Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit withdrew the prior opinion and substituted the following opinion.In this case, a nurse alleged that an assisted living center allowed a hostile work environment to continue by not preventing a resident's repetitive harassment. Plaintiff filed suit under Title VII after she was terminated in part for refusing to care for an aggressive patient in a nursing home.The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the harassment claim and held that the evidence of persistent and often physical harassment by the aggressive patient was enough to allow a jury to decide whether a reasonable caregiver on the receiving end of the harassment would have viewed it as sufficiently severe or pervasive even considering the medical condition of the harasser. In this case, an objectively reasonable caregiver would not expect a patient to grope her daily, injure her so badly she could not work for three months, and have her complaints met with laughter and dismissal by the administration. The court allowed the district court to consider plaintiff's retaliation claim via direct evidence for the first instance on remand. View "Gardner v. CLC of Pascagoula, LLC" on Justia Law

The common-law agency test is the most appropriate test for determining whether an entity is a joint employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC brought an enforcement action under Title VII on behalf of Thai workers alleging discrimination charges against Green Acre Farms and Valley Fruit Orchards. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the EEOC's allegations regarding non-orchard-related matters, which in turn affected each of the other decisions under review.The panel held, under the common-law agency test, that the EEOC plausibly alleged that defendants were also joint employers with respect to non-orchard-related matters; the EEOC's allegations stated a plausible basis for holding Green Acre liable for discrimination relating to non-orchard-related matters; and the district court should have granted the EEOC leave to amend its complaint regarding Valley Fruit's liability with respect to such matters. View "EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc." on Justia Law

After the sheriff's department decided not to reinstate plaintiff, she filed suit against the county alleging retaliation and sex, pregnancy, and disability discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA). The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of her claims and held that her Title VII claim failed because she did not plead any facts showing that another candidate was similarly situated or went through a reinstatement process. Because her state claim mirrored her Title VII claim, it likewise failed. View "Jones v. Douglas County Sheriff's Department" on Justia Law

Christopher Floeting alleged a Group Health Cooperative employee repeatedly sexually harassed him while he was seeking medical treatment. He sued Group Health for the unwelcome and offensive sexual conduct under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, which made it unlawful for any person or the person's agency or employee to commit an act of discrimination in any place of public accommodation. The trial court dismissed on summary judgment, pursuant to Group Health's argument the employment discrimination standard applied. The Court of Appeals reversed. Group Health argued the Washington Supreme Court should import workplace sexual harassment doctrines into the public accommodations context, thereby limiting its employer liability. Declining to do so, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court. View "Floeting v. Grp. Health Coop." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the superior court’s allowance of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and remanded this discrimination case, holding that the trial judge erred in determining that Plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of showing a prima facie case of discrimination.Plaintiff, a lieutenant in the Massachusetts State police, brought this Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4 action alleging that he suffered discrimination when he was denied a transfer to a different troop station on the basis of his age, race, or national origin. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the State police, holding that Plaintiff did not meet his burden of showing that the denial of his request for a lateral transfer was an “adverse employment action.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the superior court’s judgment, holding (1) under certain circumstances, the failure to grant a lateral transfer to a preferred position may constitute an adverse employment action under ch. 151B; and (2) because Plaintiff met his burden of showing a prima facie case of discrimination, this case is remanded to the motion judge to decide the issue of whether Plaintiff’s request for a lateral transfer was motivated by discriminatory animus. View "Yee v. Massachusetts State Police" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and the union he represents filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First and Fourteenth Amendment claims, seeking to reinstate privileges that granted them special access to restricted Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) property. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the transportation officials, holding that the MTA's actions against the union did not amount to unconstitutionally adverse behavior. In this case, plaintiff and the union's interest in maintaining access to restricted MTA property was slight when compared to the government's interest in regulating such access. Therefore, MTA's access policies were not sufficiently adverse to support a First Amendment retaliation claim.The court rejected the Fourth Amendment claims, holding that the police acted reasonably when it escorted plaintiff from MTA property. In this case, plaintiff's lawful purpose did not give him carte blanche to access restricted MTA offices, and the MTA had explicitly barred him from entering its restricted property without permission. Therefore, the police had probable cause to believe that plaintiff was violating the law. Finally, there was no reversible error in denying plaintiff and the union's discovery requests. View "McClure v. Ports" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Employer on Plaintiff’s claims alleging handicap discrimination and retaliation under Massachusetts state law, holding that there was no probative evidence of discrimination or retaliation.While Employer maintained that Plaintiff was fired because she violated company policy on unexcused absences, Plaintiff argued in her claim that she was fired because of her disability and that Employer retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that neither of Plaintiff’s claims could survive summary judgment. View "Miceli v. JetBlue Airways Corp." on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment to all Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination, unlawful retaliation, and violations of the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment, holding that summary judgment was properly granted as to Rodney Bouffard and Troy Ross but improperly granted as to Correct Care Solutions, LLC (CCS) and Maine Department of Corrections (MDOC).Plaintiff was employed by CCS at a MDOC prison. After MDOC revoked Plaintiff’s prison security clearance and CCS terminated Plaintiff’s employment, Plaintiff sued CCS, MDOC, and Bouffard, the warden, and Ross, the deputy warden, bringing claims under the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all claims. The First Circuit held (1) a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff’s work environment was hostile; (2) summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the warden and deputy warden based on qualified immunity; (3) an employer can be liable for a hostile work environment created by non-employees as long as the employer knew of the harassment and failed to take reasonable steps to address it; and (4) summary judgment was improper was to MDOC and CCS. View "Roy v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated in part the judgment of the district court overruling Plaintiff’s motion to recuse and granting summary judgment to Defendants on all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims, holding that the judge should have recused himself.Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant, her former employer, claiming retaliation, hostile work environment, and other claims. The district court granted summary judgment on the latter three claims. Defendant then moved for summary judgment on the retaliation and hostile work environment claims. When the district court judge assigned to the case became aware that his brother-in-law was a potential witness Plaintiff moved for recusal. Plaintiff then amended her complaint and added a claim under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d). The district court overruled the motion to recuse and granted summary judgment on the remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed to the extent of the claims disposed of before the assertion of the Equal Pay Act claim and vacated as to all other claims, holding that because the judge’s brother-in-law was likely to be a material witness, Neb. Rev. Stat. 5-302.11(A)(2)(d) mandated disqualification of the judge. View "Thompson v. Millard Public School District No. 17" on Justia Law

Frederick Theodore Rall III, a political cartoonist and blogger, filed suit against the Los Angeles Times after it published a "note to readers" and a later more detailed report questioning the accuracy of a blog post plaintiff wrote for The Times. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendants' anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motions to strike the complaint.The court held that The Times' articles were published in a public forum and concerned issues of public interest, and thus the written statements were protected free speech activity. Furthermore, the articles were absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d), because they were a fair and true report of an LAPD investigation that was central to the substance of the articles. Therefore, plaintiff failed to produce evidence demonstrating a probability of prevailing on his defamation claims. In regard to plaintiff's wrongful termination claims, the court held that plaintiff's employment claims arose directly from The Times's protected First Amendment conduct: deciding not to publish plaintiff's work. Therefore, plaintiff failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of his employment claims. View "Rall v. Tribune 365 LLC" on Justia Law