Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Northern in an action alleging that the company failed to accommodate plaintiff's disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court held that plaintiff's arguments did not establish a genuine dispute of material fact that Northern did not interact in good faith as a matter of law. Under the circumstances, the timing of Northern's response was insufficient to support a finding that the company did not act in good faith; there was no evidence to support a finding that Northern prematurely abandoned the interactive process; and Northern did not attempt to demonstrate that some other boot would be as effective as a boot that conformed to the performance standards. View "Sharbono v. Northern States Power Co." on Justia Law

A class of retired employees filed suit alleging that two reforms adopted by the County of Orange violated their vested rights when it restructured its health benefits program, in violation of the County's contractual obligations, and constituted age discrimination in violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the FEHA claim, holding that plaintiffs had no contractual right to continue receiving the Retiree Premium Subsidy pursuant to the holding in Retired Emps. Ass'n of Orange Cty., Inc. v. Cty. of Orange (REAOC V), 742 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2014); California law did not fault the County for offering different benefits to retirees and to active employees at the outset, absent a FEHA violation; the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act applied to plaintiffs; and plaintiffs' claim of unlawful age discrimination under FEHA failed as a matter of law. The panel held, however, that the district court erred in dismissing some of plaintiffs' contract claims. The panel held that plaintiffs set forth sufficient allegations regarding the continuation of the Grant Benefit during the employees' lifetime to survive a motion to dismiss. View "Harris v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

In 2008 Indiana University hired Haynes, who is black, as an assistant professor, funding most of his salary through the Strategic Recruitment Fund, which facilitates "recruitment of underrepresented minorities and women into the professoriate.” Haynes had a six-year probationary contract. Tenure candidates are evaluated on research, teaching, and service and must be “excellent” in one area and “satisfactory” in the others. In 2013, Haynes submitted his tenure dossier, selecting research as his "excellence" performance area. The committee voted 6–3 against tenure. The dean wrote that “the committee questioned the extent of Dr. Haynes’[s] impact based on low citation numbers and low numbers of publications in high-quality journals” and that Haynes’s “evaluations ha[d] been mixed[] and particularly low in the online courses” and failed to show “significant improvement.” The university-wide Tenure Advisory Committee voted unanimously against tenure; 18 of 27 faculty members found his teaching unsatisfactory and 19 found his research not excellent. Haynes sued under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the University, upholding the exclusion of Haynes’s proffered expert reports for lack of “specialized knowledge.” A plaintiff needs compelling evidence that “clear discrimination” pervasively infected the tenure decision; this case was “not a close one.” Regardless of the finer points of academic tenure and its intersection with anti-discrimination law. Haynes lacks any evidence that the University denied tenure because he is black. View "Haynes v. Indiana University" on Justia Law

The Commission for Human Rights is responsible for enforcing Alaska’s anti-discrimination laws. The Commission’s staff is authorized by regulation to use a variety of investigative methods. These include witness interviews, “inspection of documents and premises,” and “examination of written submissions of parties and witnesses.” The focus of this appeal was the Commission’s unwritten policy, followed for at least 27 years, barring third parties from investigative interviews with “certain limited exceptions.” As the Commission described its policy, third parties may be present if the interviewee is “the respondent named in the complaint, or is a member of the respondent’s ‘control group’ management, or has managerial responsibility.’ ” The Commission also allowed witnesses to be accompanied by their own attorneys and, if necessary, an interpreter or a guardian. The investigation at issue began when an employee filed two complaints against her employer, the State of Alaska Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS), in August 2014 and February 2015. The Commission opened an investigation headed by investigator Patricia Watts. Watts contacted Dori Anderson, the complainant’s supervisor, to schedule an interview. A question was raised over whether Greta Jones, a program manager for the complainant’s agency, was requested to attend Anderson’s interview. The Commission issued a subpoena to interview the complainant’s supervisor, who refused to be interviewed unless an employer representative was also present. On the Commission’s petition, the superior court issued an order to show cause why the supervisor should not be held in contempt. The supervisor moved to vacate the order and dismiss the contempt proceeding; the superior court granted the motion on the ground that the Commission lacked the legal authority to exclude third parties from its investigative interviews. The Commission appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the statutory requirement of a confidential investigation, with its specific limits on a respondent’s access to investigative materials, clearly authorized the Commission to exclude third parties from investigative interviews. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the superior court’s order dismissing the Commission’s petition and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alaska State Commission for Human Rights v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Regional West Medical Center and dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint alleging retaliatory discharge and employment discrimination, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not err in finding that Plaintiff’s discrimination claims were barred by the relevant statute of limitations; and (2) the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s retaliation claim on the basis that there was no evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff’s termination was retaliatory. View "Brown v. Regional West Medical Center" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment imposing liability on BNSF under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The panel held that plaintiff had a disability because BNSF perceived him to have a back impairment; plaintiff was qualified for the job; and BNSF impermissibly conditioned plaintiff's job offer on him procuring an MRI at his own expense because it assumed that he had a back impairment.The panel need not, and did not, decide whether the standard four-factor test for injunctive relief was required in the Title VII/ADA context, because even if the four-factor test applied, that test would be satisfied. However, the panel agreed with BNSF that the district court must make adequate factual findings to support the scope of the injunction. Therefore, the panel vacated the injunction and remanded for the district court to make further factual findings in order to establish the proper scope of the injunction. View "EEOC v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court for Regional School Unit 57 (RSU 57) on Charlene Richard’s claims that RSU 57 violated the Americans With Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, Maine Human Rights Act, and Maine Whistleblower Protection Act, holding that there was no clear error in the district court’s findings.Richard, a former kindergarten teacher at Waterboro Elementary School, claimed that RSU 57 retaliated against her for her advocacy on behalf of students with disabilities. The district court concluded that Richard had not met her burden of proving that her advocacy had actually prompted the adverse actions against her and entered judgment for RSU 57. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not improperly require Richard to present evidence of causation beyond that which supported her prima facie case; and (2) Richard’s remaining arguments were similarly unavailing. View "Richard v. Regional School Unit 57" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s retaliation claims as pertains to a handful of the original defendants in this case, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies in bringing her Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), 18 U.S.C. 1514A, claim to federal court.Plaintiff filed a complaint under SOX with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), claiming that she was retaliated against through termination in violation of SOX’s whistleblower protection provision. In the federal courts, the district court concluded that Plaintiff’s OSHA complaint was untimely and thus dismissed Plaintiff’s claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s OSHA complaint was filed outside the requisite timeframe, and Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies; and (2) therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to raise a plausible claim for relief under SOX. View "Newman v. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc." on Justia Law

