Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Southern Home under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981, asserting claims for discriminatory termination, hostile work environment, and retaliation. The Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiff's discriminatory termination and retaliation claims failed as a matter of law because she provided insufficient evidence of pretext in response to Southern Home's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her.The court held, however, that plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the harassment plaintiff suffered was severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of her employment. The court also held that plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that Southern Home had actual notice of the hostile work environment. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Smelter v. Southern Home Care Services Inc." on Justia Law

Judge had been principal of Oaklyn Elementary School for about three years when she was stopped by a Pennsylvania State Trooper for failing to signal. After acknowledging she had been drinking, Judge asked the trooper to release her because she was concerned about her job. The trooper took Judge to the barracks, where she was given a test, which showed that Judge’s blood alcohol content was .332, more than four times the legal limit. Three weeks later, Judge encountered Superintendent Kelley, who had been advised by school board members about the traffic stop. Kelley wrote: If you do choose to resign then I will offer a neutral reference in the future . . . . [I]n the alternative, if you decide not to resign and DUI charges are filed against you then I will be forced to issue a written statement of charges for dismissal. Judge did not contact a lawyer, although she had retained counsel after her arrest. The next day, Judge presented a letter of resignation, while stating she “was not even charged with DUI yet.” Kelley then handed Judge court documents indicating that she had been charged. Judge sued, asserting deprivations of procedural and substantive due process, violation of equal protection, and breach of contract, based on "constructive discharge." The Third Circuit affirmed the rejection of all her claims: Judge was presented with a reasonable alternative to immediate resignation and resigned voluntarily. View "Judge v. Shikellamy School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Kia for gender and national origin discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as race and alienage discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment for Kia.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's judgment as to the retaliation claims under Title VII and section 1981. The court held that, viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the manner of her opposition to discrimination was reasonable. In this case, were it not for plaintiff's position as a human resource manager, her action of providing the name of an attorney in connection with her EEOC charge would be protected opposition conduct, because it assisted the employee with filing her own charge. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of sex and national origin discrimination under Title VII and section 1981. View "Gogel v. Kia Motors Manufacturing of Georgia, Inc." on Justia Law

Palardy, a Millburn police officer, was involved in union leadership, participating in contract negotiations and disciplinary hearings for fellow officers. Gordon was responsible for Millburn's personnel matters. Palardy testified that other officers told him Gordon repeatedly disparaged Palardy’s union activity. In 2010, when Millburn was without a chief, Palardy was the department’s senior lieutenant, next in line to become a captain. During Gordon’s tenure, Millburn always selected its chief from among its captains. Palardy believed that he could be promoted to captain for a short time and then promoted to chief. Gordon stated that he did not believe any of the lieutenants had enough experience to become chief. Captain Weber became chief in 2011. Palardy stepped down as union president because he “knew" Gordon "had a problem with [his] union affiliation.” Gordon retained a consultant to study the department’s structure and vacancies and promoted Palardy to captain in 2012. Weber was scheduled to retire in 2015. In 2013, Palardy was offered a part-time position with the Board of Education. He says he believed that he would never become chief, so he retired and accepted that job offer. Palardy then sued the Township and Gordon. The district court rejected all claims. The Third Circuit reversed in part. The court should have analyzed Palardy’s speech and association claims separately; his union association deserves constitutional protection. Palardy’s speech claim must fail; he claims that Gordon retaliated against him because of his union membership, not because of his advocacy on any particular issue. View "Palardy v. Township of Millburn" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to LRS in an action filed by plaintiff alleging that she was denied a promotion because of her race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The court held that it was undisputed that plaintiff established a prima facie case of employment discrimination, but LRS asserted a justification that was not pretextual. In this case, there was no evidence in the record of any discrimination in the promotion decision. The court explained that any difference in qualifications between the two candidates did not create a genuine issue of fact that plaintiff was clearly better qualified for the district supervisor position. The choice to value the other candidate's credentials over plaintiff's strengths was within the realm of reasonable business judgments. View "Roberson-King v. Louisiana Workforce Commission" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the Washington Supreme Court: Under what circumstances, if any, does obesity qualify as an "impairment" under the Washington Law against Discrimination, Wash. Rev. Code 49.60.040? View "Taylor v. Burlington Northern Railroad Holdings Inc." on Justia Law

