Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
by
David Hieber, who led Oakland County’s Equalization Department for nearly twenty years, was terminated after an employee reported him for creating a hostile work environment. Hieber sued Oakland County and his supervisor, Kyle Jen, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of pretermination and post-termination due process, political-affiliation retaliation, and age discrimination. He also brought state-law claims for defamation and age discrimination. Oakland County and Jen moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of Oakland County and Jen on all claims. Hieber appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Oakland County and Jen, in his official capacity, on Hieber’s pretermination due-process claim, finding that there was a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Hieber received a meaningful opportunity to respond to the charges against him. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment on Hieber’s post-termination due-process claim, political-affiliation retaliation claim, age discrimination claims, and defamation claim. The court also affirmed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Jen in his individual capacity on the due-process claims.The main holding of the Sixth Circuit was that Hieber’s pretermination due-process rights may have been violated, warranting further proceedings on that claim. The court found that the investigatory interview and the pretermination hearing may not have provided Hieber with adequate notice of the charges and a meaningful opportunity to respond. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Hieber v. Oakland County, Mich." on Justia Law

by
Kenya Watkins, a Black woman, was employed by Genesh, Inc., d/b/a Burger King, from August 2014 to August 2015. She alleged that her manager verbally, physically, and sexually harassed her, including forcing her into a freezer, groping her, simulating sex with her, and stating she would not be promoted unless she had sex with him. Watkins filed an employment discrimination charge with the Kansas Human Rights Commission and the EEOC in early 2016. In December 2018, she alleged that Genesh admonished her then-employer, Church’s Chicken, for hiring her, leading to a second EEOC charge in 2019.In August 2019, Watkins sued Genesh in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for race discrimination. The district court dismissed her complaint, finding her allegations did not plausibly support racial harassment. The court noted that Watkins had pending EEOC charges and could file her Title VII claims once the EEOC proceedings concluded. In July 2021, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter for her 2019 charge, which Watkins did not pursue. In April 2022, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter for her 2016 charge, leading Watkins to file a second lawsuit in July 2022, raising claims under Title VII and other statutes.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed Watkins’s 2022 complaint as untimely. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on claim preclusion grounds. The court held that Watkins’s Title VII claims were precluded by the final judgment in her 2019 lawsuit, as both suits arose from the same employment relationship. The court reaffirmed that the absence of a right-to-sue letter did not deprive Watkins of a full and fair opportunity to litigate her Title VII claims in the initial suit. View "Watkins v. Genesh" on Justia Law

by
Samuel Shanks and Taylor Lambert, former employees of the International Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers, filed pro se lawsuits against the Union alleging discrimination. Shanks, who worked in accounting for over twenty years, claimed discrimination based on disability, race, color, and sexual orientation, as well as a hostile work environment and retaliation. Lambert, his niece, alleged wrongful termination, retaliation, and discrimination based on race, religion, and gender. Both claimed violations of various civil rights laws, including the D.C. Human Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.The Union removed the cases to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which dismissed the complaints for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Shanks and Lambert appealed the dismissals. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissals in part but appointed amicus curiae to present arguments in favor of claims that were not suited for summary dismissal.The D.C. Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and concluded that the allegations of racial discrimination related to the Union’s COVID-19 vaccination policy were plausible. The court found that the Union’s two-stage roll-out of the policy disproportionately affected Black employees, who were given less time and fewer resources to comply with the vaccination mandate. The court held that the disparate impact and discriminatory treatment claims based on race were sufficiently pled to survive a motion to dismiss. The court affirmed the dismissal of other claims, including those based on sexual orientation, gender, and religion, as well as Shanks’ hostile work environment claim. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings on the racial discrimination claims. View "Shanks v. International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers" on Justia Law

