Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
Joyner v. Morrison and Foerster LLP
Junius Joyner, III, an African-American male, was hired by a legal staffing agency, Mestel & Company (Hire Counsel), and assigned to work at Morrison & Foerster LLP in Washington, D.C. He worked on the merger of Sprint Corporation with T-Mobile U.S., Inc. from July to December 2019. Joyner alleged several incidents of racial discrimination and a hostile work environment, including delayed work assignments, derogatory comments, and harassment by coworkers. He also claimed wrongful discharge under D.C. law, asserting he was terminated after reporting potential antitrust violations.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Joyner’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that Joyner did not provide sufficient facts to support his claims of racial discrimination and a hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. The court also dismissed his wrongful discharge claim under D.C. law, concluding that it lacked supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Joyner’s federal claims, agreeing that Joyner failed to plausibly allege that his treatment was racially motivated or that the work environment was sufficiently hostile. The court found that Joyner’s allegations did not meet the necessary standard to infer racial discrimination or a hostile work environment. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment on the wrongful discharge claim, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this claim and remanded it with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Joyner v. Morrison and Foerster LLP" on Justia Law
Edelman v. NYU Langone Health System
Dr. Sari Edelman, a female rheumatologist, was employed by the New York University (NYU) hospital system. After nearly five years of employment without disciplinary issues, she had disputes with Joseph Antonik and David Kaplan regarding her office space. Edelman claimed that Antonik used a gender-based slur and behaved aggressively, and that Kaplan's subsequent handling of the issue was discriminatory. She lodged complaints with NYU human resources, alleging gender discrimination and hostile behavior. Her employment contract was not renewed the following year, leading to her termination.Edelman sued various NYU entities and individual employees, asserting claims under the federal and New York Equal Pay Acts, Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted partial judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) in favor of some defendants and dismissed certain claims. The jury found in favor of Edelman on her retaliation claims against NYU and Antonik, awarding her $700,000 in damages, but found for the defendants on all other claims. The District Court later granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) for the defendants, vacating the jury's verdict in favor of Edelman.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts in Edelman's favor on her retaliation claims against NYU and Antonik. The court vacated the District Court's grant of JNOV for these claims and remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury's verdict. The court also vacated the District Court's decision granting JMOL in favor of Kaplan on the retaliation claim and remanded for a new trial on that claim. The judgment on the remaining claims was affirmed. View "Edelman v. NYU Langone Health System" on Justia Law
DAMIANO V. GRANTS PASS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 7
Two plaintiffs, a middle school teacher and an assistant principal, were employed by a school district in Oregon. They created the "I Resolve" campaign, which included a website and a video uploaded to YouTube, advocating for policies on gender identity, parental rights, and education. They used their own devices and time but also sent emails from their school accounts to district employees with links to the campaign. Following complaints from employees, students, and concerned citizens, and an independent investigator's determination that they violated district policies, the district terminated them but later reinstated them and transferred them to other positions.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted summary judgment in favor of the school district and individual defendants on all claims. The plaintiffs alleged that their termination was in retaliation for their protected speech and that they were discriminated against based on their religion and viewpoint. The district court concluded that the defendants' interests in avoiding disruption outweighed the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights and that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's summary judgment. It held that there were genuine disputes regarding the circumstances of the plaintiffs' expressive conduct and the extent of the resulting disruption. The court affirmed the summary judgment for the individual defendants on the First Amendment claim for damages due to qualified immunity but vacated the summary judgment for the district on the First Amendment claim for damages and the related claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court also vacated the summary judgment on the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim and the Title VII claim, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the credibility of the district's proffered reasons for the terminations. View "DAMIANO V. GRANTS PASS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 7" on Justia Law
Rheeder v. Gray
