Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to enter an order releasing expert witness funds for an evidentiary hearing regarding his post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel motion. The court of appeals denied the petition. Appellant appealed, arguing that an expert is necessary to prove that prejudice resulted from his trial counsel's failure to have him evaluated for competency. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' order, holding that Appellant failed to satisfy the threshold requirement of showing a lack of adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise necessary for issuance of a writ. View "Jones v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree trafficking in a controlled substance, second or subsequent offense. The circuit court sentenced Appellant to twenty years imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred during the guilt phase of his trial by admitting evidence of other acts of drug trafficking. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) evidence alleging Appellant had committed other acts of drug trafficking was admitted in violation of Ky. R. Evid. 404(b), and the Court could not determine with fair assurance that the error did not substantially sway the verdict; and (2) Appellant waived his right to appellate review of the penalty phase jury instructions. View "Graves v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted discretionary review in two cases to consider related questions concerning the constitutional guarantee to the effective assistance of counsel in light of Padilla v. Kentucky, which held that the guarantee is breached when defense counsel fails to advise his or her noncitizen client that a contemplated guilty plea will subject the client to automatic deportation. The court of appeals held (1) the guarantee is breached when counsel fails to advise her client that the crime to which he is pleading guilty will automatically render him subject to a longer period of parole ineligibility under Kentucky's violent offender statute; and (2) the guarantee is not breached when counsel advises his client of the mandatory sex offender treatment applicable to the crime to which he is pleading but fails to advise him of the effects of that program on parole eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under Padilla, defendants receive ineffective assistance in cases where the defendant's guilty plea was induced by his attorney's misadvice concerning a collateral consequence of the plea sufficiently punitive, grave, and enmeshed with the plea's direct consequences, and so easily determined from the statutes, as to be deemed like deportation. View "Commonwealth v. Pridham" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of multiple counts of first-degree sexual abuse and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. On appeal, Appellant challenged the adequacy of the notice of the charges against him, the trial court's failure to grant a directed verdict, and the trial court's attempt to retain jurisdiction to impose court costs and a partial public-defender fee in the future. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions in their entirety but reversed the trial court's decision regarding costs and fees, holding that because the pertinent statutes do not empower the trial court to retain jurisdiction to determine whether Appellant could pay court costs and partial public-defender fees until after Appellant has completed his sentence, the trial court erred in trying to leave its judgment open. Remanded. View "Buster v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Ky. Rev. Stat. 189.820 regulates safety on the public highways by requiring slow-moving vehicles to display a particular brightly colored emblem to warn of the vehicles' slow speed. Appellants, all members of the Old Order Swartzentruber Amish, claimed that the requirement that they use the bright orange-yellow and the triangular shaped emblem unconstitutionally violated their freedom to practice their religion because the emblem interfered with their requirement to be plain and brightly displayed the trinity, a symbol not adopted by the Amish. The lower courts established the requisite rational basis for the statute and found that the bright color, reflective edge, and distinct shape of the slow-moving vehicle emblem required by the statute increased the visibility of the intended warning and was superior to the gray reflective tape proposed instead by Appellants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because section 189.820 is a statute of general applicability, the government need only establish a rational basis for the statute in order to pass constitutional muster; and (2) the statute meets the rational basis standard of review and is thus not unconstitutional. View "Gingerich v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants Marcus Swan and D'Andre Owens were tried and convicted of multiple crimes related to a violent home invasion they carried out in 2008 in which they stole money and threatened to kill the home's inhabitants, two of whom they ultimately shot and one of whom they threatened to rape and sodomize. Appellants raised numerous issues on appeal, some in common and other independently. The Court (1) affirmed Swan's judgment of conviction and sentence in its entirety; and (2) affirmed in part and reversed in part Owens's judgment, although his overall sentence was unaffected, holding (i) the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction on second-degree assault as a lesser-included offense of first-degree assault, and therefore, Ownens's convictions for first-degree assault must be reversed; and (ii) the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict on the charge of first-degree wanton endangerment of one of the victims, and thus this conviction was reversed. View "Swan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder, assault in the first degree, assault in the fourth degree, driving under the influence of intoxicants, and tampering with physical evidence. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment. Appellant raised sixteen issues on appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in not giving full consideration to Appellant's claim of juror misconduct, which was founded on a question of first impression alleging that jurors may have lied during voir dire and juror bias through the use of social media websites, namely Facebook. Remanded to the circuit court to hold a hearing on whether the jurors answered voir dire questions truthfully, and, if not, the extent of exposure the jurors had to the Facebook account of the victim's mother, and whether that exposure, if any, tainted the jurors to such extent that it was a miscarriage of justice to allow them to participate as jurors in Appellant's trial. View "Sluss v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to armed robbery and murder and was sentenced to life in prison. Defendant subsequently filed in the trial court a pro se motion seeking relief from the court's judgment. Defendant also requested an evidentiary hearing and assistance from the Department of Public Advocacy (DPA). The trial court granted the latter request, and a DPA attorney entered his notice of appearance on Defendant's behalf. The matter was allowed to lie dormant for more than four years, when counsel finally filed his amendment to Defendant's original motion. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, finding that counsel's amendment was untimely - both outside the three-year statute of limitations and barred by laches - and that on the merits the claims in Defendant's original motion were refuted by the record. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that to the extent the amended motion sought to raise a new, factually independent claim it was subject to dismissal as untimely, and Defendant's timely claims were facially without merit. View "Roach v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the circuit court convicting him, following a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree. Defendant was found guilty of having robbed at gun point the manager of a cash advance store. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years in prison enhanced to thirty years by virtue of Defendant's status as a second-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to suppression of the eyewitness identifications; (2) the trial court correctly limited penalty-range voir dire to unenhanced penalties for the indicted offense; (3) errors by the prosecutors were appropriately addressed by the trial court and did not render the trial unfair; and (4) the penalty phase mistrial did not require a new trial of Defendant's guilt but only a new penalty phase. View "Jacobsen v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to forty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) while the trial court erred by admitting two handguns Appellant owned, which were similar to the murder weapon but were not used to commit the crime, the error was harmless; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted hearsay testimony, specifically the victim's request to borrow money from his wife, but the error was harmless in the context of the case; and (3) the trial court did not err when it refused to allow Appellant to inform the jury he had been tried twice previously for this offense and both prior juries deadlocked. View "Harris v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law