Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A jury found Appellant Johnny Smith guilty of first-degree robbery and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). Appellant received a thirty-year prison sentence, was assessed court costs and fines, and was ordered to pay restitution. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Appellant's convictions and the PFO determination, holding that Appellant's constitutional rights to a speedy trial were not violated and that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict; (2) affirmed the trial court's restitution order; and (3) reversed the trial court's order requiring Appellant to pay court costs and fines. Remanded for a determination of whether Appellant was a "poor person" under Ky. Rev. Stat. 453.190(2), and whether he would be unable to pay court costs now or in the foreseeable future.

Desean Maynes pled guilty to third-degree burglary pursuant to a plea agreement. The trial court approved the agreement subject to the condition that Maynes pay the statutory costs of $130 to the circuit court clerk. Maynes objected to the imposition of costs, arguing that having found him an indigent defendant in need of a public defender, the court was required to waive costs. The trial court rejected those arguments, and the court of appeals affirmed. After considering the applicable statutes, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the trial court was authorized under Kentucky law to impose court costs, as (1) the appointment of counsel to a criminal defendant does not preclude an order requiring the defendant to pay court costs according to his ability to do so; (2) upon a defendant's conviction, Ky. Rev. Stat. 23A.205 requires imposition of court costs unless the defendant qualifies as a "poor person"; and (3) because Maynes entered a plea agreement whereby he was to be released from custody, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that Maynes pay the statutorily mandated court costs pursuant to section 23A.205.

Appellant Billy Mash was convicted in the circuit court of one count of first-degree sodomy and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) denying Appellant's motion to set aside the jury panel and set a new trial, as Appellant did not establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section of the community requirement; (2) allowing the Commonwealth to use a peremptory strike against the one African-American juror on the panel, as the trial court conducted the proper analysis under Batson v. Kentucky; (3) denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict, as there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (4) denying Appellant's request for an instruction on the lesser included offense of sexual abuse in the first degree, as there was no evidentiary foundation for an instruction on sexual abuse.

Appellant Michael Knox entered pleas of guilty to eight counts of second-degree robbery. The plea agreement provided that, until the sentencing hearing, Knox would be released on home incarceration subject to the conditions of a hammer clause. Based on alleged violations of the hammer clause, the trial judge sentenced Knox to a total term of imprisonment of twenty years rather than the ten years agreed to by the Commonwealth. Knox appealed, arguing that the trial judge abused his discretion by committing to the imposition of a sentence based solely on the hammer clause and not upon other relevant information. The Supreme Court reversed Knox's sentence, holding (1) a judge's commitment to impose a sentence based upon a defendant's breach of a hammer clause condition, coupled with the imposition of that sentence without proper consideration of the other relevant factors, is an abuse of judicial discretion; and (2) the trial judge in this case abused his discretion by imposing a sentence prescribed in the hammer clause without considering any alternative sentence or any other relevant facts and circumstances.

Appellant James Jackson was charged with felony drug trafficking and several misdemeanors, including possession of a handgun by a minor, in the juvenile court. The district court certified him as a youthful offender and transferred him to the circuit court where he entered a guilty plea and was sentenced as an adult. Jackson appealed, seeking to collaterally attack his conviction on the grounds that the transfer was improper and, as a result, the circuit court never acquired jurisdiction over him or his case. The Supreme Court concluded that the transfer was proper and the circuit court had jurisdiction, as the district court's transfer order was legally sufficient on its face and no other jurisdictional defects appeared on the record.

Appellant William Goldsmith pleaded guilty to three counts of second-degree criminal possession of a forged instrument in Hickman Circuit Court. Goldsmith's sentence was probated, but he violated the terms of his probation. Goldsmith then appealed several aspects of the trial court's handling of his case. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the trial court's decision at the revocation hearing to run Goldsmith's sentences for the Hickman County crimes consecutively to his sentences in a neighboring county for a total of thirty years was plain error, as the court exercised discretion it did not have. Remanded for an order requiring the Hickman County and neighboring county cases to run concurrently with each other for a total of fifteen years.

Appellant Stephen Driver was convicted of first-degree assault and sentenced to a prison term of fifteen years. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The Supreme Court reversed the first-degree assault conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court erroneously permitted the Commonwealth to introduce prior bad act evidence of previous violent conduct by Driver against his former wife under Ky. R. Evid. 404(b), and the error was not harmless; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Driver's request for an instruction on assault under extreme emotional disturbance; and (3) an argument made by the prosecutor during closing argument violated the rule that the prosecutor may not make any comment during a criminal trial about the consequences of a particular verdict.

Appellant Ronald Copley was sentenced to twenty years in prison after pleading guilty to murdering his wife. Copley appealed, alleging that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his home and that the evidence was inadmissible because the affidavit supporting the search warrant was not properly sworn pursuant to Ky. R. Crim. P. 2.02 and 13.10. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while the criminal procedure rules were violated in this case, suppression was not warranted because the error was not of constitutional magnitude, the error did not prejudice Copley, and there was no deliberate disregard of the rules.

After a jury trial, Defendant Britton McPherson was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) Defendant was not denied a fair trial because he was not allowed to question his alleged accomplice in the murder concerning a prior conviction and her other run-ins with the police; (2) the trial court did not err by refusing to give a missing evidence instruction concerning Defendant's alleged accomplice's interrogation by a homicide detective; and (3) Defendant's sentencing was properly submitted to a second jury impaneled after the initial jury could not agree on a sentence.

Appellant was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree unlawful imprisonment, fourth-degree assault, violating a protective order, and being a persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict; (2) Appellant's due process rights were not violated by the prosecutor's failure to disclose allegedly exculpatory statements; (3) the trial court improperly admitted into evidence certain statements contained in the victim's medical records, but the error was harmless, and the admission did not violate Appellant's rights under the Confrontation Clause; (4) the trial court did not err in excluding certain statements Appellant made to police; and (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting prior consistent statements offered to rehabilitate an impeached witness.