by
Natasha Knox, a Black woman of Jamaican descent, worked as a customer service attendant at three Clean Rite laundromats in the Bronx from December 2018 until her termination in April 2019. She alleged that her supervisors, Cecilia Ashmeade and Kenneth Ferris, made derogatory comments about her race and national origin, and that Clean Rite failed to accommodate her disability following a thumb injury. Knox also claimed she was not paid for extra shifts worked at other locations and was wrongfully terminated after reimbursing herself for taxi fare from the cash register, which she claimed was permitted.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Clean Rite, dismissing Knox’s claims of discriminatory and retaliatory termination, hostile work environment, refusal to accommodate her disability, and unpaid wages. The district court found that Knox had not provided sufficient evidence to support her claims. Knox’s motion to strike the defendants’ answer and request for default judgment against Ashmeade and Ferris, who had failed to appear, was denied as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo and found that Knox had presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on all her claims. The court noted that evidence such as Knox’s testimony and sworn affidavit could lead a reasonable jury to find in her favor. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on each of Knox’s claims. The claims against Ashmeade and Ferris were reinstated for the district court to reconsider Knox’s motion to strike their answer and for default judgment. View "Knox v. CRC Management Co." on Justia Law

by
Former employees of Shriners Hospitals for Children were terminated for refusing to get a COVID-19 vaccination. They sued their employer, its agents, and the Executive Commissioner of Texas Health and Human Services, alleging violations of their right to refuse the vaccine under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) Statute, and various Texas state laws.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed all claims. It found no personal jurisdiction over the agents due to the fiduciary shield doctrine, determined that Shriners was not a state actor when it implemented the vaccination policy, and ruled that the EUA Statute did not apply. The court also dismissed the claims against the Commissioner, concluding she was not liable for failing to stop Shriners from enforcing the policy. The state-law claims were dismissed for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It agreed that there was no personal jurisdiction over the agents and that Shriners was not a state actor when it adopted the vaccination policy. The court also held that the EUA Statute did not apply to Shriners in its capacity as an employer and that the Commissioner was entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a clearly established right requiring her intervention. The appellate court modified the dismissal of the state-law claims to be without prejudice and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Pearson v. Shriners Hospitals" on Justia Law

by
Stacie Culp and Stephanie Peters, both servers at Remington of Montrose Golf Club, LLC, alleged they were sexually harassed by bartender Jason DeSalvo. They filed claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) for sexual harassment and retaliation. Remington's management conducted a limited investigation, resulting in DeSalvo's suspension and demotion. Culp claimed her hours were reduced in retaliation, leading to her resignation. Peters alleged inadequate investigation and retaliation, including being scheduled to work with DeSalvo post-suspension, leading to her departure.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment for Remington on Peters's retaliation claim but allowed other claims to proceed to trial. The jury found against Peters on her remaining claims and returned inconsistent special verdicts on Culp's claims, awarding her punitive damages under Title VII despite finding no violation of her rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment on Peters's retaliation claim, holding that neither the inadequate investigation nor the scheduling with DeSalvo constituted materially adverse actions. However, the court found the jury's verdict on Culp's claims irreconcilably inconsistent and vacated the verdict, remanding for a new trial on her harassment and retaliation claims. The court upheld the district court's evidentiary rulings, noting that objections to the admission of certain evidence were not properly preserved for appeal. View "Culp v. Remington of Montrose Golf Club" on Justia Law

by
Susan Kinder, a white woman, was employed by the Marion County Prosecutor’s Office (MCPO) and alleged racial discrimination when she was reassigned to a new role. She claimed violations of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. Kinder had conflicts with a black colleague, Lydia Richardson, who accused her of making racially insensitive remarks. An investigation found the animosity was mutual. The prosecutor decided to reassign both employees, but Kinder viewed her new role as a demotion.The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a right-to-sue letter on April 28, 2022, but Kinder’s counsel could not access it until July 6, 2022. Kinder filed her complaint on October 4, 2022, alleging Title VII and Equal Protection Clause violations. The MCPO moved for summary judgment, arguing the Title VII claim was untimely and that the office was not a suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment to the MCPO, finding the Title VII claim was filed outside the 90-day window and that the MCPO was an arm of the state, immune from § 1983 claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the 90-day period for filing the Title VII claim began when Kinder’s counsel was notified on June 15, 2022, that the right-to-sue letter was available, making the October 4 filing untimely. The court also held that the MCPO is an arm of the state and not a suable “person” under § 1983, as the office is financially interdependent with the state and enjoys state indemnification for employment-related actions. View "Kinder v Marion County Prosecutor's Office" on Justia Law