Several years after a tank car spill accident, appellants Larry Lincoln and Brad Mosbrucker told their employer BNSF Railway Company (“BNSF”) that medical conditions attributable to the accident rendered them partially, permanently disabled and prevented them from working outdoors. BNSF removed appellants from service as Maintenance of Way (“MOW”) workers purportedly due to safety concerns and because MOW work entailed outdoor work. With some assistance from BNSF’s Medical and Environmental Health Department (“MEH”), Appellants each applied for more than twenty jobs within BNSF during the four years following their removal from service. After not being selected for several positions, Appellants filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), accommodation request letters with BNSF, and complaints with the Occupational Safety Health Administration (“OSHA”). Following BNSF’s rejection of their applications for additional positions, Appellants filed a complaint raising claims for: (1) discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (2) failure to accommodate under the ADA; (3) retaliation under the ADA; and (4) retaliation under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”). Relying on nearly forty years of Tenth Circuit precedent, the district court concluded that filing an EEOC charge was a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit and it dismissed several parts of Appellants’ ADA claims for lack of jurisdiction. Appellants also challenged the vast majority of the district court’s summary judgment determinations on the merits of their claims that survived the court’s exhaustion rulings. After polling the full court, the Tenth Circuit overturn its precedent that filing an EEOC charge was a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, thus reversing the district court’s jurisdictional rulings. Appellants’ ADA discrimination and ADA failure to accommodate claims relative to some of the positions over which the district court determined it lacked jurisdiction were remanded for further proceedings. With respect to the district court’s summary judgment determinations on the merits of appellants’ claims that survived the exhaustion rulings, the Tenth Circuit was unable to reach a firm conclusion on the position-based ADA discrimination and failure to accommodate claims. The Court concluded the district court’s dismissal of the FRSA claims were appropriate. Therefore, the Court reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Lincoln v. BNSF Railway Company" on Justia Law

Koty, a DuPage County Sheriff’s Department deputy, requested a different squad car model. Koty’s physician indicated Koty should be given a car with more legroom to accommodate a hip condition. The Department denied Koty’s requests. Koty submitted EEOC complaints alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Shortly thereafter, the Department reassigned Koty to courthouse duty, for which he would not need to drive a squad car. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of Koty’s claims that the Department violated the ADA when it denied his request for an SUV and then wrongfully retaliated against him for making the EEOC complaint. Koty did not qualify as “disabled” under the ADA and the Department took no adverse employment actions against Koty. All Koty alleged was that he is unable to drive one model of vehicle, which does not affect a major life activity. The transfer did not result in a pay decrease, other than Koty’s diminished opportunity for overtime pay. Koty did offer some evidence that courthouse duty is considered less prestigious but Koty conceded he knew the transfer was a way for the Department to accommodate his hip pain, an accommodation he requested. “It is the employer’s prerogative to choose a reasonable accommodation.” View "Koty v. County of Dupage" on Justia Law