Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer for race and age discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, and for promissory estoppel. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the company's motion to strike portions of plaintiff's statement of material disputed facts and grant of summary judgment.The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking paragraphs of plaintiff's statement of material fact as unsupported by the record or irrelevant and immaterial; the district court properly granted the employer summary judgment on claims arising more than 180 days before plaintiff filed his EEOC charges; the district court properly granted the employer summary judgment on the failure to rehire claim because plaintiff took no action, never applied for reemployment, and believed he could not perform the duties of the position; the Arkansas Civil Rights Act claims were time-barred; and there was no factual basis for the promissory estoppel claim. View "Kirklin v. Joshen Paper & Packaging of Arkansas Co." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Cargill in an action alleging that the company discriminated against a former employee in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The court held that plaintiff failed to present direct and indirect evidence of disability discrimination; plaintiff was not a qualified individual protected by the ADA because she failed to demonstrate that at the time of her termination she could regularly and reliably attend work, an essential function of her employment; and the ADA's protections did not extend to providing plaintiff with her desired accommodation of more time off following her 194 days of unplanned absences. View "Lipp v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) against St. James after she was terminated from her teaching position when she told the school that she had breast cancer and would need to miss work to undergo chemotherapy. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the school, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances test under Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012), the First Amendment's ministerial exception did not foreclose plaintiff's claim. In this case, plaintiff did not have any credentials, training, or ministerial background; there was no religious component to her liberal studies degree or teaching credential; St. James had no religious requirements for her position; and St. James did not hold plaintiff out as a minister. View "Biel v. St. James School" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that Plaintiff was not discriminated against but that Defendant’s decision to terminate her employment, rather than impose lesser discipline, was in retaliation for protected conduct, holding that the district court’s rulings were not erroneous or an abuse of discretion.In her complaint, Plaintiff, a former employee of the U.S. Postal Service, argued that her termination was unlawfully discriminatory due to her race and national origin and, independently, was in retaliation for her having filed earlier complaints. Defendant appealed the ruling that Defendant’s termination was in retaliation for protected conduct, and Plaintiff appealed the remedy awarded - back pay but not reinstatement or front pay. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no error in the district court’s judgments. View "Anderson v. Brennan" on Justia Law

For 35 years, Terry worked as a teacher and an administrator for the District. After the 2013–2014 school year, the District closed the school where Terry served as the Principal because of declining enrollment and reassigned her as the Assistant Principal at another school. The District picked a male employee (Cain) over Terry for a separate promotion, although Terry had earned the highest ranking of the applicants from the interviewers. Terry filed suit, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), and the Fourteenth Amendment (42 U.S.C. 1983); retaliation under Title VII; and unequal pay, 29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the District on Terry’s federal claims. Even assuming Terry’s change in position constituted a material adverse action, Terry did not marshal any evidence that the District had a discriminatory purpose. The chronology of events alone is not evidence that the District lied when it said it picked Cain for the promotion because of his experience working at the particular school. Timing, even combined with Terry’s positive employment history, is not enough to create a dispute of material fact as to whether the District retaliated against Terry. The difference in salary between Terry and Cain was based on the salary freeze (and not based on sex). View "Terry v. Gary Community School Corp." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Allina in an action brought by a former employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), after she was terminated for refusing to fulfill a job requirement that she take necessary steps to develop immunity to rubella. The court held that, although the district court erred in denying plaintiff's inquiry claim based on a lack of injury, summary judgment was proper where Allina's decision to require employees with client contact to complete an inquiry and exam was job-related, consistent with business necessity, and no more intrusive than necessary. Therefore, the health screening that plaintiff was required to take as a condition of her employment complied with the ADA and the MHRAThe court also held that the evidence was insufficient to support plaintiff's claim that she was disabled under the ADA where the evidence was insufficient to support the conclusion that plaintiff's chemical sensitivities or allergies substantially or materially limited her ability to perform major life activities. Therefore, plaintiff's failure to accommodate claim failed. Likewise, her retaliation claim failed. View "Hustvet v. Allina Health System" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kyle Guillemette challenged a determination by the Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU) of the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) that the notice requirements set forth in RSA 171-A:8, III (2014) and New Hampshire Administrative Rules, He-M 310.07 did not apply when Monadnock Worksource notified Monadnock Developmental Services of its intent to discontinue providing services to petitioner because that act did not constitute a “termination” of services within the meaning of the applicable rules. Petitioner received developmental disability services funded by the developmental disability Medicaid waiver program. MDS was the “area agency,” which coordinated and developed petitioner’s individual service plan. Worksource provides services to disabled individuals pursuant to a “Master Agreement” with MDS. Worksource began providing day services to the petitioner in August 2012. On March 31, 2017, Worksource notified MDS, in writing, that Worksource was terminating services to petitioner “as of midnight on April 30.” The letter to MDS stated that “[t]he Board of Directors and administration of . . . Worksource feel this action is in the best interest of [the petitioner] and of [Worksource].” Petitioner’s mother, who served as his guardian, was informed by MDS of Worksource’s decision on April 3. The mother asked for reconsideration, but the Board declined, writing that because the mother “repeatedly and recently expressed such deep dissatisfaction with our services to your son, the Board and I feel that you and [petitioner] would be better served by another agency . . . .” Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint with the Office of Client and Legal Services alleging that his services had been terminated improperly and requesting that they remain in place pending the outcome of the investigation of his complaint. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the AAU’s ruling was not erroneous, it affirmed. View "Petition of Kyle Guillemette" on Justia Law

