Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

This case required the Supreme Court to determine whether a state employee, after receiving notice of her employer's intent to dismiss her, waived her right to a pre-termination hearing by repeatedly engaging in conduct that delayed the hearing. The Kentucky Personnel Board concluded that the employee did not waive her right to a pre-termination hearing, and that her dismissal therefore violated her right to due process. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the employee was not deprived of her constitutional rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to her dismissal, as the employee constitutionally waived her right to a hearing by applying for FMLA leave in a deliberate attempt to delay the pre-termination hearing, after previously postponing the hearing twice, which constituted a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of that hearing. View "Dep't of Revenue v. Wade" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with assault in the fourth degree. Before Defendant was arrested, Defendant's attorney made an ex parte request to a different district court judge from the one who issued the warrant, requesting to set the warrant aside and issue a summons. The warrant was withdrawn and a summons issued instead. The Supreme Court granted the certification request of the county attorney to answer a question of law surrounding the practice of ex parte communications by criminal defense lawyers with judges after warrants have been issued. The Court then certified the law to state that Kentucky law does not authorize as ex parte motion by a criminal defendant to vacate or set aside a warrant for his or her arrest with no notice or opportunity for the Commonwealth to be heard. View "Commonwealth v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted discretionary review of two probation revocation cases to consider whether the trial court may proceed to hold evidentiary hearings to revoke or modify probation when the grounds for revocation or modification are new, unresolved criminal charges against the probationer. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court is not required to delay probation revocation or modification hearings awaiting resolution of the criminal charges that arise during the probationary period; (2) when the probationer is faced with probation revocation or modification and a criminal court trial based on the same conduct that forms the basis of new criminal charges, the probationer's testimony at the probation revocation hearing is protected from use at any later criminal trial in Kentucky state courts; and (3) the probationer's testimony at the revocation hearing can be used for impeachment purposes or rebuttal evidence in the trial of the new charges. View "Barker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This case presented two constitutional questions related to Kentucky's prevailing wage law. The first question was whether the law violates procedural due process by failing to afford contractors a hearing before the Labor Cabinet assesses back wages and civil penalties and demands their payments. The second question was whether the law improperly delegates legislative or judicial authority to the Labor Cabinet by failing to define the categories of workers to which it applies. The circuit court found that the law does not violate due process or improperly delegate legislative or judicial authority. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prevailing wage law does not violate either the Kentucky or U.S. Constitutions.

Appellants Marcus Swan and D'Andre Owens were tried and convicted of multiple crimes related to a violent home invasion they carried out in 2008 in which they stole money and threatened to kill the home's inhabitants, two of whom they ultimately shot and one of whom they threatened to rape and sodomize. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Swan's judgment of conviction and sentence in its entirety; and (2) affirmed in part and reversed in part Owens's judgment, although his overall sentence was unaffected, holding that Owens's convictions for first-degree assault and first-degree wanton endangerment of one of the home's inhabitants must be reversed, as (i) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on second-degree assault as a lesser-included offense of first-degree assault, and (ii) the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict on the charge of first-degree wanton endangerment.

Appellant appealed his convictions in two separate cases. In the first case, Appellant was found guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance, possession of marijuana, feeing or evading, and being a persistent felony offender (PFO). In the second case, Appellant was convicted of escape, trafficking, and PFO. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's conviction for possession of a controlled substance, vacated his sentence for that conviction, and remanded for a new trial, holding that Appellant's waiver of his right to counsel was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and therefore, the trial court erred by denying his request to proceed pro se; and (2) affirmed Appellant's remaining convictions and corresponding sentences.

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years' imprisonment enhanced to thirty years by virtue of Defendant's status as a second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err (1) by denying Defendant's motion to suppress eyewitness identification evidence; (2) by not allowing Defendant during voir dire to inform the jury of the potential range of PFO enhanced penalties; (3) by denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial when, during voir dire, the Commonwealth suggested that Defendant had concealed evidence of the crime; (4) by denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial when the Commonwealth referred to scientific studies of which there was no evidence; and (5) by denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, not just a new penalty phase, when during the original penalty proceedings, an improper argument by the Commonwealth necessitated a mistrial.

A jury convicted Defendant of theft by unlawful taking over $10,000 and three counts of first-degree criminal mischief. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence but vacated the trial court's amended judgment and remanded to the trial court to reinstate the final judgment as originally entered, holding (1) Defendant's convictions did not violate double jeopardy; (2) the trial court did not err by ordering Defendant to pay restitution that exceeded $100,000 because the $100,000 statutory cap was not applicable to the trial court's restitution order; but (3) the trial court lacked authority to amend the final judgment more than ten days after its entry.

Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth, whereby he agreed to a sentence of five years' imprisonment. In addition, the circuit court imposed a $1,000 fine, which the Commonwealth later conceded was improper because Defendant was indigent. Defendant appealed the portion of the judgment imposing the fine. The court of appeals reversed the fine but left the five-year plea agreement intact. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the fine may be properly vacated while letting the plea agreement stand. The Court affirmed, holding that the fine in this case may be reversed without invalidating the plea agreement because the imposition of the fine was not part of the agreement but was instead left to the discretion of the circuit court.

Several weeks after Defendant was convicted of first-degree sodomy he moved for a new trial based upon an unsworn, unauthenticated note purportedly written by a member of the jury panel that convicted him. The note stated that the jury had been influenced by information not presented in evidence and that the writer had been pressured into voting to convict. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a hearing to ascertain the validity of the claim, and if true, whether the prejudicial effect of the occurrence would entitle Defendant to a new trial. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed, holding (1) an unauthenticated and unsworn letter from a lone juror, without more, is insufficient to trigger the process for further inquiry into the validity of a jury verdict by motion for a new trial; and (2) therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial.