Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant David Hoff was convicted by a jury of eight counts of first-degree rape and eight counts of incest and was given a life sentence. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding (1) because the extensive use of inadmissible hearsay and the impermissible bolstering of the victim's testimony was highly prejudicial to Appellant and rose to the level of manifest injustice, reversal was required; (2) it was error to allow a detective to testify that the victim's testimony at trial was consistent with her previous statements; and (3) it was error to admit evidence of Appellant's uncharged crimes or bad acts without proper notice or proper showing of relevance. Remanded.

Shortly after announcing her intention to seek election to the office of county clerk, Appellant Stacie Cook was discharged from her position as a deputy clerk by the incumbent county clerk, Appellee Lisha Popplewell, who also intended to seek election to the clerk position. Following Cook's defeat in the primary election, she brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Popplewell and the county, alleging that she had been discharged in violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The circuit court dismissed Cook's complaint by summary judgment, ruling that Cook's interest in being a candidate enjoyed no constitutional protection. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no reason to deviate from settled law concluding that there is no constitutional right to candidacy.

A jury found Appellant Rachel Blackburn guilty of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant's forty-year sentence, holding (1) Ky. Rev. Stat. 533.060(2) modifies Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.110(1) so that subsequent offenses run consecutively may exceed the maximum aggregate duration allowed by section 532.110(1)(c); and (2) in this case, the trial court incorrectly entered a total sentence of forty years based on the jury's earlier recommendation that Appellant's sentences should all run consecutively because, pursuant to Kan. Rev. Stat. 532.080 and 532.110(1)(c), Appellant's consecutive sentences could not exceed twenty years. Remanded for resentencing.

After the fiscal court voted to discontinue maintenance on a county road, Appellant, who owned property and lived on the road, erected a locked gate blocking the road and provided a key to each property owner on the road. Appellees, a non-profit association known as Preserve Rural Roads of Madison County, filed suit against Appellant to force him to remove the gates. The circuit court granted Appellees' motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellees had standing and that Appellant was without legal right or ownership to prohibit others from using the road. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rural Roads had associational standing in this matter; (2) the discontinuance of maintenance on the county road did not affect any public easement rights; and (3) the lower courts' decisions in this case, holding that the county road is a public road and that Appellant could not block the road with gates, did not constitute an unlawful taking of Appellant's land.

Kenneth Williams pled guilty to possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, and loitering. Before trial, Williams moved to suppress the handgun seized from him, asserting that it was the product of an unconstitutional stop and patdown of his person. When police detained Williams, he was among a group of nine people, some of whom the police observed openly engaging in illegal drug activity and some of whom police found in possession of handguns. Williams argued that the group's activities did not create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity particularized to him to justify a Terry detention. The trial court denied Williams' motion to suppress, finding that Williams was part of a distinct group whose conduct aroused sufficient reasonable suspicion for the officers to detain Williams. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling on Williams's suppression motion, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the trial court's factual findings; and (2) the Terry stop was constitutional because police had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity among the group that justified an investigatory stop of its members.

Appellant Lawrence Stinnett was convicted of murder and kidnapping and sentenced to life in prison without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) properly failed to dismiss the kidnapping charge pursuant to the kidnapping exemption statute even though the court's analysis in refusing to apply the exemption was flawed; (2) properly instructed the jury on the crime of intentional murder; (3) properly denied Appellant's request to remove his attorneys and allowed him to represent himself; (4) properly denied Appellant's request to compel the attendance at trial of an out-of-state witness, a psychologist who had previously examined Appellant; and (5) did not abuse its discretion by permitting the Commonwealth to use a letter written by Appellant's prior attorney because the letter did not violate the attorney-client privilege, and the hearsay testimony elicited from counsel was harmless error.

Appellant Brian Moore was convicted of the robbery, kidnapping, and murder of Virgil Harris and sentenced to death. After the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, Appellant unsuccessfully sought to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence at both the state and federal levels. Appellant then pursued post-conviction DNA testing under Ky. Rev. Stat. 422.285 in the circuit court. Appellant came before the Supreme Court seeking additional DNA testing beyond that ordered below or, in the alternative, to vacate his conviction and sentence for several reasons, including the post-trial loss of evidence that was to be tested for DNA. The Commonwealth cross-appealed as to several issues. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the orders of the circuit court, holding (1) the Commonwealth's cross-appeal was without merit; and (2) although Appellant did not demonstrate that his conviction and sentence should be vacated, the circuit court erred in reading its power to order independent DNA testing to be limited by statute. Remanded.

After a jury trial, Thomas York was found guilty of burglary in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) York's Fifth amendment right to remain silent was not violated where he was required to recite a neutral phrase before the jury so the victim could make an in-court identification of York's voice; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying York's motions for a mistrial where (i) certain testimony during the trial did not taint the jury or unduly prejudice York, and (ii) any prejudice resulting from misstatements made during the penalty phase were cured from the judge's admonitions.

Ronny Walker was convicted of murder, first-degree burglary, tampering with physical evidence, intimidating a participant in the legal process, and tampering with a witness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the admission into evidence of Walker's entire interrogation video, including Walker's statements to an investigator and the investigator's questions and comments, did not amount to palpable error in the absence of specific objections; (2) the trial court did not palpably err in advising the jurors prior to the attorneys' opening statements how the jurors might go about assessing the credibility of witnesses; and (3) the burglary instruction did not allow for a non-unanimous verdict.

Linvil Turpin was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and was found to be a first-degree persistent felony offender. On appeal, Turpin contended that his twenty-year sentence was so disproportionate to his offense that it violated the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sentence meted out in the case did not run afoul of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as it was within the range authorized by the General Assembly for three-time offenders and was neither so long as to be deemed extreme nor so harsh in the context of a third offense as to be deemed grossly disproportionate.