Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

This case presented the question of whether the Department of Corrections could correct an alleged error in the calculation of a presentencing custody credit after the calculation was incorporated into the court's final judgment. Defendant was found guilty but mentally ill of first-degree manslaughter and sentenced to twenty years' incarceration. Six years after a calculation of Defendant's presentencing custody credit was incorporated into the trial court's judgment, the Department modified Defendant's presentencing custody credit. The circuit court found that the Department had the authority to modify Defendant's presentencing custody credit. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department lacked the authority to modify the amount of presentencing custody credit awarded to Defendant in the trial court's sentence. Remanded.

Appellant Joseph Singleton was charged with several drug-related offenses. All of the charges were based on evidence obtained by police officers after they stopped Appellant at a traffic checkpoint and searched his vehicle. The circuit court granted Appellant's motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that stopping a motorist at a traffic checkpoint without any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing cannot be justified under the Fourth Amendment when the purpose of the checkpoint was unrelated to highway safety or border security. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the use of a traffic checkpoint to verify compliance with a city's sticker ordinance was similar in purpose to the checkpoints set up to ascertain compliance with driver's licensing and vehicle registration laws previously approved by the U.S. Supreme Court and court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a traffic checkpoint established to detect violations of city ordinances such as the one involved here unreasonably intrudes upon the liberty interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Remanded.

Kenneth Malone was convicted of murder and sentenced to thirty-two years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Malone was not denied an opportunity to present a complete defense when the trial court conditionally excluded evidence of the victim's and one of the witness's bad character, since Malone did not establish that the evidence was relevant to some issue in the case; (2) the trial court did not err by denying Malone's motion for a directed verdict; (3) the trial court did not err by instructing the jury on alternative theories of murder, as a combination murder instruction was appropriate and did not compromise Malone's right to a unanimous verdict; and (4) Malone's absence during the trial court's initial consideration of the deliberating jury's request for additional information did not entitle Malone to relief.

Police made a warrantless entry into an apartment occupied by Appellant Hollis King and discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia. The circuit court denied King's motion to suppress. King entered a conditional guilty plea to several drug-related offenses. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of King's motion to suppress, holding that if exigent circumstances existed when police heard sounds of movement after they knocked on the door of the apartment occupied by King, any exigency that did arise when police announced their presence was police-created and could not be relied upon as a justification for a warrantless entry. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) police may rely on exigent circumstances so long as the police do not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, and (2) police in this case did not engage in any such conduct. The U.S. Supreme Court then remanded to determine whether exigent circumstances existed. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of King's motion to suppress and vacated King's conviction, holding that exigent circumstances did not exist when police made the warrantless entry. Remanded.

A circuit court jury convicted Frederick Davis of first-degree manslaughter and first-degree attempted manslaughter. Davis appealed, contending (1) the trial court erred by empanelling a new jury to determine whether to run his sentences for the two crimes concurrently or consecutively; and (2) even if the trial court properly empanelled a new jury, it employed erroneous procedures for the second penalty phase. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court acted well within its discretion to conduct a trial when it empanelled a new jury to decide whether to run Davis's sentences concurrently or consecutively, in whole or in part; and (2) the trial court appropriately conducted the second penalty phase.

Following a bench trial, Appellant Raymond Clutter was convicted of murder and tampering with physical evidence and was found to be a persistent felony offender in the first degree. Clutter appealed, claiming that the trial court erred when it permitted a witness to testify about information provided by Clutter's then-attorney in pre-trial discussions with a law enforcement agent for the Commonwealth, arguing that the information constituted statements made during plea discussions and thus was inadmissible under Ky. R. Evid. 410(4). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony, as Rule 410(4) did not apply to bar the admission of the testimony.

Appellant Patricia Buster entered a conditional guilty plea to four counts of complicity to first-degree rape. Appellant's conditional guilty plea preserved her right to appeal the adverse ruling of the trial court on her motion to suppress her written confession given to police officers. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress and vacated her conviction, holding that Appellant did not voluntarily waive her Miranda rights, as the police officers did not respect Appellant's invocation of her rights under the analysis set forth in Michigan v. Mosley. Remanded so that Appellant could withdraw her guilty plea.

A circuit court jury found Appellant Derryl Blane guilty of several drug-related offenses and of being a first-degree Persistent Felony Offender (PFO). The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's conviction for trafficking in marijuana, eight ounces or more, holding that the trial court erred when, after granting Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of trafficking in marijuana within 1,000 yards of a school, it permitted the Commonwealth to amend the indictment to trafficking in marijuana, eight ounces or more; (2) reversed Appellant's conviction for first-degree PFO as to Count I of the indictment, as the facts necessary to convict Appellant of being a first-degree PFO as to Count I were incapable of being proved; (3) affirmed Appellant's remaining convictions; and (4) remanded for a new penalty phase, as the penalty phase introduction of the original dismissed charges from Appellant's prior convictions was erroneous.

Appellant, TECO Mechanical Contractor, Inc., filed a complaint and petition for declaration of rights against the Labor Cabinet, asserting that Kentucky's prevailing wage law (1) violated due process by authorizing the Cabinet to assess back wages and civil penalties without a hearing; and (2) failed to specify how workers should be classified and, as a result, improperly delegated legislative or judicial authority to the Cabinet. The circuit court ruled in favor of the Cabinet, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prevailing wage law did not violate the state or federal Constitutions, as (1) TECO failed to establish that the Cabinet's actions under the prevailing wage law deprived it of a property or liberty interest that is protected by the due process clause; and (2) the law prescribes sufficient standards to prevent the Cabinet from abusing any legislative or judicial authority granted to it under the prevailing wage law.

Appellant Robert Smith was convicted of first-degree robbery and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender and was sentenced to thirty-two years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Smith's conviction and sentence, holding that the first-degree robbery instruction violated the unanimous verdict requirement by including a theory not supported by the evidence, but because there was no possibility that any juror voted to convict Smith under the unsupported theory the error was harmless; and (2) vacated a surplus provision included in the judgment that stated, "Defendant's court costs and fines are credit time served," as the statement had no readily determinable meaning and served no purpose. Remanded for entry of a new judgment excluding the provision.