Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant Daniel Newman was convicted of two counts of first-degree sodomy and one count of attempted first-degree sexual abuse. The jury recommended a life sentence for each of the sodomy convictions, and Appellant was sentenced in accordance with the jury's recommendation. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding (a) the trial court did not err by introducing other crimes evidence, and (b) questions by the prosecutor during the cross-examination of Appellant were improper but did not rise to the level of palpable error; but (2) vacated Appellant's life sentence, holding that the jury was improperly instructed as to the sentencing range. Remanded for a new penalty phase.

Appellant Lloyd Hammond was convicted by a jury of three counts of murder, one count of first-degree burglary, one count of first-degree unlawful imprisonment, and retaliating against a participant in the legal process. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's convictions, holding (1) Appellant was deprived of a fair trial when one of the murder charges was improperly joined for trial with the other charges; and (2) admission of hearsay statements of a material witness under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing was not based upon substantial evidence. Remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.

Appellant Thomas Bowling petitioned for a declaratory judgment seeking to challenge the implementation of his two twenty-two year-old death sentences upon the grounds that he was mentally retarded. Appellant had previously challenged his sentences upon the same grounds, and the Supreme Court concluded that Appellant had procedurally defaulted by waiver any challenge to his death sentences upon the grounds of mental retardation because he failed to raise the issue at trial, on direct appeal, or in any of his subsequent collateral attacks on his judgment on sentence. In the instant case, the circuit court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) it was the law of the case that Appellant had procedurally defaulted on his mental retardation claim and that he failed to demonstrate adequate cause for his default; and (2) it was the law of the case that Appellant could not make a prima facie showing that he was able to meet the statutory definition for mental retardation.

This case presented the question of whether the Department of Corrections could correct an alleged error in the calculation of a presentencing custody credit after the calculation was incorporated into the court's final judgment. Defendant was found guilty but mentally ill of first-degree manslaughter and sentenced to twenty years' incarceration. Six years after a calculation of Defendant's presentencing custody credit was incorporated into the trial court's judgment, the Department modified Defendant's presentencing custody credit. The circuit court found that the Department had the authority to modify Defendant's presentencing custody credit. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department lacked the authority to modify the amount of presentencing custody credit awarded to Defendant in the trial court's sentence. Remanded.

Appellant Joseph Singleton was charged with several drug-related offenses. All of the charges were based on evidence obtained by police officers after they stopped Appellant at a traffic checkpoint and searched his vehicle. The circuit court granted Appellant's motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that stopping a motorist at a traffic checkpoint without any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing cannot be justified under the Fourth Amendment when the purpose of the checkpoint was unrelated to highway safety or border security. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the use of a traffic checkpoint to verify compliance with a city's sticker ordinance was similar in purpose to the checkpoints set up to ascertain compliance with driver's licensing and vehicle registration laws previously approved by the U.S. Supreme Court and court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a traffic checkpoint established to detect violations of city ordinances such as the one involved here unreasonably intrudes upon the liberty interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Remanded.

Kenneth Malone was convicted of murder and sentenced to thirty-two years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Malone was not denied an opportunity to present a complete defense when the trial court conditionally excluded evidence of the victim's and one of the witness's bad character, since Malone did not establish that the evidence was relevant to some issue in the case; (2) the trial court did not err by denying Malone's motion for a directed verdict; (3) the trial court did not err by instructing the jury on alternative theories of murder, as a combination murder instruction was appropriate and did not compromise Malone's right to a unanimous verdict; and (4) Malone's absence during the trial court's initial consideration of the deliberating jury's request for additional information did not entitle Malone to relief.

Police made a warrantless entry into an apartment occupied by Appellant Hollis King and discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia. The circuit court denied King's motion to suppress. King entered a conditional guilty plea to several drug-related offenses. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of King's motion to suppress, holding that if exigent circumstances existed when police heard sounds of movement after they knocked on the door of the apartment occupied by King, any exigency that did arise when police announced their presence was police-created and could not be relied upon as a justification for a warrantless entry. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) police may rely on exigent circumstances so long as the police do not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, and (2) police in this case did not engage in any such conduct. The U.S. Supreme Court then remanded to determine whether exigent circumstances existed. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of King's motion to suppress and vacated King's conviction, holding that exigent circumstances did not exist when police made the warrantless entry. Remanded.

A circuit court jury convicted Frederick Davis of first-degree manslaughter and first-degree attempted manslaughter. Davis appealed, contending (1) the trial court erred by empanelling a new jury to determine whether to run his sentences for the two crimes concurrently or consecutively; and (2) even if the trial court properly empanelled a new jury, it employed erroneous procedures for the second penalty phase. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court acted well within its discretion to conduct a trial when it empanelled a new jury to decide whether to run Davis's sentences concurrently or consecutively, in whole or in part; and (2) the trial court appropriately conducted the second penalty phase.

Following a bench trial, Appellant Raymond Clutter was convicted of murder and tampering with physical evidence and was found to be a persistent felony offender in the first degree. Clutter appealed, claiming that the trial court erred when it permitted a witness to testify about information provided by Clutter's then-attorney in pre-trial discussions with a law enforcement agent for the Commonwealth, arguing that the information constituted statements made during plea discussions and thus was inadmissible under Ky. R. Evid. 410(4). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony, as Rule 410(4) did not apply to bar the admission of the testimony.

Appellant Patricia Buster entered a conditional guilty plea to four counts of complicity to first-degree rape. Appellant's conditional guilty plea preserved her right to appeal the adverse ruling of the trial court on her motion to suppress her written confession given to police officers. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress and vacated her conviction, holding that Appellant did not voluntarily waive her Miranda rights, as the police officers did not respect Appellant's invocation of her rights under the analysis set forth in Michigan v. Mosley. Remanded so that Appellant could withdraw her guilty plea.