A custodian for a city police department sued the city and some of its employees, claiming she experienced sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The custodian alleged that a deputy chief made her uncomfortable with his behavior and comments, and that after she reported this, she faced retaliation from her administrative manager, who threatened her and her coworkers.The Iowa District Court for Linn County denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the custodian's claims of sexual harassment and retaliation, except for the claim of constructive discharge. The defendants then sought interlocutory review.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the alleged harassment by the deputy chief was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to support an ICRA claim. The court also determined that the alleged acts of retaliation by the administrative manager did not amount to a materially adverse action as required for an ICRA claim. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for dismissal of the custodian's claims. View "Rheeder v. Gray" on Justia Law
Misjuns v. City of Lynchburg
Martin Misjuns, a Fire Captain and paramedic with the Lynchburg Fire Department, was terminated after posting offensive social media content targeting transgender individuals. Misjuns alleged that his termination was due to his political and religious views, which he expressed on his Facebook pages. He claimed that the City of Lynchburg and its officials conspired to violate his constitutional rights, leading to his firing.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed all of Misjuns' claims. The court found that the claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities were duplicative and dismissed them. The court also dismissed Misjuns' breach of contract, equal protection, conspiracy, and wrongful termination claims. The court partially dismissed his First Amendment claims but later dismissed them entirely.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Misjuns' claims. The court held that Misjuns failed to establish Monell liability against the City of Lynchburg, as he did not adequately plead that a policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violations. The court also found that the City's Employment Policies & Procedures handbook did not constitute a binding contract, thus dismissing the breach of contract claim. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the conspiracy and wrongful termination claims against the individual defendants, as those claims were not asserted against the City and had been dismissed by agreement.The Fourth Circuit concluded that Misjuns did not sufficiently plead facts to state a claim for relief on any of his six claims, affirming the district court's decision. View "Misjuns v. City of Lynchburg" on Justia Law
Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services
Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, worked for the Ohio Department of Youth Services since 2004. In 2019, she applied for a management position but was passed over in favor of a lesbian woman. Subsequently, Ames was demoted from her role as a program administrator, and a gay man was hired to fill her previous position. Ames filed a lawsuit under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on her sexual orientation.The District Court granted summary judgment to the agency, applying the McDonnell Douglas framework for evaluating disparate-treatment claims. The court held that Ames failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination because she did not show "background circumstances" suggesting the agency discriminated against majority-group members. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, requiring Ames to meet this additional burden as a straight woman.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case. The Court held that the Sixth Circuit's "background circumstances" rule, which imposes a heightened evidentiary standard on majority-group plaintiffs, is inconsistent with Title VII's text and precedents. Title VII prohibits discrimination against any individual based on protected characteristics without distinguishing between majority and minority groups. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for application of the proper prima facie standard under Title VII. View "Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services" on Justia Law
Brokken v. Hennepin County
Petra Brokken sued her employer, Hennepin County, alleging religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), and wrongful discharge under Minnesota’s Refusal of Treatment statute. Brokken claimed that the County's Covid-19 vaccine and testing policy conflicted with her religious beliefs. After initially granting her a religious exemption, the County revised its policy, threatening termination and loss of accrued benefits if she did not comply. Brokken retired under duress and subsequently filed her lawsuit.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Brokken's claims. The court ruled that she failed to plead an adverse employment action, did not plausibly plead religious beliefs conflicting with the County’s policy, and that the MHRA does not provide a cause of action for failure to accommodate religious beliefs. Additionally, the court found that Minnesota’s Refusal of Treatment statute does not create a private right of action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the wrongful discharge claim under Minnesota’s Refusal of Treatment statute, agreeing that it does not create a private right of action. However, the court reversed the dismissal of Brokken’s Title VII and MHRA claims. The appellate court held that Brokken plausibly pled an adverse employment action and sufficiently alleged that her religious beliefs conflicted with the County’s policy. The court also recognized that the MHRA provides protection against failures to accommodate religious beliefs. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Brokken v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law
