Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants conspired against him and violated the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, 11H, 11I by depriving him of his protected property right of continued employment with the Salisbury Police Department (SPD), holding that summary judgment was properly granted.In 2010, Cornelius Harrington, the Salisbury town manager, hired Robert St. Pierre to investigate allegations of misconduct by the then-police chief. During the investigation, St. Pierre uncovered evidence of alleged wrongdoing by Plaintiff, an officer at the SPD. After a follow-up investigation, Harrington terminated Plaintiff from his employment. An arbitrator later reversed that decision. Plaintiff retired soon after and filed this lawsuit against Harrington and St. Pierre. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that summary judgment was proper where Plaintiff offered little evidence beyond bald speculation for the existence of a conspiracy and failed to show that his constitutional rights ere interfered with by “threats, intimidation, or coercion,” as required by the MCRA. View "Thomas v. Town of Salisbury" on Justia Law

Bogart, a Democrat, worked as the Financial Resources Director of Vermilion County, Illinois. Marron, a Republican, assumed control of the County Board and fired her. She brought claims under the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause, alleging that Vermilion County and Marron violated her right of political affiliation and engaged in political retaliation. The district court dismissed the equal protection claim as duplicative of the First Amendment claim, and, after finding that the substantial fiscal and budgetary responsibilities of Bogart’s position fit within the exception to political patronage dismissals, granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court has held (the Elrod-Branti exception) that, while public employers cannot condition employment on an individual’s political affiliation, an employee’s First Amendment right of political association leaves room for employers to dismiss employees in positions where political loyalty is a valid job qualification. Determining whether a particular job fits within the exception requires “focus on the inherent powers of the office as presented in the official job description,” while also looking at “how the description was created and when, and how often, it was updated.” Bogart held a senior position requiring the trust and confidence of the elected Board members, including the County Chairman, and entailing substantial policymaking authority. View "Bogart v. Vermilion County" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to the City of Providence, Rhode Island (the City) as to Plaintiff’s complaint for discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, and related state anti-discrimination laws, holding that the district court properly entered summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims.Following an injury that he sustained while on duty, Plaintiff, a veteran police officer in the City, sued the City for discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on all claims, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to establish that he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA and failed to show a cognizable disability as to his state-law claims. Although its reasoning differed from that of the district court, the First Circuit affirmed, holding that summary judgment was properly entered on Plaintiff’s claims. View "Mancini v. City of Providence" on Justia Law

Taylor, a former Lawrenceburg, Indiana police officer, also held positions with the civil-city, parks, and electric departments. Taylor ran for a City Council position and improperly appeared in police uniform at a campaign event and represented on his time sheet that he was on duty during that event. The State Police investigated, resulting in criminal charges for Official Misconduct and Ghost Employment. Taylor won election to the Council. Taylor signed a deferred prosecution agreement admitting to the criminal charges and agreeing to resign from the Council. The next day, he distributed a letter accusing the Board and city officials of corruption and criminal wrongdoing. The Board notified Taylor of its intent to terminate his employment. The Board terminated Taylor’s employment, crediting a prosecutor’s testimony that he would not accept case-related information from a police officer, like Taylor, who had admitted a crime of dishonesty, and rejected Taylor’s contention that Board members were biased and that the termination proceedings were a response to his letter accusing Board members of wrongdoing. Taylor dismissed his state court appeal and filed a First Amendment retaliation claim, 42 U.S.C. 1983, with state law defamation and whistleblower claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in the city’s favor. Federal courts must give state administrative fact-finding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in state courts, if the agency acted in a judicial capacity and resolved issues that the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate. The Board acted in a judicial capacity and Taylor had a fair opportunity to litigate the issues. View "Taylor v. City of Lawrenceburg" on Justia Law

