Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A circuit court jury found Appellant Derryl Blane guilty of several drug-related offenses and of being a first-degree Persistent Felony Offender (PFO). The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's conviction for trafficking in marijuana, eight ounces or more, holding that the trial court erred when, after granting Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of trafficking in marijuana within 1,000 yards of a school, it permitted the Commonwealth to amend the indictment to trafficking in marijuana, eight ounces or more; (2) reversed Appellant's conviction for first-degree PFO as to Count I of the indictment, as the facts necessary to convict Appellant of being a first-degree PFO as to Count I were incapable of being proved; (3) affirmed Appellant's remaining convictions; and (4) remanded for a new penalty phase, as the penalty phase introduction of the original dismissed charges from Appellant's prior convictions was erroneous.

Appellant, TECO Mechanical Contractor, Inc., filed a complaint and petition for declaration of rights against the Labor Cabinet, asserting that Kentucky's prevailing wage law (1) violated due process by authorizing the Cabinet to assess back wages and civil penalties without a hearing; and (2) failed to specify how workers should be classified and, as a result, improperly delegated legislative or judicial authority to the Cabinet. The circuit court ruled in favor of the Cabinet, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prevailing wage law did not violate the state or federal Constitutions, as (1) TECO failed to establish that the Cabinet's actions under the prevailing wage law deprived it of a property or liberty interest that is protected by the due process clause; and (2) the law prescribes sufficient standards to prevent the Cabinet from abusing any legislative or judicial authority granted to it under the prevailing wage law.

Appellant Robert Smith was convicted of first-degree robbery and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender and was sentenced to thirty-two years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Smith's conviction and sentence, holding that the first-degree robbery instruction violated the unanimous verdict requirement by including a theory not supported by the evidence, but because there was no possibility that any juror voted to convict Smith under the unsupported theory the error was harmless; and (2) vacated a surplus provision included in the judgment that stated, "Defendant's court costs and fines are credit time served," as the statement had no readily determinable meaning and served no purpose. Remanded for entry of a new judgment excluding the provision.

A jury found Appellant Johnny Smith guilty of first-degree robbery and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). Appellant received a thirty-year prison sentence, was assessed court costs and fines, and was ordered to pay restitution. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Appellant's convictions and the PFO determination, holding that Appellant's constitutional rights to a speedy trial were not violated and that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict; (2) affirmed the trial court's restitution order; and (3) reversed the trial court's order requiring Appellant to pay court costs and fines. Remanded for a determination of whether Appellant was a "poor person" under Ky. Rev. Stat. 453.190(2), and whether he would be unable to pay court costs now or in the foreseeable future.

Desean Maynes pled guilty to third-degree burglary pursuant to a plea agreement. The trial court approved the agreement subject to the condition that Maynes pay the statutory costs of $130 to the circuit court clerk. Maynes objected to the imposition of costs, arguing that having found him an indigent defendant in need of a public defender, the court was required to waive costs. The trial court rejected those arguments, and the court of appeals affirmed. After considering the applicable statutes, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the trial court was authorized under Kentucky law to impose court costs, as (1) the appointment of counsel to a criminal defendant does not preclude an order requiring the defendant to pay court costs according to his ability to do so; (2) upon a defendant's conviction, Ky. Rev. Stat. 23A.205 requires imposition of court costs unless the defendant qualifies as a "poor person"; and (3) because Maynes entered a plea agreement whereby he was to be released from custody, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that Maynes pay the statutorily mandated court costs pursuant to section 23A.205.

Appellant Billy Mash was convicted in the circuit court of one count of first-degree sodomy and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) denying Appellant's motion to set aside the jury panel and set a new trial, as Appellant did not establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section of the community requirement; (2) allowing the Commonwealth to use a peremptory strike against the one African-American juror on the panel, as the trial court conducted the proper analysis under Batson v. Kentucky; (3) denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict, as there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (4) denying Appellant's request for an instruction on the lesser included offense of sexual abuse in the first degree, as there was no evidentiary foundation for an instruction on sexual abuse.

Appellant Michael Knox entered pleas of guilty to eight counts of second-degree robbery. The plea agreement provided that, until the sentencing hearing, Knox would be released on home incarceration subject to the conditions of a hammer clause. Based on alleged violations of the hammer clause, the trial judge sentenced Knox to a total term of imprisonment of twenty years rather than the ten years agreed to by the Commonwealth. Knox appealed, arguing that the trial judge abused his discretion by committing to the imposition of a sentence based solely on the hammer clause and not upon other relevant information. The Supreme Court reversed Knox's sentence, holding (1) a judge's commitment to impose a sentence based upon a defendant's breach of a hammer clause condition, coupled with the imposition of that sentence without proper consideration of the other relevant factors, is an abuse of judicial discretion; and (2) the trial judge in this case abused his discretion by imposing a sentence prescribed in the hammer clause without considering any alternative sentence or any other relevant facts and circumstances.

Appellant James Jackson was charged with felony drug trafficking and several misdemeanors, including possession of a handgun by a minor, in the juvenile court. The district court certified him as a youthful offender and transferred him to the circuit court where he entered a guilty plea and was sentenced as an adult. Jackson appealed, seeking to collaterally attack his conviction on the grounds that the transfer was improper and, as a result, the circuit court never acquired jurisdiction over him or his case. The Supreme Court concluded that the transfer was proper and the circuit court had jurisdiction, as the district court's transfer order was legally sufficient on its face and no other jurisdictional defects appeared on the record.

Appellant William Goldsmith pleaded guilty to three counts of second-degree criminal possession of a forged instrument in Hickman Circuit Court. Goldsmith's sentence was probated, but he violated the terms of his probation. Goldsmith then appealed several aspects of the trial court's handling of his case. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the trial court's decision at the revocation hearing to run Goldsmith's sentences for the Hickman County crimes consecutively to his sentences in a neighboring county for a total of thirty years was plain error, as the court exercised discretion it did not have. Remanded for an order requiring the Hickman County and neighboring county cases to run concurrently with each other for a total of fifteen years.

Appellant Stephen Driver was convicted of first-degree assault and sentenced to a prison term of fifteen years. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The Supreme Court reversed the first-degree assault conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court erroneously permitted the Commonwealth to introduce prior bad act evidence of previous violent conduct by Driver against his former wife under Ky. R. Evid. 404(b), and the error was not harmless; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Driver's request for an instruction on assault under extreme emotional disturbance; and (3) an argument made by the prosecutor during closing argument violated the rule that the prosecutor may not make any comment during a criminal trial about the consequences of a particular verdict.