Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

This case concerns an appeal by the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (the "Department") against a jury's verdict in favor of Lawanna Tynes, a former employee. Tynes had sued the Department for race and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, after she was terminated from her position as the superintendent of the Broward Regional Juvenile Detention Center. The Department argued on appeal that Tynes failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, as required under the evidentiary framework set by the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green case, because the comparator employees she presented were not similarly situated in all material respects.However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court ruled that the Department's focus on the McDonnell Douglas framework and the adequacy of Tynes's comparators missed the ultimate question in a discrimination case, which is whether there is enough evidence to show that the reason for an adverse employment action was illegal discrimination. The jury found that the Department had intentionally discriminated against Tynes, and the Department did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for that conclusion on appeal. Therefore, the Department's arguments regarding the adequacy of Tynes's comparators and the insufficiency of her prima facie case were irrelevant and did not disturb the jury's verdict.The Department also challenged the jury's verdict on Tynes's § 1981 claim, arguing that her complaint did not adequately plead the § 1981 claim and that she did not prove that race was a but-for cause of her termination. However, the appellate court found that the Department had forfeited both arguments because it failed to challenge the district court's authority to allow an amendment to the pleadings during the trial under Rule 15(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and did not argue that Tynes failed to prove that race was a but-for cause in its post-trial motion.Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Tynes on both her Title VII and § 1981 claims. View "Tynes v. Florida Department of Juvenile Justice" on Justia Law

Plaintiff employees who opted out of their union and employer-sponsored health plans received a monetary credit, part of which was deducted as a fee that was then used to fund the plans from which plaintiffs had opted out. Plaintiffs argue that this opt-out fee should be treated as part of their “regular rate” of pay for calculating overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The panel held that the opt-out fees were not part of the employees’ “regular rate” of pay, but rather were exempted as “contributions irrevocably made by an employer to a trustee or third person pursuant to a bona fide plan for providing” health insurance under 29 U.S.C. Section 207(e)(4). View "ANTHONY SANDERS, ET AL V. COUNTY OF VENTURA" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in this lawsuit alleging disability discrimination, hostile work environment, and other claims, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Plaintiff filed this action claiming disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act (RA), hostile work environment under the RA and Americans with Disabilities Act, retaliation in violation of Title VII, and failure to accommodate under the RA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the VA on all counts. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly concluded that 5 U.S.C. 8461(d) did not bar its review of Plaintiff's claims at summary judgment; (2) did not err in rejecting Plaintiff's preclusion claim; and (3) did not err in granting summary judgment. View "Dixon-Tribou v. McDonough" on Justia Law

California State University’s (CSU) hired Plaintiff as the director of university communications of California State University at Northridge’s Marketing and Communications Department (the Department). The VP testified that after speaking with employees while investigating complaints against Plaintiff, he determined that Plaintiff could not be an effective department leader because he disregarded CSU’s direction regarding professionalism; staff could not work with him; and subordinates were intimidated and threatened by him. Plaintiff filed a complaint against CSU alleging gender, race, color, and sexual orientation discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); race, gender, and sexual orientation harassment; and failure to prevent harassment and discrimination. CSU filed a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. The trial court entered the order granting summary judgment to Defendants and Plaintiff appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court found that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s discrimination claims. The court explained that CSU established a legitimate reason for the termination. Moreover, the court held that Plaintiff failed to submit evidence that creates a dispute of material fact as to pretext. Similarily, the court explained that Plaintiff has not established a dispute of fact regarding whether CSU’s internal investigation was pretextual. The court wrote that Plaintiff failed to produce substantial evidence of any bias in the E&D investigation, and his statistical evidence is not probative of discriminatory motive. Further, Plaintiff’s evidence of CSU’s commitment to diversity does not create a triable issue of discriminatory motive. View "Martin v. Board of Trustees of the Cal. State University" on Justia Law

In 2020, Bennett, a nursing student completing a clinical rotation at Hurley, requested that her service dog, Pistol, be permitted to accompany her. Pistol recognizes the symptoms Bennett exhibits just before a panic attack and alerts her so that she can take Ativan. Hurley agreed. Its Service Animal Policy largely tracks regulations implementing the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12131. When Bennett brought Pistol to the hospital, one staff member and one patient reported allergic reactions. Hurley revoked Bennett’s ability to have Pistol with her at all times, stating the hospital remained “open to continued dialogue” and would provide space for a crate for Pistol on another floor and “make every effort to accommodate” unscheduled breaks. Hurley concluded that relocating staff and patients could compromise patient care. Moving nurses would be difficult; Hurley nurses are union members and the hospital was short-staffed during the pandemic. There were concerns about having a dog on a floor with immunocompromised or unconscious patients. Bennett finished her Hurley rotation without Pistol and without experiencing a panic attack. Bennett completed rotations at other hospitals with PistolThe Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of Bennett’s claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and Michigan law. Hurley’s concerns were with Pistol, not with Bennett’s medical condition. Hurley reasonably decided that Pistol posed a direct threat to the health and safety of patients and that the accommodations necessary to mitigate the risk were not reasonable. View "Bennett v. Hurley Medical Center" on Justia Law

