Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

At issue before the Supreme Court in this interlocutory appeal from the circuit court’s review of an agency ruling was whether Kentucky courts can undertake a statutorily created judicial review of an administrative agency’s final order when the appellant does not have a concrete injury.The Supreme Court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s test for standing as set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992), and held (1) the existence of a plaintiff’s standing is a constitutional requirement to prosecute any action in the Commonwealth courts; (2) Kentucky courts have the responsibility to ascertain, upon the court’s motion if the issue was not raised by a party opponent, whether a plaintiff has constitutional standing to pursue the case in court; and (3) in the instant case, the putative petitioner did not have the requisite constitutional standing to pursue her case in Kentucky courts. View "Commonwealth v. Sexton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions of two counts of murder and sentence of life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by proceeding with voir dire without Defendant present.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court improperly conducted voir dire when Defendant was unable to be present and that the court erred when it failed to grant immunity pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.085(1). The Supreme court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to be present at jury selection pertaining to thirty-one jurors that were questioned in his absence, and the error was not harmless; and (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error when it failed to grant immunity pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.085. View "Truss v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court’s denial of Defendant’s Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42 motion without a hearing, holding that counsel’s failure to advise a client of the sex offender registration requirement constitutes deficient performance.Defendant pled guilty to criminal attempt to commit kidnapping of a minor victim and other offenses. After he was released from prison, Defendant learned that, as a consequence of his guilty plea, he was required to register under Ky. Rev. Stat. 17.510 as a person who had committed sex crimes or crimes against minors. Defendant filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to Rule 11.42, claiming that counsel had failed to discuss the sex offender registration requirement with him. The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing, ruling that counsel’s failure to advise his client about registration did not warrant relief under Rule 11.42. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel concerning the requirement to register as a sex offender. View "Commonwealth v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded Defendant’s conviction for two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and affirmed his conviction for two counts of first-degree sodomy, holding that the jury instructions on the sexual abuse counts violated the unanimity requirement.Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial court erred in allowing duplicitous instructions on sexual abuse in violation of the unanimity requirement for jury verdicts; (2) the jury instructions for sexual abuse and for sodomy did not subject Defendant to double jeopardy; (3) the trial court did not err in the method of impeachment of the victim’s testimony or in admitting a recorded interview; (4) the trial court erred by admitting a recorded phone call as an adoptive admission, but the error was harmless; and (5) any error in running Defendant’s sentences consecutively instead of concurrently will be cured on remand. View "King v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that Defendant was entitled to a new persistent felony offender (PFO) and sentencing trial because because the proceedings were fundamentally unfair.A jury found Defendant guilty of robbery and two counts of kidnapping and found Defendant to be a PFO. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the two kidnapping charges, but before Defendant was retried on the kidnapping charges, he filed a RCr 11.42 motion alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from a juror’s presence on the jury who was biased toward Defendant. The circuit court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court held (1) the guilt phase of trial was not fundamentally unfair where no one knew of the juror’s bias toward Defendant during voir dire or the guilt phase of the trial; but (2) once the juror realized that he was Defendant’s former victim prejudice could be presumed, and Defendant was entitled to a new PFO and sentencing trial. View "Commonwealth v. Douglas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant’s convictions for possession of a controlled substance, first degree, first offense, and for tampering with physical evidence, holding that traffic stop in this case was unreasonably prolonged, and therefore, the incriminating evidence must be suppressed.Defendant’s convictions were based on evidence discovered after a canine sniff search of Defendant’s vehicle conducted during a traffic stop. The court of appeals concluded that the sniff search prolonged the traffic stop and that the incriminating evidence should have been suppressed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the free air sniff of Defendant’s vehicle impermissibly extended the duration of the stop. View "Commonwealth v. Lane" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, felony possession of a firearm, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender and sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment, holding that Defendant’s arguments on appeal were unavailing.Specifically, the Court held (1) any minor discrepancies in the search warrant did not require suppression of the evidence; (2) Appellant’s right to be free from double jeopardy was not violated because the trial court instructed the jury on two counts of trafficking instead of one; (3) it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to convict Appellant of trafficking in heroin and methamphetamine; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s request for expert funding; and (5) the length of Appellant’s sentence did not violate Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.110(1)(c) or 532.080(6)(b). View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court, which denied Defendant’s Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42 motion without a hearing.Defendant pled guilty to second-degree terroristic threatening, criminal attempt to commit kidnapping, and other offenses. Upon his release from prison, Defendant learned that he was obligated to register under Ky. Rev. Stat. 17.510 as a person who had committed sex crimes or crimes against minors. Defendant filed this Rule 11.42 motion, asserting that counsel had never discussed the sex offender registration requirement with him. The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing, concluding that counsel’s failure to inform his client of the post-conviction registration requirement and the circuit court’s failure to include registration notification in the sentencing order did not warrant action under Rule 11.42. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) counsel’s failure to advise Defendant of the sex offender registration requirement constituted deficient performance; and (2) the case must be remanded to the circuit court to evaluate whether Defendant’s counsel’s deficient performance caused him prejudice. View "Commonwealth v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence discovered in his vehicle during a traffic stop, holding that the initial traffic stop was impermissibly prolonged to allow a canine search to proceed. Therefore, the dog sniff that followed was unreasonable and constitutionally impermissible and must be suppressed.Upon entered a conditional plea, Appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, first degree, and carrying a concealed deadly weapon. Appellant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence found after a canine sniff search indicated the presence of drugs. The Supreme Court reversed the motion to suppress, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, while the initial traffic stop was valid, the stop was unconstitutionally prolonged. View "Moberly v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of raping and murdering Pamela Armstrong and sentencing Defendant to death. The Court held (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error when it allowed the Commonwealth to admit other bad acts evidence of Appellant as addressed by Ky. R. Evid. 404(b); (2) the trial court’s failure to define the terms “modus operandi” and “identity evidence” in the jury instructions did not violate Appellant’s due process rights; (3) there was no reversible error in the trial court’s refusal to suppress Defendant’s DNA sample; (4) there was no error in the trial judge’s refusal to disqualify himself from presiding over Appellant’s trial; (5) Appellant was not entitled to a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly admitted unreliable evidence; (6) any alleged prosecutorial misconduct did not require reversal; and (7) Appellant was not entitled to relief on his remaining claims of error. View "White v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law