Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

This case presented two constitutional questions related to Kentucky's prevailing wage law. The first question was whether the law violates procedural due process by failing to afford contractors a hearing before the Labor Cabinet assesses back wages and civil penalties and demands their payments. The second question was whether the law improperly delegates legislative or judicial authority to the Labor Cabinet by failing to define the categories of workers to which it applies. The circuit court found that the law does not violate due process or improperly delegate legislative or judicial authority. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prevailing wage law does not violate either the Kentucky or U.S. Constitutions.

Appellants Marcus Swan and D'Andre Owens were tried and convicted of multiple crimes related to a violent home invasion they carried out in 2008 in which they stole money and threatened to kill the home's inhabitants, two of whom they ultimately shot and one of whom they threatened to rape and sodomize. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Swan's judgment of conviction and sentence in its entirety; and (2) affirmed in part and reversed in part Owens's judgment, although his overall sentence was unaffected, holding that Owens's convictions for first-degree assault and first-degree wanton endangerment of one of the home's inhabitants must be reversed, as (i) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on second-degree assault as a lesser-included offense of first-degree assault, and (ii) the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict on the charge of first-degree wanton endangerment.

Appellant appealed his convictions in two separate cases. In the first case, Appellant was found guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance, possession of marijuana, feeing or evading, and being a persistent felony offender (PFO). In the second case, Appellant was convicted of escape, trafficking, and PFO. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's conviction for possession of a controlled substance, vacated his sentence for that conviction, and remanded for a new trial, holding that Appellant's waiver of his right to counsel was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and therefore, the trial court erred by denying his request to proceed pro se; and (2) affirmed Appellant's remaining convictions and corresponding sentences.

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years' imprisonment enhanced to thirty years by virtue of Defendant's status as a second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err (1) by denying Defendant's motion to suppress eyewitness identification evidence; (2) by not allowing Defendant during voir dire to inform the jury of the potential range of PFO enhanced penalties; (3) by denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial when, during voir dire, the Commonwealth suggested that Defendant had concealed evidence of the crime; (4) by denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial when the Commonwealth referred to scientific studies of which there was no evidence; and (5) by denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, not just a new penalty phase, when during the original penalty proceedings, an improper argument by the Commonwealth necessitated a mistrial.

A jury convicted Defendant of theft by unlawful taking over $10,000 and three counts of first-degree criminal mischief. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence but vacated the trial court's amended judgment and remanded to the trial court to reinstate the final judgment as originally entered, holding (1) Defendant's convictions did not violate double jeopardy; (2) the trial court did not err by ordering Defendant to pay restitution that exceeded $100,000 because the $100,000 statutory cap was not applicable to the trial court's restitution order; but (3) the trial court lacked authority to amend the final judgment more than ten days after its entry.

Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth, whereby he agreed to a sentence of five years' imprisonment. In addition, the circuit court imposed a $1,000 fine, which the Commonwealth later conceded was improper because Defendant was indigent. Defendant appealed the portion of the judgment imposing the fine. The court of appeals reversed the fine but left the five-year plea agreement intact. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the fine may be properly vacated while letting the plea agreement stand. The Court affirmed, holding that the fine in this case may be reversed without invalidating the plea agreement because the imposition of the fine was not part of the agreement but was instead left to the discretion of the circuit court.

Several weeks after Defendant was convicted of first-degree sodomy he moved for a new trial based upon an unsworn, unauthenticated note purportedly written by a member of the jury panel that convicted him. The note stated that the jury had been influenced by information not presented in evidence and that the writer had been pressured into voting to convict. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a hearing to ascertain the validity of the claim, and if true, whether the prejudicial effect of the occurrence would entitle Defendant to a new trial. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed, holding (1) an unauthenticated and unsworn letter from a lone juror, without more, is insufficient to trigger the process for further inquiry into the validity of a jury verdict by motion for a new trial; and (2) therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial.

Defendant was convicted of eight counts of first-degree sodomy, one count of use of a minor in a sexual performance, and one count of first-degree sexual abuse, for which he received a total sentence of seventy years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commonwealth introduced an egregious amount of inadmissible character evidence in this case that was meant to prejudice the jury against Defendant; (2) the Commonwealth improperly bolstered the alleged victims' testimony; and (3) the cumulative effect of these prejudicial errors rose to the level of palpable error and deprived Appellant of a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial.

Pursuant to a guilty verdict, Defendant was convicted of one count of murder and three counts of wanton endangerment in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty-five years' imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) there was insufficient proof to support a charge of murder because the Commonwealth failed to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant was not privileged to act in self-defense; and (2) certain conduct of the Commonwealth attorney during his cross-examination of Appellant amounted to reversible prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court vacated the convictions and remanded, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find Appellant guilty of murder; but (2) the prosecutor's conduct in certain instances was improper, and the prosecutorial misconduct in this case was reversible error.

Defendant was charged with several offenses. Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to all charges, and the district court set his bail at $10,000. At the preliminary hearing, the district court made a finding of probable cause and then increased Defendant's bail to $100,000. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in circuit court, arguing that his bond was increased without the benefit of a formal hearing as required by statute. The circuit court granted the petition, ordering that Defendant's bond be reduced to $10,000 unless the district court held a hearing or the case was transferred to circuit court. After the director of metro corrections filed an appeal, the grand jury returned an indictment against Defendant on the charges, and the circuit court set Defendant's bond at $10,000 in an arraignment order. The court of appeals then dismissed the director's appeal as moot. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this case was not moot because the issue was one capable of repetition yet evading review; and (2) the district court may increase the amount of a defendant's bail following a preliminary hearing, where the only change in circumstances is the court's finding of probable cause.