Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A high school student, Adrianna Wadsworth, filed a lawsuit against her principal, Andrew Cavanaugh, a school social worker, Chuck Nguyen, and the school district, MSAD 40/RSU 40, alleging constitutional violations and a Title IX claim. Wadsworth claimed that Cavanaugh sexually harassed her, Nguyen failed to protect her, and the school district was indifferent to the harassment.The United States District Court for the District of Maine dismissed some of Wadsworth's claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on others. The court dismissed the supervisor-liability claim against Nguyen, finding no control over Cavanaugh. It also granted summary judgment to Cavanaugh on the substantive due process claim, concluding that non-physical harassment did not violate Wadsworth's right to bodily integrity. The court found that Wadsworth's equal protection claim against Cavanaugh was valid but granted him qualified immunity. Nguyen was granted summary judgment on the state-created-danger claim, as his conduct did not shock the conscience. The court also granted summary judgment to MSAD on the § 1983 municipal liability claim, finding no deliberate indifference, and on the Title IX claim, concluding that the assistant principals did not have actual knowledge of the harassment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court's decision on the substantive due process claim against Cavanaugh but reversed the summary judgment on the equal protection claim, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Cavanaugh's conduct was severe and pervasive enough to constitute sexual harassment. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the supervisor-liability claim against Nguyen and the summary judgment on the state-created-danger claim. However, it reversed the summary judgment on the Title IX claim against MSAD, concluding that a reasonable jury could find that the assistant principals had actual knowledge of the harassment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Wadsworth v. MSAD 40/RSU 40" on Justia Law

The case involves Jose Rosado, a Hispanic male of Colombian origin, who worked as an Information Technology (IT) Specialist for the United States Navy. Rosado alleged that he was denied promotions on five occasions between 2014 and 2018 due to race, national origin, and age discrimination, as well as retaliation for his prior Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) activity. The promotions in question were for various IT Specialist positions within the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southeast (NAVFAC SE).In the lower court, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy. The court concluded that Rosado failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation for any of the promotion decisions. Specifically, the court found that Rosado did not provide sufficient evidence to show that he was equally or more qualified than the individuals who were selected for the positions or that the Navy's decisions were influenced by discriminatory or retaliatory motives.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Rosado did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he failed to show that the selected candidates were similarly situated in all material respects or that unlawful discrimination played any part in the Navy's decision-making process. Additionally, the court found that Rosado did not present sufficient evidence to support his retaliation claims, as there was no indication that retaliatory animus influenced the Navy's actions.In summary, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Navy, concluding that Rosado did not provide enough evidence to support his claims of discrimination and retaliation. View "Rosado v. Secretary, U.S. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

Betty Grooms, a Missouri clerk of court, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Alice Bell and Judge Steven Privette, alleging violations of her First Amendment rights through discrimination and retaliation, and violations of her substantive due process rights. Grooms, a Republican, had defeated Bell, a Democrat, in an election for Circuit Clerk. Bell, who retained her job under Grooms, later married Privette, a Republican judge. Tensions arose when Bell and Privette were uncooperative with Grooms, leading to Bell's resignation and announcement to run for Circuit Clerk. Privette ordered Grooms to prepare detailed spreadsheets, which he repeatedly rejected, and initiated a contempt prosecution against her, which was eventually dismissed by the Missouri Supreme Court.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri dismissed Grooms's claims, ruling that the defendants did not violate her clearly established First Amendment rights and did not violate her substantive due process rights. The court found that the defendants' actions did not constitute adverse employment actions under clearly established law and that Grooms did not suffer a serious deprivation of a protected interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Bell and Privette were entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim, as Grooms failed to show that their actions constituted adverse employment actions under clearly established law. Additionally, the court found that Grooms's substantive due process claim was inadequate, as she did not demonstrate a serious deprivation of a protected interest. The court concluded that the defendants' conduct did not shock the conscience and did not violate Grooms's substantive due process rights. View "Grooms v. Privette" on Justia Law

