Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court finding that an arbitration agreement between the parties in this case was enforceable, granting AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico, Inc.’s (AT&T) motion to compel arbitration and dismissing Nereida Rivera-Colon’s (Rivera) suit, holding that Rivera manifested her intent to accept the agreement to arbitrate legal grievances as per Puerto Rico law.Rivera filed suit against AT&T, her former employer, alleging age discrimination and wrongful termination. AT&T entered a special appearance and moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. In response, Rivera argued that there was no valid arbitration agreement. The district court held that the arbitration agreement was enforceable and granted the motion to compel arbitration. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, under Puerto Rico law, Rivera was bound by the arbitration agreement because she failed to opt out of the agreement. View "Rivera-Colon v. AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s complaint claiming that he was fired from his job in retaliation for accusing his employer of violating the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and making false representations in customer contracts, holding that Appellant plausibly pleaded that he engaged in protected conduct within the meaning of a False Claims Act (FCA) retaliation claim.The district court dismissed the complaint after finding that Appellant did not allege sufficient facts to show he was engaged in protected conduct within the meaning of the retaliation provision of the FCA. The First Circuit affirmed as to the contractual language claim but vacated and remanded as to the AKS claim, holding that Appellant plausibly pleaded that the concerns he raised about certain payments could have led to an FCA action. View "Guilfoile v. Shields" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court finding the board of regents of Harris-Stowe State University liable on Dr. Shereen Kader’s claims of national origin discrimination and retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), holding that the circuit court’s jury instructions were erroneous and prejudicial.The jury returned a verdict in Dr. Kader’s favor on her claims of national original discrimination and retaliation, awarding $750,000 in actual damages and $1.75 million in punitive damages. The circuit court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict. On appeal, Harris-Stowe argued that the circuit court’s disjunctive jury instructions Nos. 8 and 9 misled and confused the jury, thereby resulting in prejudice. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the circuit court’s jury instructions were erroneous and prejudicial because they included at least one alternative that did not constitute actionable conduct under the MHRA. View "Kader v. Board of Regents of Harris-Stowe State University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Chief Justice Valdez in his individual and official capacities, arguing that Valdez intervened in plaintiff's hiring as retaliation for plaintiff filing a complaint against Valdez. The Fifth Circuit held that Valdez is entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established as of May 2014 that where a briefing attorney swore as part of his employment to comply with a code of conduct requiring him to report judicial misconduct to a specific state authority, he nonetheless spoke as a citizen in reporting a judge to that authority. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order denying Valdez's motion for summary judgment in both his official and individual capacity. View "Anderson v. Valdez" on Justia Law

In 1998, Do a government employee since 1990, was hired by HUD’s Information Systems Audit Division. She became Division Director. In 2006, Asuncion, then working as a Justice Department auditor, applied for a GS-11 position in Do’s Division. On her resume and Questionnaire, Asuncion claimed she had a college degree in accounting. A pre-employment investigation revealed that Asuncion did not have that degree. Asuncion explained that she had completed the required coursework but needed to take one additional course to raise her GPA. Asuncion claimed good-faith mistake and promised to secure her degree. After conferring with her supervisor, Do approved Asuncion’s hiring. Asuncion was eventually promoted. In 2009, Do posted two GS-14 auditor positions. Human resources flagged Asuncion “as a qualified candidate.” Do selected Asuncion, knowing that Asuncion still did not have an accounting degree. Do later was advised that Asuncion could continue as an auditor but must obtain her degree. Asuncion resigned in 2016. HUD demoted Do to Nonsupervisory Senior Auditor and suspended her for 14 days. The Federal Circuit reversed. Do’s due process rights were violated; the Board relied on a new ground to sustain the discipline. Do's notice alleged a single charge of “negligence of duty” in hiring and promoting Asuncion. The Board’s decision concluded that Do negligently failed to investigate whether Asuncion met alternative requirements. That alternative theory appears nowhere in the notice or in the deciding official’s decision. View "Do v. Department of Housing and Urban Development" on Justia Law

Labor Code section 226.2, a recently enacted law articulating wage requirements applicable where an employer uses a piece-rate method of compensating its employees, is not unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeal held that the demurrer was properly sustained as to constitutional challenges to the statute, and the statutory phrase "other nonproductive time" as "time under the employer's control, exclusive of rest and recovery periods, that is not directly related to the activity being compensated on a piece-rate basis" provides an adequately discernable standard that possesses a reasonable degree of specificity. Furthermore, because the substance of the declaratory relief cause of action, to the extent that it went beyond the basic issues the court has clarified, constituted a nonjusticiable request for an advisory opinion, the court concluded that it was properly dismissed. View "Nisei Farmers League v. California Labor & Workforce Development Agency" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, BNSF, for disability discrimination and retaliation after he was diagnosed with Parkinson's disease and later placed on medical leave by the company. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for BNSF on plaintiff's disability discrimination claim, holding that even assuming BNSF's alleged safety concerns were legitimate and non-discriminatory, the totality of the circumstances created a material fact issue as to whether BNSF's proffered reasons for refusing to reinstate plaintiff were merely pretextual.The court affirmed the district court's judgment regarding the retaliation claim and held that plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to support a causal link between the filing of his EEOC claim and his continued placement on medical leave. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Nall v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

A county school board may require all applicants for substitute teacher positions to submit to and pass a drug test as a condition of employment. The Eleventh Circuit held that the school board may, without any suspicion of wrongdoing, collect and search -- by testing -- the urine of all prospective substitute teachers. Because the school board has a sufficiently compelling interest in screening its prospective teachers to justify this invasion of the privacy rights of job applicants, the court held that the school board did not violate the constitutional mandate barring unreasonable searches and seizures. The court recognized that ensuring the safety of millions of schoolchildren in the mandatory supervision and care of the state, and ensuring and impressing a drug-free environment in our classrooms, were compelling concerns. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction because plaintiff failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. View "Friedenberg v. School Board of Palm Beach County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court entering judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant terminated her employment in violation of the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), holding that Plaintiff complied with the statutory requirements for commencing a FEPA violation action in superior court.Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint on the basis that, as to the FEPA claim, Plaintiff had not properly and timely requested a right-to-sue letter from the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights as required by R.I. Gen. Laws 28-5-24.1. The Commission intervened. The hearing justice granted Defendant’s and the Commission’s motions to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff had not timely requested a right-to-sue letter. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below, holding that, based on the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff complied with the requirements of section 28-5-24.1 for bringing this FEPA action. View "Mokwenyei v. Rhode Island Hospital" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to defendant, the chief of police, on plaintiff's hostile work environment claim where plaintiff, a police sergeant, sufficiently alleged that he sustained harassment that undermined his ability to work and defendant was deliberately indifferent to this racially hostile work environment.The court also affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on 42 U.SC. 1981 claims where plaintiff's allegations of a retaliatory shift change supported a claim of unlawful retaliation that a reasonable officer would know was unlawful. However, the court reversed as to plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim where defendant was entitled to qualified immunity, because it was not clearly established that an internal complaint of discrimination made only to supervisors, primarily to vindicate one's own rights, qualified as speech made as a citizen rather than as an employee. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Halstead" on Justia Law