Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that an offender placed on post-incarceration supervision does not receive a constitutionally sufficient final revocation hearing before the Kentucky Parole Board under the current procedures.David Wayne Bailey was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse, and after serving a sentence, was released to a period of post-incarceration supervision (supervision). When Bailey failed to complete sex offender treatment as directed, a final revocation hearing was held. Bailey was not provided notice of the time and place of the hearing, did not have counsel to represent him, and was not able to present witnesses or further testimony on the alleged violations. After the hearing, the Parole Board revoked Bailey's post-incarceration supervision. Bailey filed a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the Board's procedures on due process grounds. The circuit court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the reversal of the order of dismissal, holding that Bailey's due process rights were violated but that Ky. Rev. Stat. 31.110 does not provide an offender a statutory right to counsel at a revocation hearing; and (2) reversed the appellate court's holding regarding due process requirements and section 31.110. View "Jones v. Bailey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the circuit court granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in favor of Employer on Employee's complaint alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, holding that the circuit court properly dismissed the complaint.Plaintiff alleged that she was terminated in retaliation for informing other workers that one of their supervisors was a registered sex offender or, at the least, that this was a substantial motivating factor in her termination. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that the Kentucky Sex Offender Registration Act establishes a public policy that the sex offender registry should be open and accessible to the public at large. The circuit court granted Employer's motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that even if a right to disseminate information from the sex offender registry existed to prevent termination for that dissemination, the dissemination would need to be effectuated in a manner consistent with appropriate workplace behavior and decorum. View "Marshall v. Montaplast of North America, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to suppress blood test results obtained via a court order directing the hospital at which Defendant was treated after an accident to test Defendant's blood for drugs and alcohol, holding that the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress.Defendant was driving while intoxicated when she struck and killed two pedestrians standing on a sidewalk. After Defendant was transported to the hospital to be treated for minor injuries, the hospital tested Defendant's blood. In her motion to suppress Defendant argued that the testing violated her Fourth Amendment rights because the court order was not a search warrant. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant pled guilty to second-degree manslaughter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court order was for all intents and purposes a valid search warrant and that no violations of Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights occurred. View "Whitlow v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s post-conviction motion requesting that the trial court declare him to be intellectually disabled, which would preclude the imposition of the death penalty, holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.130(2), a statute with an outdated test for ascertaining intellectual disability, is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.Defendant was sentenced to death for the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a teenage girl. Eventually, Defendant filed a Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02 and 60.03 motion alleging that he is intellectually disabled. The trial court denied the motion without conducting a hearing. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a hearing consistent with this opinion, holding that section 532.130(2) does not go far enough in recognizing that, in addition to ascertaining intellectual disability using a bright-line test to determine death-penalty-disqualifying intellectual disability, prevailing medical standards should always take precedence in a court’s determination. View "Woodall v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court ordering that the results of blood alcohol tests obtained by the police be suppressed, holding that no statutory violation occurred in this case.After Defendant was arrested, the arresting officer read the pertinent portion of the statutory implied consent warning to Defendant and asked him to submit to an intoxilyzer test. Defendant agreed to do so, and the result of the test was a .266 blood alcohol level. The district court denied Defendant’s motions to suppress his .266 intoxilyzer result and to dismiss his third offense DUI charge. The circuit court reversed, determining that Defendant had been denied his statutory right to obtain an independent blood test and that his due process right had been violated since the results of the independent test may have provided exculpatory evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Defendant failed to argue that any additional assistance by the officer could have resulted in Defendant obtaining a blood test, no statutory violation occurred; and (2) Defendant received due process. View "Commonwealth v. Riker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals vacating Defendant’s sentence as a persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first degree to ten years’ imprisonment in connection with his conviction of third-degree assault on the grounds that Defendant’s second trial violated his rights against double jeopardy, holding that Defendant’s retrial was barred by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution.After a mistrial, the Commonwealth indicted Defendant as a PFO, first-degree. After a second trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of third-degree assault. The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s retrial was barred by both the United States and Kentucky Constitutions because jeopardy had clearly and unrefutably attached in Defendant’s case and there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial. View "Commonwealth v. Padgett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of first-degree assault, first-degree sexual abuse, and first-degree unlawful imprisonment and sentence of sixty years as a persistent felony offender, holding that any error in the proceedings below was harmless.Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated; (2) the trial court did not err in failing to appoint Defendant substitute counsel; (3) the trial court did not commit reversible error in advising Defendant of the right to or appoint stand-by or hybrid counsel; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (4) any error in the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence under the Rape Shield Law was harmless; and (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in advising Defendant of his right to recall a witness. View "Henderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s first-degree robbery conviction and sentence, vacated his persistent felony offender (PFO) conviction and sentence, which was predicated upon the underlying first-degree robbery conviction, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the trial court erred when it failed to direct a verdict on the first-degree robbery charge.After a jury convicted Defendant of first-degree robbery Defendant pleaded guilty to the PFO charge. The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err by failing to dismiss the indictment for an alleged violation of Defendant’s right to a speedy trial; (2) the trial court erred when it denied Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the first-degree robbery charge; and (3) the trial court should have conducted further review of Defendant’s request to make opening and closing statements himself. View "Lang v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court in this interlocutory appeal from the circuit court’s review of an agency ruling was whether Kentucky courts can undertake a statutorily created judicial review of an administrative agency’s final order when the appellant does not have a concrete injury.The Supreme Court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s test for standing as set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992), and held (1) the existence of a plaintiff’s standing is a constitutional requirement to prosecute any action in the Commonwealth courts; (2) Kentucky courts have the responsibility to ascertain, upon the court’s motion if the issue was not raised by a party opponent, whether a plaintiff has constitutional standing to pursue the case in court; and (3) in the instant case, the putative petitioner did not have the requisite constitutional standing to pursue her case in Kentucky courts. View "Commonwealth v. Sexton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions of two counts of murder and sentence of life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by proceeding with voir dire without Defendant present.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court improperly conducted voir dire when Defendant was unable to be present and that the court erred when it failed to grant immunity pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.085(1). The Supreme court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to be present at jury selection pertaining to thirty-one jurors that were questioned in his absence, and the error was not harmless; and (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error when it failed to grant immunity pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.085. View "Truss v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law