A national news reporter employed by a prominent newspaper sued her employer and six of its editors in Superior Court, alleging violations of the D.C. Human Rights Act and the common law tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. She claimed that the defendants discriminated against her based on her status as a sexual assault victim and her gender, took adverse employment actions against her, subjected her to a hostile work environment, and retaliated against her for protesting their discriminatory actions.The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and filed a special motion to dismiss under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act, arguing that the claims arose from acts in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest. The Superior Court denied the special motion to dismiss, finding that the claims did not arise from speech protected by the Anti-SLAPP Act, but granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, concluding that the complaint failed to plausibly allege unlawful discrimination or retaliation.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the denial of the special motion to dismiss, agreeing that the Anti-SLAPP Act did not apply. The court reversed the dismissal of the counts alleging adverse action discrimination, finding that the complaint plausibly alleged that the defendants took certain adverse employment actions against the reporter in violation of the Human Rights Act. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the hostile work environment and retaliation claims, concluding that the allegations did not meet the necessary legal standards. The court also noted that it was premature to decide whether the defendants' actions were protected by the First Amendment, leaving that issue open for further proceedings. View "Sonmez v. WP Company, LLC" on Justia Law

A registered nurse, Alexandra Melino, sued her former employer, Boston Medical Center (BMC), alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Massachusetts General Laws by denying her request for a religious exemption from BMC's COVID-19 vaccination mandate. Melino's primary duties involved direct patient care in critical units. During the pandemic, BMC converted several units to COVID-19 units and faced significant staffing challenges due to the virus. BMC implemented a vaccination policy based on CDC recommendations to mitigate the risk of COVID-19 transmission among staff and patients.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment to BMC, holding that Melino's requested exemption would impose undue hardship on the hospital. The court found that Melino could not work remotely, could not work in-person unvaccinated without risking patient safety, and that any feasible accommodation would impose substantial costs on BMC. Melino's motion to strike portions of an affidavit submitted by BMC was also denied due to her failure to comply with local procedural rules.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that BMC had demonstrated undue hardship by showing that allowing Melino to work unvaccinated would increase the risk of COVID-19 transmission. The court noted that Melino did not provide any medical evidence to contradict BMC's reliance on CDC recommendations. Additionally, Melino's argument that BMC should have considered alternative accommodations was waived as it was not raised in the lower court. The court upheld the district court's rulings, affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of BMC. View "Melino v. Boston Medical Center" on Justia Law

Caroline Retzios was terminated by Epic Systems Corporation after she refused to be vaccinated against COVID-19, citing religious objections. She filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming that Epic was required to accommodate her religious beliefs. Epic requested the district court to compel arbitration based on an agreement Retzios had signed, which the court granted, subsequently dismissing the suit.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the case after referring it to arbitration, despite Epic's request for a stay. According to the Federal Arbitration Act, a stay should have been issued instead of a dismissal when arbitration is requested. This dismissal allowed Retzios to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court erred in dismissing the suit instead of staying it. However, the appellate court proceeded with the case due to the district court's actions. The appellate court found that Retzios's claims fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement she had signed with Epic. The court rejected Retzios's arguments against the enforceability of the arbitration agreement, including her claims of promissory estoppel and waiver. The court also found her objections to arbitration to be frivolous and granted Epic's motion for sanctions, directing Retzios to reimburse Epic for its legal expenses incurred on appeal. The decision of the district court was affirmed, with sanctions imposed on Retzios. View "Retzios v Epic Systems Corp." on Justia Law

George Rodrique, II, a photographer for WCVB-TV, sued his employer, Hearst Stations, Inc. ("Hearst"), after it denied his request for a religious exemption from the company's COVID-19 vaccination requirement and subsequently terminated him for refusing to receive the vaccine. Rodrique claimed that Hearst's actions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits religious discrimination in employment.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted Hearst's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Rodrique's objections to the vaccine were not religious in nature. The court did not address whether accommodating Rodrique's request would have imposed an undue hardship on Hearst.Rodrique appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, arguing that his objections were indeed religious and that granting the exemption would not have caused undue hardship. He contended that Hearst provided insufficient evidence that the COVID-19 vaccine reduces virus transmission.The First Circuit assumed, without deciding, that Rodrique's objections were religious. However, it affirmed the district court's summary judgment on different grounds, holding that Hearst reasonably relied on objective medical evidence, including public health guidance, to conclude that the vaccine reduces the likelihood of transmitting COVID-19. The court found that Hearst's reliance on such evidence was reasonable and that accommodating Rodrique's request would have imposed an undue hardship on the company. Thus, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment to Hearst. View "Rodrique v. Hearst Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