Bailey, an RN employed by MMBH, West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) psychiatric facility, alleges that he intervened when M.C., a patient with a known history of self-harm, attempted to harm himself. A struggle ensued. M.C. suffered minor injuries. Subsequently, an employee of Legal Aid of West Virginia (LAWV), observed M.C.'s bruising, read the nursing notes, and viewed a security video of the struggle, then filed a referral with Adult Protective Services. MMBH’s Director of Nursing filed a patient grievance form on behalf of M.C. Bailey was suspended. Several witnesses were never interviewed and the report failed to relate M.C.’s history of self-harm. Bailey’s employment was terminated. The Board of Nursing initiated proceedings against his nursing license.The West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board reinstated Bailey. The Board of Nursing dismissed the complaint against his license. During the investigation, MFCU allegedly made Bailey submit to a “custodial interrogation,” conducted by MFCU employees and a West Virginia Attorney General’s Office lawyer. Bailey was not advised of his Miranda rights. Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU) investigator Lyle then referred the matter to the Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, which filed criminal charges. MMBH again suspended Bailey. The charges were later dismissed.Bailey sued DHHR, MMBH, MFCU, LAWV, and several individuals under 42 U.S.C. 1983 based on unreasonable and unlawful seizure of the person, malicious prosecution, and violation of the Whistle-Blower Law.The West Virginia Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition. Bailey cannot maintain section 1983 claims against MFCU and Lyle. Bailey’s whistle-blower claim against Lyle is unsustainable because Lyle had no authority over Bailey’s employment. Bailey’s malicious prosecution claim fails to allege sufficient facts to meet the required heightened pleading standard to overcome MFCU’s and Lyle’s qualified immunity. View "State of West Virginia v. Ballard" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff's claims for disability discrimination, in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Mass Gen. Laws ch. 151B, and for age discrimination, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, holding that there was no error.The district court (1) concluded that Plaintiff had failed to carry her burden to make out a prima facie case that she was a "qualified individual" under the ADA and thus also failed to do so under chapter 151B; and (2) concluded that Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant's proffered reason for her termination was pretextual. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's ADA and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B disability discrimination claims; and (2) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of age discrimination under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B. View "Der Sarkisian v. Austin Preparatory School" on Justia Law

In 2011, Lutter began working for Essex County, in a bargaining unit represented by JNESO. Under Supreme Court precedent (Abood), a public-sector union could charge fees from non-union members whom the union represented. New Jersey law permitted public-sector unions to deduct an "agency fee." Lutter joined JNESO and authorized payroll deductions of her union dues.In 2018, New Jersey enacted the Workplace Democracy Enhancement Act (WDEA): a union member could revoke authorization for payroll deductions only during the 10 days following the anniversary of his employment start date. Previously, union members could give notice of revocation at any time. A month later, the Supreme Court (Janus) held that the First Amendment prohibits public-sector unions from collecting agency fees from nonmembers without their clear and affirmative consent. Under WDEA Janus would have to wait nearly a year to revoke her payroll deduction authorization. In July 2018, she nonetheless requested that deductions of her union dues cease and resigned from JNESO. Essex County deducted Lutter's union dues for 10 months.Lutter filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. JNESO sent her a check in the amount of the contested union dues plus interest. She did not cash or deposit that check. The district court dismissed the case. The Third Circuit affirmed in part. The check did not moot her damages claims against JNESO but Lutter, as a non-union member no longer subject to payroll deductions, lacks standing for her claims against the other parties and for her additional requests for relief against JNESO. View "Lutter v. Jneso" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a black female, worked at Crestwood Hospital as an emergency department nurse from 2007 to 2018. Plaintiff repeatedly complained about racial discrimination in the months before Crestwood Healthcare terminated her employment. But, also during that period, Crestwood uncovered evidence that Plaintiff engaged in bullying and other misconduct. After Plaintiff sued Crestwood for retaliating against her complaints of discrimination, she argued that circumstantial evidence created a reasonable inference of retaliation under either the McDonnell Douglas framework or a “convincing mosaic” of proof. The district court disagreed and entered summary judgment in favor of Crestwood.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that although an employee may prove retaliation with whatever circumstantial evidence creates a reasonable inference of retaliation, Plaintiff’s evidence falls short. The court wrote that Plaintiff turned to evidence of systematically better treatment of similarly situated employees. She asserts that two employees engaged in similar misconduct but were not terminated. The court explained that nothing in the record suggests that either of those employees engaged in misconduct comparable in degree or kind to Plaintiff’s misconduct. Neither employee was the subject of multiple reports that they were unprofessional, threatening, intimidating, and abusive. The court explained that because Plaintiff cannot prove that other employees engaged in a similar degree of misconduct, she lacks evidence of better treatment of similarly situated employees. View "Daphne Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, et al" on Justia Law

The U.S. Department of Labor brought the underlying lawsuit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, alleging that Appellants Brian Bowers and Dexter Kubota sold their company to an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) at an allegedly inflated value. The government’s case hinged on a single valuation expert, who opined that the plan overpaid for that company. The district court rejected the opinion, and the government lost a bench trial. The district court denied Appellants’ request for attorneys’ fees and nontaxable costs under EAJA, finding that the government’s litigation position was “substantially justified” and that it did not act in bad faith.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees and nontaxable costs. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the government’s position at trial was substantially justified, and in denying attorneys’ fees and nontaxable costs under EAJA. The panel noted that the government could not rely on red flags alone, such as the “suspicious” circumstances of the ESOP transaction, to defend its litigation position as “substantially justified.” The panel held that the district court abused its discretion in reducing the award of taxable costs because it relied on a clearly erroneous finding of fact in reducing the magistrate judge’s recommended award of taxable costs. View "JULIE SU V. BRIAN BOWERS, ET AL" on Justia Law