by
Annette Rodriguez, the plaintiff, served as the Director of the City of Corpus Christi and Nueces County Public Health District. Her salary was split between the City and the County. In 2019, the City increased her salary to 90% of the market rate. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Rodriguez requested and initially received overtime pay, but the City later stopped these payments. Rodriguez faced several allegations of policy violations and creating a hostile work environment, leading to a disciplinary memorandum. Despite a positive evaluation from the County, the City terminated her in 2022 and hired a new director.Rodriguez sued the City in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, claiming violations under the Equal Pay Act, Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed her Section 1983 claim on the pleadings, finding she did not allege a constitutionally protected interest in continued employment. The court granted summary judgment to the City on the remaining claims, concluding Rodriguez was exempt from FLSA overtime pay requirements, did not establish the equal-work or equal-pay prongs of her EPA claim, and failed to identify a proper comparator for her Title VII claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's rulings, agreeing that Rodriguez did not engage in protected activity under the FLSA, failed to identify a proper comparator for her Title VII and EPA claims, and did not establish pretext for retaliation. The court also found that Rodriguez remained an exempt employee despite receiving additional overtime pay temporarily. The court concluded that the City paid Rodriguez on a salary basis, maintaining her exempt status under the FLSA. View "Rodriguez v. City of Corpus Christi" on Justia Law

by
A high school student, Adrianna Wadsworth, filed a lawsuit against her principal, Andrew Cavanaugh, a school social worker, Chuck Nguyen, and the school district, MSAD 40/RSU 40, alleging constitutional violations and a Title IX claim. Wadsworth claimed that Cavanaugh sexually harassed her, Nguyen failed to protect her, and the school district was indifferent to the harassment.The United States District Court for the District of Maine dismissed some of Wadsworth's claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on others. The court dismissed the supervisor-liability claim against Nguyen, finding no control over Cavanaugh. It also granted summary judgment to Cavanaugh on the substantive due process claim, concluding that non-physical harassment did not violate Wadsworth's right to bodily integrity. The court found that Wadsworth's equal protection claim against Cavanaugh was valid but granted him qualified immunity. Nguyen was granted summary judgment on the state-created-danger claim, as his conduct did not shock the conscience. The court also granted summary judgment to MSAD on the § 1983 municipal liability claim, finding no deliberate indifference, and on the Title IX claim, concluding that the assistant principals did not have actual knowledge of the harassment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court's decision on the substantive due process claim against Cavanaugh but reversed the summary judgment on the equal protection claim, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Cavanaugh's conduct was severe and pervasive enough to constitute sexual harassment. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the supervisor-liability claim against Nguyen and the summary judgment on the state-created-danger claim. However, it reversed the summary judgment on the Title IX claim against MSAD, concluding that a reasonable jury could find that the assistant principals had actual knowledge of the harassment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Wadsworth v. MSAD 40/RSU 40" on Justia Law

by
The case involves Jose Rosado, a Hispanic male of Colombian origin, who worked as an Information Technology (IT) Specialist for the United States Navy. Rosado alleged that he was denied promotions on five occasions between 2014 and 2018 due to race, national origin, and age discrimination, as well as retaliation for his prior Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) activity. The promotions in question were for various IT Specialist positions within the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southeast (NAVFAC SE).In the lower court, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy. The court concluded that Rosado failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation for any of the promotion decisions. Specifically, the court found that Rosado did not provide sufficient evidence to show that he was equally or more qualified than the individuals who were selected for the positions or that the Navy's decisions were influenced by discriminatory or retaliatory motives.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Rosado did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he failed to show that the selected candidates were similarly situated in all material respects or that unlawful discrimination played any part in the Navy's decision-making process. Additionally, the court found that Rosado did not present sufficient evidence to support his retaliation claims, as there was no indication that retaliatory animus influenced the Navy's actions.In summary, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Navy, concluding that Rosado did not provide enough evidence to support his claims of discrimination and retaliation. View "Rosado v. Secretary, U.S. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law