Marcus Todd, a state employee in Minnesota, alleged that a union violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by deducting union dues from his paycheck without his consent. Todd joined the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees in 2014 and authorized dues deductions. In 2018, a new authorization card was allegedly signed electronically with Todd's name, which he claims was forged. After the Supreme Court's decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, Todd attempted to resign from the union and stop dues deductions, but the union continued until May 2021, citing an annual opt-out period.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Todd's federal claims, stating that he voluntarily agreed to the dues deductions before Janus and was contractually bound to the opt-out period. The court also found that the union did not act under color of state law regarding the alleged forgery and dismissed Todd's claims for prospective relief as moot. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over Todd's state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Todd's claims failed due to the lack of state action, as the union's actions were based on private agreements, not state statutes. The court referenced Hoekman v. Education Minnesota and Burns v. School Service Employees Union Local 284, which established that private agreements for dues deductions do not constitute state action. The court also found that the alleged forgery did not establish state action, as it was a private misuse of state law. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Todd v. AFSCME" on Justia Law

Marci Walkingstick Dixon, a Native American woman and member of the Cherokee Nation, worked at Northeastern State University (NSU) in the Information Technology Services Department. After being supervised by Dr. Richard Reif, she reported experiencing discriminatory comments and actions based on her race and sex. Following her complaint to NSU's Title IX officer, she faced increased hostility from Dr. Reif. In 2018, after a dispute over compensatory time and subsequent reprimand, she formally complained about a hostile work environment. NSU then began characterizing her time report as falsified and eventually terminated her employment, citing poor job performance and improper timekeeping.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment in favor of NSU and Dr. Reif on Dixon's claims of Title VII sex and race discrimination, Title VII retaliation, and FMLA retaliation. The court found that Dixon failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation and could not show that NSU's reasons for her termination were pretextual. The court also concluded that Dr. Reif was not Dixon's employer under the FMLA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's summary judgment on Dixon's Title VII sex and race discrimination claims and her Title VII retaliation claim, finding that she had established a prima facie case and presented sufficient evidence of pretext. However, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Reif on the FMLA retaliation claim, agreeing with the lower court's application of the economic reality test to determine that Dr. Reif was not Dixon's employer under the FMLA. View "Dixon v. Regional University System of the Oklahoma Board" on Justia Law

Carmen Wannamaker-Amos, a Black woman, worked in quality management at Purem Novi, Inc. for over thirty years. Despite receiving positive reviews from her supervisors, she faced negative treatment from Javad Hosseini, Purem’s chief quality executive. Hosseini repeatedly urged her supervisors to fire her, and in January 2020, after a problem with an automobile part, he requested her termination. Purem terminated her two days later. Wannamaker-Amos sued Purem, alleging racial and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina granted summary judgment to Purem, ruling that Wannamaker-Amos failed to produce sufficient evidence that the nondiscriminatory reason given for her firing was pretextual. The court found that she did not meet her employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of her termination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that numerous issues of material fact were in dispute. The court found that Wannamaker-Amos provided ample evidence to dispute Purem’s claims about her performance and that Hosseini’s criticisms were baseless. The court also noted that Purem’s shifting reasons for her termination and failure to follow its own disciplinary policies could indicate pretext for discrimination. The court emphasized that it is the role of the jury to decide which party’s evidence is more persuasive.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing a jury to determine whether Wannamaker-Amos was subjected to intentional discrimination. View "Wannamaker-Amos v. Purem Novi, Inc." on Justia Law