Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant Ronald Copley was sentenced to twenty years in prison after pleading guilty to murdering his wife. Copley appealed, alleging that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his home and that the evidence was inadmissible because the affidavit supporting the search warrant was not properly sworn pursuant to Ky. R. Crim. P. 2.02 and 13.10. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while the criminal procedure rules were violated in this case, suppression was not warranted because the error was not of constitutional magnitude, the error did not prejudice Copley, and there was no deliberate disregard of the rules.

After a jury trial, Defendant Britton McPherson was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) Defendant was not denied a fair trial because he was not allowed to question his alleged accomplice in the murder concerning a prior conviction and her other run-ins with the police; (2) the trial court did not err by refusing to give a missing evidence instruction concerning Defendant's alleged accomplice's interrogation by a homicide detective; and (3) Defendant's sentencing was properly submitted to a second jury impaneled after the initial jury could not agree on a sentence.

Appellant was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree unlawful imprisonment, fourth-degree assault, violating a protective order, and being a persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict; (2) Appellant's due process rights were not violated by the prosecutor's failure to disclose allegedly exculpatory statements; (3) the trial court improperly admitted into evidence certain statements contained in the victim's medical records, but the error was harmless, and the admission did not violate Appellant's rights under the Confrontation Clause; (4) the trial court did not err in excluding certain statements Appellant made to police; and (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting prior consistent statements offered to rehabilitate an impeached witness.

Appellant Michael Dunn was convicted of five counts of first-degree sodomy. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it refused to suppress the condom seized from Appellant's property during a search by law enforcement officers, and the court properly admitted the condom into evidence; (2) the trial judge did not err by not granting Appellant's motion for a bill of particulars, and Appellant was not denied proper notice by the offenses listed in the indictment; (3) the trial judge properly denied Appellant's motion asking the court to allow evidence of the victim's previous sexual behavior; (4) the trial judge did not err in finding certain portions of the victim's psychotherapy records were not exculpatory and in declining to provide the documents to the parties; (5) the trial court did not err by not granting Appellant's motion for a change of venue; and (6) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in not excusing two jurors whose family members were victims of sexual abuse.

After a jury trial, Bradley Day was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse. The court of appeals affirmed Day's conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by telling the jury the penalty range for a lesser included offense during the guilt phase of trial, and the error was not harmless. The Court also addressed other issues raised in the appeal that were capable of recurring on re-trial, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by (1) admitting evidence of Day's move to another state as "flight evidence," and (2) admitting evidence for clothing the victim wore at the time of the evidence. Remanded.

Appellants had worked for thirty-seven and thirty-four years, respectively, in underground coal mines. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed decisions to dismiss both Appellants' applications for benefits because the "consensus readings" of their X-rays interpreted them to be negative for coal workers' pneumoconiosis. On review, two separate court of appeals' panels held that the "consensus procedure" required by Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.316 for proving the existence of coal workers' pneumoconiosis and the clear and convincing standard the statute required to rebut such a consensus were unconstitutional because such provisions denied the claimants and other workers who suffered from coal workers' pneumoconiosis equal protection under the law by placing a more stringent burden of proof on them than those who suffered from pneumoconiosis from other sources. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases and affirmed, concluding that there was no rational basis or substantial and justifiable reason for the disparate treatment of coal workers in this instance, and the arbitrary distinction requiring coal workers to meet a higher standard of proof in pneumoconiosis cases than other workers violated the equal protection guarantees of the federal and state constitutions.

Larrell Porter pled guilty to trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, being a persistent felony offender in the second degree, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The plea was pursuant to the second plea deal offered by the Commonwealth, the first of which Porter rejected when he refused to comply with a condition attached to the plea deal, namely that he waive his right to view video recordings of the drug buys. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Porter's motion to withdraw his voluntary and knowing guilty plea; (2) the condition in the initial plea offer did not violate Porter's discovery rights or his due process rights; (3) the Commonwealth acted properly when it conditioned the first plea deal on waiver of Porter's right to view the video; and (4) the Commonwealth need not reoffer the previously rejected original plea deal.

Appellant James Miller was convicted of possession of a controlled substance in the first degree and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree, for which he received a twenty-year sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commonwealth's introduction of Appellant's prior uncharged acts of misconduct during the penalty phase did not constitute palpable error; (2) the presence of an armed corrections officer did not violate Appellant's rights to a fair trial and due process; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to strike the jury for not representing a fair cross-section of the community.

Plaintiff, an employee of the Court of Justice, brought an action against the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), alleging violation of her due process rights and of the state's whistleblower statute in the termination of her employment. The circuit court dismissed her claims as being barred under the doctrine of res judicata because the issues in question had already been decided in federal court. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the portion of the circuit court judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims founded on the potential violation of her due process rights under the state Constitution where there was nothing in the record below, or in the federal action, indicating there was a finding of whether Plaintiff's position with the AOC was tenured or at will, and if tenured, whether she was afforded her rights under the administrative procedures of the AOC; and (2) reversed the order of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff's claim under the Kentucky whistleblower statute on the basis of issue preclusion where the final decision of the federal courts was deprived of one of the required tests in order for issue preclusion to apply to the state court action. Remanded.

When Appellant Thomas Jones pled guilty to third-degree rape and other charges, the trial court imposed a twenty-year prison sentence and ordered him to pay $288,000 in restitution, $175 in court costs, and a jail fee of $5,126. Appellant appealed to challenge the pecuniary aspects of the sentence imposed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the assessment of court costs, as the Commonwealth conceded that aspect of the judgment was improper; and (2) reversed the judgment insofar as it imposed restitution because the imposition of restitution in this case violated Appellant's right to due process and was palpable error. Remanded to determine the issue of restitution.