Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant Michael Dunn was convicted of five counts of first-degree sodomy. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it refused to suppress the condom seized from Appellant's property during a search by law enforcement officers, and the court properly admitted the condom into evidence; (2) the trial judge did not err by not granting Appellant's motion for a bill of particulars, and Appellant was not denied proper notice by the offenses listed in the indictment; (3) the trial judge properly denied Appellant's motion asking the court to allow evidence of the victim's previous sexual behavior; (4) the trial judge did not err in finding certain portions of the victim's psychotherapy records were not exculpatory and in declining to provide the documents to the parties; (5) the trial court did not err by not granting Appellant's motion for a change of venue; and (6) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in not excusing two jurors whose family members were victims of sexual abuse.

After a jury trial, Bradley Day was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse. The court of appeals affirmed Day's conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by telling the jury the penalty range for a lesser included offense during the guilt phase of trial, and the error was not harmless. The Court also addressed other issues raised in the appeal that were capable of recurring on re-trial, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by (1) admitting evidence of Day's move to another state as "flight evidence," and (2) admitting evidence for clothing the victim wore at the time of the evidence. Remanded.

Appellants had worked for thirty-seven and thirty-four years, respectively, in underground coal mines. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed decisions to dismiss both Appellants' applications for benefits because the "consensus readings" of their X-rays interpreted them to be negative for coal workers' pneumoconiosis. On review, two separate court of appeals' panels held that the "consensus procedure" required by Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.316 for proving the existence of coal workers' pneumoconiosis and the clear and convincing standard the statute required to rebut such a consensus were unconstitutional because such provisions denied the claimants and other workers who suffered from coal workers' pneumoconiosis equal protection under the law by placing a more stringent burden of proof on them than those who suffered from pneumoconiosis from other sources. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases and affirmed, concluding that there was no rational basis or substantial and justifiable reason for the disparate treatment of coal workers in this instance, and the arbitrary distinction requiring coal workers to meet a higher standard of proof in pneumoconiosis cases than other workers violated the equal protection guarantees of the federal and state constitutions.

Larrell Porter pled guilty to trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, being a persistent felony offender in the second degree, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The plea was pursuant to the second plea deal offered by the Commonwealth, the first of which Porter rejected when he refused to comply with a condition attached to the plea deal, namely that he waive his right to view video recordings of the drug buys. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Porter's motion to withdraw his voluntary and knowing guilty plea; (2) the condition in the initial plea offer did not violate Porter's discovery rights or his due process rights; (3) the Commonwealth acted properly when it conditioned the first plea deal on waiver of Porter's right to view the video; and (4) the Commonwealth need not reoffer the previously rejected original plea deal.

Appellant James Miller was convicted of possession of a controlled substance in the first degree and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree, for which he received a twenty-year sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commonwealth's introduction of Appellant's prior uncharged acts of misconduct during the penalty phase did not constitute palpable error; (2) the presence of an armed corrections officer did not violate Appellant's rights to a fair trial and due process; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to strike the jury for not representing a fair cross-section of the community.

Plaintiff, an employee of the Court of Justice, brought an action against the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), alleging violation of her due process rights and of the state's whistleblower statute in the termination of her employment. The circuit court dismissed her claims as being barred under the doctrine of res judicata because the issues in question had already been decided in federal court. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the portion of the circuit court judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims founded on the potential violation of her due process rights under the state Constitution where there was nothing in the record below, or in the federal action, indicating there was a finding of whether Plaintiff's position with the AOC was tenured or at will, and if tenured, whether she was afforded her rights under the administrative procedures of the AOC; and (2) reversed the order of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff's claim under the Kentucky whistleblower statute on the basis of issue preclusion where the final decision of the federal courts was deprived of one of the required tests in order for issue preclusion to apply to the state court action. Remanded.

When Appellant Thomas Jones pled guilty to third-degree rape and other charges, the trial court imposed a twenty-year prison sentence and ordered him to pay $288,000 in restitution, $175 in court costs, and a jail fee of $5,126. Appellant appealed to challenge the pecuniary aspects of the sentence imposed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the assessment of court costs, as the Commonwealth conceded that aspect of the judgment was improper; and (2) reversed the judgment insofar as it imposed restitution because the imposition of restitution in this case violated Appellant's right to due process and was palpable error. Remanded to determine the issue of restitution.

Appellant David Hoff was convicted by a jury of eight counts of first-degree rape and eight counts of incest and was given a life sentence. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding (1) because the extensive use of inadmissible hearsay and the impermissible bolstering of the victim's testimony was highly prejudicial to Appellant and rose to the level of manifest injustice, reversal was required; (2) it was error to allow a detective to testify that the victim's testimony at trial was consistent with her previous statements; and (3) it was error to admit evidence of Appellant's uncharged crimes or bad acts without proper notice or proper showing of relevance. Remanded.

Shortly after announcing her intention to seek election to the office of county clerk, Appellant Stacie Cook was discharged from her position as a deputy clerk by the incumbent county clerk, Appellee Lisha Popplewell, who also intended to seek election to the clerk position. Following Cook's defeat in the primary election, she brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Popplewell and the county, alleging that she had been discharged in violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The circuit court dismissed Cook's complaint by summary judgment, ruling that Cook's interest in being a candidate enjoyed no constitutional protection. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no reason to deviate from settled law concluding that there is no constitutional right to candidacy.

A jury found Appellant Rachel Blackburn guilty of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant's forty-year sentence, holding (1) Ky. Rev. Stat. 533.060(2) modifies Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.110(1) so that subsequent offenses run consecutively may exceed the maximum aggregate duration allowed by section 532.110(1)(c); and (2) in this case, the trial court incorrectly entered a total sentence of forty years based on the jury's earlier recommendation that Appellant's sentences should all run consecutively because, pursuant to Kan. Rev. Stat. 532.080 and 532.110(1)(c), Appellant's consecutive sentences could not exceed twenty years. Remanded for resentencing.