Riley worked for the Kokomo Housing Authority (KHA) for eight years before she was terminated in 2014. During her employment, Riley suffered from seizures, anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, and depression, which required her to take leaves of absence. She claims that KHA improperly denied her requests for medical leave and retaliated against her for these requests by disciplining and terminating her, in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601; that KHA failed to make reasonable accommodations and discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101; and that she was subjected to retaliation for engaging in protected activity in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3617. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in KHA's favor. Five months elapsed between the end of Riley’s FMLA leave and a written warning; although Riley had requested leave for medical appointments and was told that her leave had been exhausted, she was allowed time off for her appointments nonetheless. Riley alleged that she had been terminated because of her disability, but, in her EEOC complaint, she omitted any allegation that KHA had denied her a reasonable accommodation. Rejecting Riley’s retaliation and FHA claims, the court noted that there is no evidence that she called HUD to report a discriminatory housing practice. View "Riley v. City of Kokomo, Indiana, Housing Authority" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer in an action alleging that the unauthorized review and disclosure of plaintiff's confidential personnel files to support her racial and religious discrimination claims constituted protected activity under Title VII.The court held that, under the opposition clause, unauthorized disclosures of confidential information to third parties are generally unreasonable. In this case, plaintiff's unauthorized review and duplication of confidential personnel files did not constitute protected opposition or participation activity. The court also held that section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does not protect a violation of valid state law that poses no conflict with Title VII. The court explained that, like in plaintiff's opposition claim, she failed to meet her burden of proving that the sheriff terminated her employment because she engaged in protected activity. View "Netter v. Barnes" on Justia Law

In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal noted that effective January 1, 2019, Code of Civil Procedure section 998 will have no application to costs and attorney and expert witness fees in a Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) action unless the lawsuit is found to be "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." In regard to the litigation that predated the application of the amended version of Government Code section 12965(b), the court held that section 998 does not apply to nonfrivolous FEHA actions and reversed the order awarding defendant costs and expert witness fees pursuant to that statute. View "Huerta v. Kava Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The EEOC filed suit alleging that North Memorial violated 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), by unlawfully retaliating against an employee. The district court granted summary judgment for North Memorial and dismissed the claim, concluding that North Memorial did not violate section 2000e-3(a) because it did not discriminate against the employee.The Eighth Circuit affirmed and held that the EEOC failed to establish a prima facie case of opposition-clause unlawful retaliation because merely requesting a religious accommodation was not the same as opposing the allegedly unlawful denial of a religious accommodation. The court reasoned that, when an employee or applicant requested a religious accommodation, and the request was denied by an employer such as North Memorial that accommodated reasonable requests that did not cause undue hardship, there was no basis for an opposition-clause retaliation claim under Sec. 2000e-3(a). The court held that the employee or applicant's exclusive Title VII remedy was an unlawful disparate treatment or disparate impact claim under section 2000e-2(a)(1). View "EEOC v. North Memorial Health Care" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Saint Luke's in an employment discrimination action. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to reconsider under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). The court explained that, although defendant's delay was brief, Saint Luke's made no claim of prejudice and defendant did not act in bad faith, such factors did not outweigh defendant's carelessness or mistake in construing the rules and the absence of any apparent meritorious defense. Furthermore, there were no exceptional circumstances in this case that warranted relief under Rule 60(b)(6). View "Giles v. St Luke's Northland-Smithville" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Edward Manavian held a career executive assignment (CEA) position as chief of the Criminal Intelligence Bureau (Bureau), part of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Assignment by appointment to such a position does not confer any rights or status in the position other than provided in Article 9 . . . of [Government Code] Chapter 2.5 of Part 2.6.” The rights conferred by article 9 are the rights of all civil service employees relating to punitive actions, except that the termination of a CEA is not a punitive action. CEA positions are part of the general civil service system, but an employee enjoys no tenure. Manavian’s job description was to cooperate with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to prevent terrorism and related criminal activity. However, Manavian’s relationships with state and federal decisionmakers were not good. The director and deputy director of the state Office of Homeland Security refused to work with Manavian. Richard Oules, Manavian’s superior, decided to terminate Manavian’s CEA position because of his dysfunctional relationship with federal and state representatives, and because of Manavian’s hostility toward Oules. Manavian sued, his complaint contained a long list of grievances. Manavian also claims that certain actions he took in liaising with other state and federal homeland security representatives, then reporting potentially illegal policy proposals, were protected by the California whistleblower statutes. The Court of Appeal concluded that the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) protections were not triggered by the termination of Manavian’s CEA position, and that he was not protected as a whistleblower. View "Manavian v. Dept. of Justice" on Justia Law