. P. 56O(e) does not preclude an affidavit from being self-serving, nor does it require an affidavit to be corroborated by independent evidence. Further, an affidavit is conclusory if it expresses a conclusion without stating the underlying facts or reaches a conclusion that is not reasonably drawn from the underlying facts.In this case involving a claim brought by an employee against her former employer alleging that she was terminated on the basis of her gender, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in rejecting the employee’s declarations as uncorroborated, self-serving, and conclusory; (2) erred in striking a declaration submitted by an employee in opposition that complied with the circuit court’s order allowing supplemental briefing; and (3) erred in granting summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer’s proffered reasons for the employee’s termination were based on pretext. View "Nozawa v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss an action filed by plaintiff, challenging the termination of his employment from the University. The court held that plaintiff's speech stemmed from his professional responsibilities and was made in furtherance of those responsibilities, and was therefore not protected under the First Amendment; the pre- and post-termination procedures did not violate plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights; plaintiff failed to establish a substantive due process claim because he failed to show that the University President's decision to terminate him was both conscience shocking and in violation of one or more fundamental rights; the district court properly dismissed the individual capacity claims against the University President based on qualified immunity; and the district court properly dismissed the claims against defendants in their official capacity. View "Groenewold v. Kelley" on Justia Law