Smith v. City of Atlantic City
Alexander Smith, a Christian firefighter in Atlantic City, was prohibited from growing a beard due to the city's grooming policy, which he claimed violated his religious beliefs. Smith sued the city, alleging violations of the Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and Title VII’s accommodation and anti-retaliation provisions. The District Court denied his motion for a preliminary injunction and later granted summary judgment for the city on all claims.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially denied Smith's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that his claims were unlikely to succeed on the merits. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the city on all four claims, leading Smith to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the District Court’s judgment regarding Smith’s Title VII accommodation claim and his free exercise claim, finding that the city's grooming policy was not generally applicable and failed strict scrutiny. The court affirmed the District Court’s judgment on the equal protection claim and the Title VII retaliation claim, concluding that Smith did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Additionally, the court reversed the denial of Smith’s motion for a preliminary injunction, recognizing a likelihood of success on the merits and the irreparable harm caused by the loss of First Amendment freedoms. View "Smith v. City of Atlantic City" on Justia Law
Oldham v. Penn State University
A private fencing coach alleged that during a flight, a university’s assistant fencing coach sexually harassed and assaulted her. She reported the incident to the university’s head coach, who discouraged her from reporting it further and, along with the assistant coach, allegedly retaliated against her within the fencing community. The university later investigated and confirmed the harassment but found no policy violation. The coach sued the university, the two coaches, and the Title IX coordinator, claiming violations of Title IX and state-law torts.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina transferred the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania due to improper venue and judicial efficiency. After the transfer, the plaintiff amended her complaint, and the defendants moved to dismiss. The transferee court dismissed the entire suit, holding that the plaintiff, as neither a student nor an employee, was outside the zone of interests protected by Title IX. It also dismissed the state-law tort claims as untimely or implausible.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the zone-of-interests test applies to Title IX claims and that the plaintiff’s claims related to her exclusion from university-hosted fencing events and retaliation manifesting on campus were within that zone. The court affirmed the dismissal of the state-law tort claims against the university and its employees, except for the claims against the assistant coach, which were not time-barred under North Carolina’s three-year statute of limitations. The case was vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oldham v. Penn State University" on Justia Law
BUTLER v. COLLINS
Cheryl Butler was hired as an assistant law professor at Southern Methodist University (SMU) in 2011. After a mandatory third-year performance review, her contract was renewed, and she became eligible for tenure consideration in the fall semester of 2015. Due to illness, Butler requested an extension of the tenure vote, which was denied, but she was later granted leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) for the spring semester of 2016. Her tenure committee, chaired by Professor Roy Anderson, concluded that Butler met tenure standards for scholarship and service but not teaching. Consequently, the law faculty voted not to recommend tenure, and Butler's appeals to the SMU Law School Dean and the Provost were unsuccessful. Butler completed the 2016-2017 academic year without teaching any classes.Butler filed a lawsuit against SMU and several of its employees, alleging racially discriminatory tenure standards and processes, and retaliation for her internal complaints about race, disability, and FMLA discrimination. She brought federal statutory claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title IX, and the FMLA. Additionally, she asserted state-law discrimination and retaliation claims under Texas Labor Code Chapter 21, along with state common law claims for breach of contract and negligent supervision. Against the employee defendants, she claimed defamation, conspiracy to defame, and fraud.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed Butler's defamation and fraud claims against the employee defendants, citing preemption by Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. The court held that the gravamen of these claims was unlawful employment discrimination and retaliation, which Chapter 21 specifically addresses. Butler appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of Texas regarding whether Chapter 21 preempts common law defamation and fraud claims against employees based on the same conduct as discrimination claims against the employer.The Supreme Court of Texas held that Chapter 21 does not preempt common law defamation and fraud claims against employees. The court reasoned that Chapter 21 subjects only employers to liability for discriminatory and retaliatory conduct and does not immunize individuals from liability for their own tortious actions. Therefore, Butler's defamation and fraud claims against the employee defendants are not foreclosed by Chapter 21. View "BUTLER v. COLLINS" on Justia Law