Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth, whereby he agreed to a sentence of five years' imprisonment. In addition, the circuit court imposed a $1,000 fine, which the Commonwealth later conceded was improper because Defendant was indigent. Defendant appealed the portion of the judgment imposing the fine. The court of appeals reversed the fine but left the five-year plea agreement intact. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the fine may be properly vacated while letting the plea agreement stand. The Court affirmed, holding that the fine in this case may be reversed without invalidating the plea agreement because the imposition of the fine was not part of the agreement but was instead left to the discretion of the circuit court.

Several weeks after Defendant was convicted of first-degree sodomy he moved for a new trial based upon an unsworn, unauthenticated note purportedly written by a member of the jury panel that convicted him. The note stated that the jury had been influenced by information not presented in evidence and that the writer had been pressured into voting to convict. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a hearing to ascertain the validity of the claim, and if true, whether the prejudicial effect of the occurrence would entitle Defendant to a new trial. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed, holding (1) an unauthenticated and unsworn letter from a lone juror, without more, is insufficient to trigger the process for further inquiry into the validity of a jury verdict by motion for a new trial; and (2) therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial.

Defendant was convicted of eight counts of first-degree sodomy, one count of use of a minor in a sexual performance, and one count of first-degree sexual abuse, for which he received a total sentence of seventy years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commonwealth introduced an egregious amount of inadmissible character evidence in this case that was meant to prejudice the jury against Defendant; (2) the Commonwealth improperly bolstered the alleged victims' testimony; and (3) the cumulative effect of these prejudicial errors rose to the level of palpable error and deprived Appellant of a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial.

Pursuant to a guilty verdict, Defendant was convicted of one count of murder and three counts of wanton endangerment in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty-five years' imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) there was insufficient proof to support a charge of murder because the Commonwealth failed to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant was not privileged to act in self-defense; and (2) certain conduct of the Commonwealth attorney during his cross-examination of Appellant amounted to reversible prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court vacated the convictions and remanded, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find Appellant guilty of murder; but (2) the prosecutor's conduct in certain instances was improper, and the prosecutorial misconduct in this case was reversible error.

Defendant was charged with several offenses. Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to all charges, and the district court set his bail at $10,000. At the preliminary hearing, the district court made a finding of probable cause and then increased Defendant's bail to $100,000. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in circuit court, arguing that his bond was increased without the benefit of a formal hearing as required by statute. The circuit court granted the petition, ordering that Defendant's bond be reduced to $10,000 unless the district court held a hearing or the case was transferred to circuit court. After the director of metro corrections filed an appeal, the grand jury returned an indictment against Defendant on the charges, and the circuit court set Defendant's bond at $10,000 in an arraignment order. The court of appeals then dismissed the director's appeal as moot. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this case was not moot because the issue was one capable of repetition yet evading review; and (2) the district court may increase the amount of a defendant's bail following a preliminary hearing, where the only change in circumstances is the court's finding of probable cause.

Appellant Travis Smith was convicted of first-degree burglary by complicity, first-degree robbery by complicity, and second-degree assault by complicity and was sentenced to a total of twenty-two years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction but remanded for further proceedings on the question of the imposition of court costs, holding (1) Appellant's claims of instructional error were not properly preserved, but upon palpable error review the jury was adequately instructed upon the necessary elements of accomplice culpability, and therefore the jury instructions did not amount to palpable error; and (2) the trial court erred by imposing court costs against Appellant without determining if he was a "poor person."

Appellant Brian McGuire appealed from a judgment of the circuit court convicting him of first-degree manslaughter and unlawful possession of a weapon on school property and sentencing him to twenty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not deny Appellant's constitutional right to present a defense based on his assertion that the public school system interfered with his efforts to interview witnesses employed by the school system, as the effect of any troublesome conduct of school officials was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) did not err by permitting the Commonwealth to present evidence concerning Appellant's stressful personal life during its case in chief; (3) erred by admitting victim impact evidence during the penalty phase of the trial, but no manifest injustice occurred as a result of the improperly admitted evidence; (4) did not err in the penalty phase by disallowing mitigation testimony from Appellant's father; and (5) erred by permitting the jury to rehear a witness's testimony outside of Appellant's presence, but the error was not palpable.

Appellant Kenneth Hudson was convicted of murder as an accomplice by the circuit court. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred (1) in declining to instruct the jury on theories of accomplice liability for first-degree manslaughter, second-degree manslaughter, and reckless homicide, and (2) by admitting irrelevant evidence concerning a shooting in Tennessee and Appellant's gang activity, asserting that the prejudicial effect of such evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Appellant's requested instructions on the lesser included homicide instructions; and (2) the evidence of the Tennessee shooting and Appellant's gang activity was properly admitted.

Appellant entered a conditional plea to first-degree possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress the evidence found during the search of her apartment. The court of appeals affirmed the conditional plea of guilty. Appellant appealed, complaining that the court of appeals' analysis incorrectly found a reasonable suspicion to justify the protective sweep of her apartment following Appellant's consent to officers entering her apartment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the law, as is stated in this case, is that consent by the owner for the police to enter his home does not extend to the entire house, even for a protective sweep; and (2) the motion to suppress should have been granted because the protective sweep was illegal and the contraband discovered was the result of this unlawful invasion as fruit of the poisonous tree.

Appellant Michael Elery was convicted of murder, tampering with physical evidence, and violating a protective order and sentenced to life in prison with no possibility of probation or parole. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding, inter alia, (1) the jury was improperly allowed to hear evidence of an uncharged crime, but the error was harmless; (2) any error in the trial court's instructions to the jury was not prejudicial to Appellant; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking a juror for cause; (4) certain victim impact testimony was properly admitted; and (5) the exclusion of a portable breathalyzer test was error, but the error was harmless.