Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Scott Stanton pled guilty to first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy. Staton's guilty plea, in which he admitted anal intercourse with his stepson, was conditioned upon his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress two statements he gave to law enforcement officers. Stanton maintained that the officers coerced him to make the incriminating statements by representing that his two children could be removed from the family home pursuant to a court order if he failed to cooperate with the investigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly found from the totality of the circumstances that Stanton was not coerced to make the challenged statements.

Appellant Larry Ordway was charged with crimes relating to a string of robberies, burglaries, and thefts occurring at, inter alia, a convenience store, a mini storage facility, and a sports equipment retailer. Appellant was convicted of three counts of robbery in the first degree, ten counts of burglary in the third degree, six counts of theft by unlawful taking over $300, and receiving stolen property over $300. The Supreme Court (1) reversed nine burglary convictions arising from the mini storage facility because each of the nine instructions were identical and in no way differentiated one count from another, thus depriving Appellant of a unanimous verdict and adequate appellate remedy; (2) vacated one of Appellant's convictions for theft by unlawful taking over $300 because Appellant was convicted of two thefts arising from a single offense, thus implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause; and (3) otherwise affirmed.

Appellant James Mullins was convicted of murder, tampering with physical evidence, and persistent felony offender in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction for murder and reversed his conviction for tampering with physical evidence, holding that (1) it was insufficient to bring a charge of tampering based solely on the fact that evidence was not found when there were sufficient steps to locate that evidence, and (2) because were was no proof that Appellant acted with the intent to prevent evidence from being available at trial, no reasonable jury could have found Appellant guilty of tampering with physical evidence. Remanded.

Appellant Marcus Minix received documents from the county mediator stating that the county court had received a complaint against him for a violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 514.030 and directing Appellant to mediation. After attending mediation, Appellant was informed he may need to return to mediation. Appellant petitioned the court of appeals for a writ prohibiting the county attorney from referring felony criminal complaints, including a felony complaint against him, to a mediator before presenting the complaints to a district court for review and issuance of a summons or warrant. The court of appeals denied the petition, finding it was without jurisdiction to address Appellant's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a writ of prohibition may not be issued against non-judicial parties such as the Appellees, the county attorney and the mediator, and the substantive relief Appellant sought was within the original jurisdiction of the circuit court, not the court of appeals.

Appellant was convicted of murder pursuant to a guilty but mentally ill verdict. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court erred in a giving a "no duty to retreat" instruction regarding the victim and in refusing to admit evidence that Appellant believed he was being poisoned in jail. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was reversible error to give the "no duty to retreat" instruction regarding the victim because Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.055(3) was not intended to apply to the victim's conduct but only to a defendant's conduct relative to his or her claim of self-defense. Remanded for retrial.

Angela Peters was charged with a DUI first offense. At her arraignment, defense counsel requested a pretrial conference and requested the presence of the officer who had arrested Peters. The Commonweath objected to producing the arresting officer. The district court ruled in favor of Peters. The circuit court then granted the Commonwealth's request for a writ of prohibition. The court of appeals overturned the writ, determining there was no substantial evidence to support the circuit court's finding that the Commonwealth would suffer irreparable harm under the district court order. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' reversal of the writ of prohibition granted by the circuit court and reinstated the circuit court's writ, holding that because the district court's order compelled the Commonwealth to present the witness at a pretrial conference so the witness could be interviewed, the order exceeded what Ky. R. Crim. P. 7.24 and Ky. R. Crim. P. 8.03 allowed, and the issuance of the writ by the circuit court was proper.

James Turner was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and incest. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed Turner's conviction of first-degree sexual abuse, holding (1) Turner's argument that his prosecution was procedurally deficient due to the Commonwealth's failure to establish the county in which Turner was prosecuted as an appropriate venue was waived because Turner failed to raise it at trial; and (2) because Turner was convicted of sexual abuse under a statute that did not become effective until after the alleged abuse was to have occurred under the jury instructions, the circuit court convicted Turner for behavior that was not criminalized at the time. Remanded.

Allegedly under the influence of methamphetamine, Appellant James Peters lost control of his car while being pursued by police. Appellant crashed his car, and his passenger died from injuries sustained in the crash. Appellant was convicted of second-degree manslaughter, first-degree fleeing or evading, two misdemeanor convictions, and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty years' imprisonment and imposed court costs and fines. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but reversed the trial court's imposition of court costs and fines, holding that because Appellant was indigent, the trial court erred in imposing the costs and fines.

In two flagrant nonsupport cases, the defendants failed to pay child support, the trial court revoked their probation for failure to comply with child support payment conditions, and the court of appeals vacated the trial court's judgments and remanded each case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review and affirmed, holding (1) due process requires that the trial court considering revocation for nonpayment of support (a) consider whether the probationer has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay but has been unable to pay through no fault of his own, and (b) if so, consider whether alternative forms of punishment might serve the interests of punishment and deterrence; and (2) due process requires that the trial court make clear findings on the record specifying the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking probation.

Defendant Randy Leinenbach was convicted of rape in the first degree and unlawful imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant then filed a motion with the trial court to set aside the conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to jury instructions on the rape charge. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that Defendant's argument failed to satisfy the requirements of Strickland v. Washington as there was no showing of prejudice.