Haddad sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging his employment was terminated by the Michigan Department of Insurance and Financial Services (MDIFS), for exercising his First Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer. Haddad argued that he was acting as a “virtual private citizen” because his duties as an MDIFS examiner required him to speak in the public interest and work to end the inclusion of intra-family exclusion clauses (IFEs) in insurance policies. By making this argument, however, Haddad acknowledged that he was acting pursuant to his official duties when he sought to end the use of IFEs through his examinations, the very activity that he claims was the basis for his termination. “[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Haddad’s purpose was to further his official work to end what he believed to be an unfair insurer practice; his conduct was part of the performance of his job, and the district court did not err by concluding that Haddad was not speaking as a private citizen. View "Haddad v. Gregg" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting Steak 'n Shake's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's Americans with Disabilities (ADA) discrimination claim and his Missouri Workers' Compensation claim. The court held that plaintiff failed to show that he was a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA. In this case, although he believed that he could perform the essential job functions of a fountain operator, plaintiff's permanent medical restrictions barred him from performing the duties described in the job description. Likewise, plaintiff could not perform the duties of other positions he identified as alternative jobs. View "Denson v. Steak 'n Shake, Inc." on Justia Law

Lewis, an employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs, worked as a cook in the Nutrition and Food Service Department in 2008-2009 and again from December 2013 until April 2015. The four‐year gap in employment occurred because Lewis was terminated and then, after a successful Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint, was reinstated to his former position. Lewis alleges that upon reinstatement he faced retaliation from the VA and two supervisors for his EEO activity. The district court granted the Va summary judgment, holding that none of the alleged retaliatory actions constituted a materially adverse action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Some of the actions constituted isolated administrative errors that were subsequently corrected; they represent the kind of minor workplace grievances against which Title VII does not protect against. Other incidents may have resulted in annoyance and frustration, but they did not cause the kind of harm that would dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity. Unfulfilled threats that do not produce harm do not qualify as adverse actions. Lewis also failed to demonstrate a causal link between his protected activity and nearly all of the alleged retaliatory actions; failed to identify any similarly‐situated employee; and failed to demonstrate the VA’s legitimate, non‐discriminatory explanations were pretextual. View "Lewis v. Wilkie" on Justia Law