Milwaukee County hired Thicklen in 2012 as a jail corrections officer. A zero-tolerance policy forbids corrections officers from having any sexual contact with inmates. The county repeatedly instructed Thicklen not to engage in any such contact and trained him to avoid it. Thicklen gave answers to quizzes indicating he understood the training. He nonetheless raped Shonda Martin in jail. Martin sued him and sued the county for indemnification under Wisconsin Statute 895.46. A jury awarded her $6,700,000 against the county, finding that the assaults were in the scope of employment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Martin and the verdict, no reasonable jury could find the sexual assaults were in the scope of Thicklen’s employment; that the sexual assaults were natural, connected, ordinary parts or incidents of contemplated services; that the assaults were of the same or similar kind of conduct as that Thicklen was employed to perform; or that the assaults were actuated even to a slight degree by a purpose to serve County. No reasonable jury could even regard the sexual assaults as improper methods of carrying out employment objectives. Martin presented no evidence that his training was deficient or that Thicklen did not understand it. View "Martin v. Milwaukee County" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to MVM, Inc. as to a former employee’s claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000, et seq., and related Puerto Rico laws, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to these claims.Plaintiff, a former employee of MVM, Inc., brought a variety of federal and Puerto Rico law claims against MVM and other defendants. After dismissing several of Plaintiff’s claims, the district court granted summary judgment to MVM as to the remainder. The First Circuit affirmed the summary judgment ruling, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to MVM on Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff’s claim under Title VII that MVM had unlawfully subjected her to disparate treatment because of her gender, and Plaintiff’s claim under Title VII for retaliation. View "Bonilla-Ramirez v. MVM, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Trimark in an action filed by plaintiff, alleging that she was terminated from her job as an executive housekeeper because of her age, in retaliation against her, because she took protected leave, and because she opposed Millennium's discriminatory practices. The court held that plaintiff failed to provide direct evidence that she was retaliated against because of her deposition testimony. Under the McDonnell-Douglas framework, even assuming plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Millennium had clearly shown a legitimate non-discriminatory or retaliatory reason for firing her. In this case, Millennium's internal investigation credibly exposed that plaintiff regularly altered employee hours without using a company-sanctioned form. The court also held that plaintiff failed to show a specific link between any age discrimination and her termination sufficient to support the inference that the discrimination was the cause of her termination. Finally, plaintiff failed to provide any direct evidence that she was fired because she took protected leave under the Family Medical Leave Act. View "Naguib v. Trimark Hotel Corp." on Justia Law

Cleven worked as a City of Madison stagehand, classified as an independent contractor and not enrolled in the Wisconsin Retirement System. In 2006, a union sought to represent the stagehands. The Employment Relations Commission found that they were not independent contractors and ordered an election. The city agreed to review the stagehands’ hours to determine whether they qualified for enrollment in the System, determined that Cleven qualified as of December 2009, and agreed to pay the stagehands’ share of the required contribution starting in 2010. There was no agreement concerning the period before the labor agreement. The state Employee Trust Funds Board concluded that Cleven was eligible to enroll in 1983, but declined to decide who was responsible for paying the past‐due employee contribution. State courts declined his efforts to seek judicial review. In the meantime, the city did not report his hours and earnings. Cleven sought mandamus relief. In 2016, the state court ordered the city to “immediately” report his enrollment as a participating employee as of 1983. The city complied; the System invoiced the city for the employer and employee contributions. After the city paid, it joined parallel litigation about whether the stagehands owed the past‐due employee contribution; its appeal is pending. Cleven sued the city and city employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they violated his due process rights because he wanted to retire in 2011, but the delay in reporting his hours forced him to wait until 2016, holding his benefits "hostage” without a pre-deprivation hearing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the city. If there was a deprivation of property, Cleven’s ability to seek a writ of mandamus was adequate post-deprivation process. View "Cleven v. Soglin" on Justia Law