Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant Marcus Minix received documents from the county mediator stating that the county court had received a complaint against him for a violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 514.030 and directing Appellant to mediation. After attending mediation, Appellant was informed he may need to return to mediation. Appellant petitioned the court of appeals for a writ prohibiting the county attorney from referring felony criminal complaints, including a felony complaint against him, to a mediator before presenting the complaints to a district court for review and issuance of a summons or warrant. The court of appeals denied the petition, finding it was without jurisdiction to address Appellant's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a writ of prohibition may not be issued against non-judicial parties such as the Appellees, the county attorney and the mediator, and the substantive relief Appellant sought was within the original jurisdiction of the circuit court, not the court of appeals.

Appellant was convicted of murder pursuant to a guilty but mentally ill verdict. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court erred in a giving a "no duty to retreat" instruction regarding the victim and in refusing to admit evidence that Appellant believed he was being poisoned in jail. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was reversible error to give the "no duty to retreat" instruction regarding the victim because Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.055(3) was not intended to apply to the victim's conduct but only to a defendant's conduct relative to his or her claim of self-defense. Remanded for retrial.

Angela Peters was charged with a DUI first offense. At her arraignment, defense counsel requested a pretrial conference and requested the presence of the officer who had arrested Peters. The Commonweath objected to producing the arresting officer. The district court ruled in favor of Peters. The circuit court then granted the Commonwealth's request for a writ of prohibition. The court of appeals overturned the writ, determining there was no substantial evidence to support the circuit court's finding that the Commonwealth would suffer irreparable harm under the district court order. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' reversal of the writ of prohibition granted by the circuit court and reinstated the circuit court's writ, holding that because the district court's order compelled the Commonwealth to present the witness at a pretrial conference so the witness could be interviewed, the order exceeded what Ky. R. Crim. P. 7.24 and Ky. R. Crim. P. 8.03 allowed, and the issuance of the writ by the circuit court was proper.

James Turner was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and incest. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed Turner's conviction of first-degree sexual abuse, holding (1) Turner's argument that his prosecution was procedurally deficient due to the Commonwealth's failure to establish the county in which Turner was prosecuted as an appropriate venue was waived because Turner failed to raise it at trial; and (2) because Turner was convicted of sexual abuse under a statute that did not become effective until after the alleged abuse was to have occurred under the jury instructions, the circuit court convicted Turner for behavior that was not criminalized at the time. Remanded.

Allegedly under the influence of methamphetamine, Appellant James Peters lost control of his car while being pursued by police. Appellant crashed his car, and his passenger died from injuries sustained in the crash. Appellant was convicted of second-degree manslaughter, first-degree fleeing or evading, two misdemeanor convictions, and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty years' imprisonment and imposed court costs and fines. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but reversed the trial court's imposition of court costs and fines, holding that because Appellant was indigent, the trial court erred in imposing the costs and fines.

In two flagrant nonsupport cases, the defendants failed to pay child support, the trial court revoked their probation for failure to comply with child support payment conditions, and the court of appeals vacated the trial court's judgments and remanded each case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review and affirmed, holding (1) due process requires that the trial court considering revocation for nonpayment of support (a) consider whether the probationer has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay but has been unable to pay through no fault of his own, and (b) if so, consider whether alternative forms of punishment might serve the interests of punishment and deterrence; and (2) due process requires that the trial court make clear findings on the record specifying the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking probation.

Defendant Randy Leinenbach was convicted of rape in the first degree and unlawful imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant then filed a motion with the trial court to set aside the conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to jury instructions on the rape charge. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that Defendant's argument failed to satisfy the requirements of Strickland v. Washington as there was no showing of prejudice.

Follow a jury trial, Ronnie Anderson was convicted of assault in the first degree and found to be a persistent felony offender in the second degree. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Anderson's conviction on the charge of assault in the first degree, holding that there was insufficient evidence of a serious physical injury, a necessary element of the crime, and therefore, the trial court violated Anderson's right to due process. The Court also held that the trial court correctly denied Anderson's motion to suppress statements he made on his cell phone prior to interrogation because they were voluntary, were not elicited by police, and were admitted in accord with the dictates of Miranda. Remanded.

Appellant Brian Moore was convicted of the 1979 robbery, kidnapping, and murder of Virgil Harris and sentenced to death. Appellant pursued post-conviction DNA testing under Kan. Rev. Stat 422.285 in the circuit court. The circuit court denied Appellant's motion for release of evidence for independent testing, finding that it did not have the authority to grant DNA testing that exceeds the limitations of the statute. On appeal, Appellant sought additional DNA testing beyond that ordered below, or, in the alternative, to vacate his conviction and sentence for several reasons, including the post-trial loss of evidence that was to be tested for DNA. The Supreme Court concluded that (1) Appellant did not demonstrate that his conviction and sentence should be vacated, but (2) the circuit court erred in reading its power to order certain DNA testing to be limited by statute. The Court also found that Commonwealth's cross-appeal on several issues to be without merit. For those reasons, the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant William Meece appealed from a judgment of the circuit court sentencing him to consecutive twenty-year terms of confinement on two convictions of robbery and burglary and to death for each of three convictions for murder. Meece sought review of forty-five listed issues, some of which were either not raised in the lower court or were not preserved for review. However, where the death penalty was imposed, the Supreme Court reviewed allegations for those quasi errors. The Court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the circuit court, holding in part that (1) there was no abuse of discretion regarding the evidence admitted at trial; (2) there was no abuse of discretion regarding excluded evidence; (3) the procedural issues during trial raised by Meece did not involve an abuse of discretion; (4) the trial court's jury instructions were not erroneous and the trial court did not err in connection with the penalty phase instructions; (5) the death penalty is constitutional and appropriate in Meece's case; and (6) Meece received a fair trial and there was no cumulative effect that mandated reversal.