Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant Travis Smith was convicted of first-degree burglary by complicity, first-degree robbery by complicity, and second-degree assault by complicity and was sentenced to a total of twenty-two years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction but remanded for further proceedings on the question of the imposition of court costs, holding (1) Appellant's claims of instructional error were not properly preserved, but upon palpable error review the jury was adequately instructed upon the necessary elements of accomplice culpability, and therefore the jury instructions did not amount to palpable error; and (2) the trial court erred by imposing court costs against Appellant without determining if he was a "poor person."

Appellant Brian McGuire appealed from a judgment of the circuit court convicting him of first-degree manslaughter and unlawful possession of a weapon on school property and sentencing him to twenty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not deny Appellant's constitutional right to present a defense based on his assertion that the public school system interfered with his efforts to interview witnesses employed by the school system, as the effect of any troublesome conduct of school officials was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) did not err by permitting the Commonwealth to present evidence concerning Appellant's stressful personal life during its case in chief; (3) erred by admitting victim impact evidence during the penalty phase of the trial, but no manifest injustice occurred as a result of the improperly admitted evidence; (4) did not err in the penalty phase by disallowing mitigation testimony from Appellant's father; and (5) erred by permitting the jury to rehear a witness's testimony outside of Appellant's presence, but the error was not palpable.

Appellant Kenneth Hudson was convicted of murder as an accomplice by the circuit court. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred (1) in declining to instruct the jury on theories of accomplice liability for first-degree manslaughter, second-degree manslaughter, and reckless homicide, and (2) by admitting irrelevant evidence concerning a shooting in Tennessee and Appellant's gang activity, asserting that the prejudicial effect of such evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Appellant's requested instructions on the lesser included homicide instructions; and (2) the evidence of the Tennessee shooting and Appellant's gang activity was properly admitted.

Appellant entered a conditional plea to first-degree possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress the evidence found during the search of her apartment. The court of appeals affirmed the conditional plea of guilty. Appellant appealed, complaining that the court of appeals' analysis incorrectly found a reasonable suspicion to justify the protective sweep of her apartment following Appellant's consent to officers entering her apartment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the law, as is stated in this case, is that consent by the owner for the police to enter his home does not extend to the entire house, even for a protective sweep; and (2) the motion to suppress should have been granted because the protective sweep was illegal and the contraband discovered was the result of this unlawful invasion as fruit of the poisonous tree.

Appellant Michael Elery was convicted of murder, tampering with physical evidence, and violating a protective order and sentenced to life in prison with no possibility of probation or parole. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding, inter alia, (1) the jury was improperly allowed to hear evidence of an uncharged crime, but the error was harmless; (2) any error in the trial court's instructions to the jury was not prejudicial to Appellant; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking a juror for cause; (4) certain victim impact testimony was properly admitted; and (5) the exclusion of a portable breathalyzer test was error, but the error was harmless.

In 1988, Gregory Wilson was convicted of, inter alia, murder and kidnapping and received the death sentence. In 2010, Wilson moved the trial court to prohibit execution of the death sentence because of his mental retardation and to compel DNA testing of hairs and semen found in the victim's automobile and used by the prosecution in his trial. The trial court denied both motions without holding an evidentiary hearing on either motion. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court's ruling on Wilson's motion denying DNA testing of the hairs; (2) vacated the trial court's order to the extent that it failed to rule on whether Wilson was entitled to DNA testing of the semen and remanded this issue to the trial court for a ruling; and (3) vacated the trial court's ruling on the mental retardation motion and remanded this issue to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether Wilson was exempt from execution because he was a mentally retarded offender.

William Louis Rogers was convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance and one count of possessing a controlled substance. The charges for which Rogers was indicted - three counts of trafficking - arose after he twice allegedly sold small amounts of cocaine to a confidential informant and after police, acting pursuant to a search warrant, found more cocaine and drug paraphernalia secreted in his garage. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the trial court did not err (1) by denying Rogers' motion to suppress the garage evidence as the fruit of an illegal search; (2) by refusing to sever the trafficking charge based on the garage evidence from those based on the alleged sales to the confidential informant; and (3) by limiting Rogers' cross-examination of a forensic chemist, who tested various seized items for the presence of cocaine.

Appellant Daniel Newman was convicted of two counts of first-degree sodomy and one count of attempted first-degree sexual abuse. The jury recommended a life sentence for each of the sodomy convictions, and Appellant was sentenced in accordance with the jury's recommendation. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding (a) the trial court did not err by introducing other crimes evidence, and (b) questions by the prosecutor during the cross-examination of Appellant were improper but did not rise to the level of palpable error; but (2) vacated Appellant's life sentence, holding that the jury was improperly instructed as to the sentencing range. Remanded for a new penalty phase.

Appellant Lloyd Hammond was convicted by a jury of three counts of murder, one count of first-degree burglary, one count of first-degree unlawful imprisonment, and retaliating against a participant in the legal process. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's convictions, holding (1) Appellant was deprived of a fair trial when one of the murder charges was improperly joined for trial with the other charges; and (2) admission of hearsay statements of a material witness under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing was not based upon substantial evidence. Remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.

Appellant Thomas Bowling petitioned for a declaratory judgment seeking to challenge the implementation of his two twenty-two year-old death sentences upon the grounds that he was mentally retarded. Appellant had previously challenged his sentences upon the same grounds, and the Supreme Court concluded that Appellant had procedurally defaulted by waiver any challenge to his death sentences upon the grounds of mental retardation because he failed to raise the issue at trial, on direct appeal, or in any of his subsequent collateral attacks on his judgment on sentence. In the instant case, the circuit court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) it was the law of the case that Appellant had procedurally defaulted on his mental retardation claim and that he failed to demonstrate adequate cause for his default; and (2) it was the law of the case that Appellant could not make a prima facie showing that he was able to meet the statutory definition for mental retardation.