Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After the fiscal court voted to discontinue maintenance on a county road, Appellant, who owned property and lived on the road, erected a locked gate blocking the road and provided a key to each property owner on the road. Appellees, a non-profit association known as Preserve Rural Roads of Madison County, filed suit against Appellant to force him to remove the gates. The circuit court granted Appellees' motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellees had standing and that Appellant was without legal right or ownership to prohibit others from using the road. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rural Roads had associational standing in this matter; (2) the discontinuance of maintenance on the county road did not affect any public easement rights; and (3) the lower courts' decisions in this case, holding that the county road is a public road and that Appellant could not block the road with gates, did not constitute an unlawful taking of Appellant's land.

Kenneth Williams pled guilty to possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, and loitering. Before trial, Williams moved to suppress the handgun seized from him, asserting that it was the product of an unconstitutional stop and patdown of his person. When police detained Williams, he was among a group of nine people, some of whom the police observed openly engaging in illegal drug activity and some of whom police found in possession of handguns. Williams argued that the group's activities did not create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity particularized to him to justify a Terry detention. The trial court denied Williams' motion to suppress, finding that Williams was part of a distinct group whose conduct aroused sufficient reasonable suspicion for the officers to detain Williams. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling on Williams's suppression motion, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the trial court's factual findings; and (2) the Terry stop was constitutional because police had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity among the group that justified an investigatory stop of its members.

Appellant Lawrence Stinnett was convicted of murder and kidnapping and sentenced to life in prison without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) properly failed to dismiss the kidnapping charge pursuant to the kidnapping exemption statute even though the court's analysis in refusing to apply the exemption was flawed; (2) properly instructed the jury on the crime of intentional murder; (3) properly denied Appellant's request to remove his attorneys and allowed him to represent himself; (4) properly denied Appellant's request to compel the attendance at trial of an out-of-state witness, a psychologist who had previously examined Appellant; and (5) did not abuse its discretion by permitting the Commonwealth to use a letter written by Appellant's prior attorney because the letter did not violate the attorney-client privilege, and the hearsay testimony elicited from counsel was harmless error.

Appellant Brian Moore was convicted of the robbery, kidnapping, and murder of Virgil Harris and sentenced to death. After the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, Appellant unsuccessfully sought to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence at both the state and federal levels. Appellant then pursued post-conviction DNA testing under Ky. Rev. Stat. 422.285 in the circuit court. Appellant came before the Supreme Court seeking additional DNA testing beyond that ordered below or, in the alternative, to vacate his conviction and sentence for several reasons, including the post-trial loss of evidence that was to be tested for DNA. The Commonwealth cross-appealed as to several issues. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the orders of the circuit court, holding (1) the Commonwealth's cross-appeal was without merit; and (2) although Appellant did not demonstrate that his conviction and sentence should be vacated, the circuit court erred in reading its power to order independent DNA testing to be limited by statute. Remanded.

After a jury trial, Thomas York was found guilty of burglary in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) York's Fifth amendment right to remain silent was not violated where he was required to recite a neutral phrase before the jury so the victim could make an in-court identification of York's voice; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying York's motions for a mistrial where (i) certain testimony during the trial did not taint the jury or unduly prejudice York, and (ii) any prejudice resulting from misstatements made during the penalty phase were cured from the judge's admonitions.

Ronny Walker was convicted of murder, first-degree burglary, tampering with physical evidence, intimidating a participant in the legal process, and tampering with a witness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the admission into evidence of Walker's entire interrogation video, including Walker's statements to an investigator and the investigator's questions and comments, did not amount to palpable error in the absence of specific objections; (2) the trial court did not palpably err in advising the jurors prior to the attorneys' opening statements how the jurors might go about assessing the credibility of witnesses; and (3) the burglary instruction did not allow for a non-unanimous verdict.

Linvil Turpin was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and was found to be a first-degree persistent felony offender. On appeal, Turpin contended that his twenty-year sentence was so disproportionate to his offense that it violated the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sentence meted out in the case did not run afoul of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as it was within the range authorized by the General Assembly for three-time offenders and was neither so long as to be deemed extreme nor so harsh in the context of a third offense as to be deemed grossly disproportionate.

Scott Stanton pled guilty to first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy. Staton's guilty plea, in which he admitted anal intercourse with his stepson, was conditioned upon his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress two statements he gave to law enforcement officers. Stanton maintained that the officers coerced him to make the incriminating statements by representing that his two children could be removed from the family home pursuant to a court order if he failed to cooperate with the investigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly found from the totality of the circumstances that Stanton was not coerced to make the challenged statements.

Appellant Larry Ordway was charged with crimes relating to a string of robberies, burglaries, and thefts occurring at, inter alia, a convenience store, a mini storage facility, and a sports equipment retailer. Appellant was convicted of three counts of robbery in the first degree, ten counts of burglary in the third degree, six counts of theft by unlawful taking over $300, and receiving stolen property over $300. The Supreme Court (1) reversed nine burglary convictions arising from the mini storage facility because each of the nine instructions were identical and in no way differentiated one count from another, thus depriving Appellant of a unanimous verdict and adequate appellate remedy; (2) vacated one of Appellant's convictions for theft by unlawful taking over $300 because Appellant was convicted of two thefts arising from a single offense, thus implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause; and (3) otherwise affirmed.

Appellant James Mullins was convicted of murder, tampering with physical evidence, and persistent felony offender in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction for murder and reversed his conviction for tampering with physical evidence, holding that (1) it was insufficient to bring a charge of tampering based solely on the fact that evidence was not found when there were sufficient steps to locate that evidence, and (2) because were was no proof that Appellant acted with the intent to prevent evidence from being available at trial, no reasonable jury could have found Appellant guilty of tampering with physical evidence. Remanded.