Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A circuit court jury found Appellant guilty of murder, first-degree wanton endangerment, first-degree criminal mischief, and driving under the influence. For these crimes, Appellant received a thirty-five year prison sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion when allowing the introduction of Appellant's pre-arrest silence during the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, but the error was harmless; (2) the trial court did not err in permitting the introduction of an accident scene video; (3) the trial court properly admitted a 911 recording; (4) any potential error that arose out of the admission of Appellant's post-collision use of profanity was harmless; and (5) the trial court did not commit palpable error in permitting the introduction of Appellant's misdemeanor theft by deception conviction during the sentencing phase of her trial. View "Baumia v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A circuit court jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree fleeing or evading police, fourth-degree assault, possession of marijuana, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment and fined Appellant $600. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's convictions and sentences for first-degree fleeing or evading and first-degree PFO, holding that the trial court's jury instruction on the fleeing or evading charge were erroneous; and (2) held that the trial court erred by imposing fines upon Appellant after previously finding him to be indigent and therefore vacated those portions of his sentences imposing fines. View "Wright v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted review of this case to consider how to interpret Kentucky's grandparent-visitation statute consistently with the constitutional principles articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, Troxel v. Granville, and whether the trial court in this case appropriately interceded to grant the grandmother visitation with the child despite the objection of the child's mother. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's grant, holding (1) a grandparent petitioning for child visitation contrary to the wishes of the child's parent can overcome the presumption that a fit parent is presumed to act in the best interest of the child only with clear and convincing evidence that granting visitation to the grandparent is in the child's best interest; and (2) the trial court here, in granting visitation to the grandmother, relied on pre-Troxel case law that inappropriately placed grandparents on equal footing with parents when determining visitation. Remanded. View "Walker v. Blair" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to, among other offenses, five counts of first-degree robbery. First-degree robbery is a "violent offense" under Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401, and under that statute, a person convicted of a violent offense does not become eligible for parole until he has served the lesser of eighty-five percent of the sentence imposed or twenty years. Appellant moved for relief from his guilty plea, claiming he was not apprised of the parole ramifications of his sentence. The trial court summarily denied Appellant's motion, and an unanimous panel of the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) counsel renders deficient assistance under Commonwealth v. Padilla and Strickland v. Washington when his guilty plea advice does not accurately reflect the parole consequences under the violent offender statute; but (2) the deficient performance alleged in this case did not entitle Appellant to relief because it could not have resulted in any prejudice. View "Stiger v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Petitioner's second trial on charges of capital kidnapping, attempted murder, arson, and receiving stolen property ended when the trial court declared a mistrial for the Commonwealth's violation of a pretrial order. Petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from retrying him, arguing that a retrial would violate the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. Although Petitioner would not suffer irreparable injury if the retrial were to proceed, Petitioner argued that the administration of justice would suffer great and irreparable injury if the retrial took place. The Supreme Court declined to issue the writ, holding that the writ of prohibition was not an available remedy, as Petitioner offered nothing to persuade the Court that he would suffer any injury that could not be corrected on appeal. View "St. Clair v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The circuit court sentenced him to thirty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) granting a continuance was a proper exercise of judicial discretion; (2) the trial court did not err by not permitting Appellant to cross-examine the victim regarding her failure to appear on the first trial date; (3) the trial court did not err by permitting the victim to testify concerning her fear of contracting a disease from Appellant; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial; (5) Appellant was correctly found competent to stand trial; (6) no error resulted as a result of the prosecutor's comments; and (7) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excusing a juror for cause. View "Slone v. Commonwealth " on Justia Law

Appellant was tried on two counts of first-degree sodomy and was convicted of one count. The trial court imposed a sentence of forty-five years incarceration. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court erred in denying an independent psychological evaluation or competency hearing of the alleged victim; and (2) the hearing conducted by the trial court to determine if various allegations of prior sexual conduct made by the alleged victim were admissible was insufficient, and the trial court erred in ruling that several of the allegations were not demonstrably false without reviewing all of the evidence. View "Perry v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A jury found Appellant guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The trial court sentenced Appellant to eighteen years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of Appellant's spouse under Ky. R. Evid. 504(c)(2)(A), an exception to the spousal testimonial privilege. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit for different reasons, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony based on the Court's interpretation of Rule 504(c)(2)(A); but (2) the trial court's decision to permit the spouse to testify was harmless error. View "Meyers v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant shot and killed Christopher Tolliver. At trial, the defense argued that Appellant was acting under an extreme emotional disturbance (EED) at the time of the shooting. The trial court ruled that Dr. Peter Shilling, who diagnosed Appellant with PTSD, could not testify unless Appellant testified because his testimony would include Appellant's hearsay statements regarding the EED. Appellant ultimately testified in order to offer Dr. Shilling's testimony. The jury rejected Appellant's claim of EED and found him guilty of intentional murder, first-degree fleeing or evading police, and leaving the scene of an accident. On appeal, Appellant argued that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated by the trial court's ruling with respect to Dr. Shilling. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling that Appellant's testimony was required in order to admit Dr. Shilling's testimony; and (2) the error was not harmless. View "Lasure v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A circuit court jury found Appellant guilty but mentally ill of murder and first-degree assault. Appellant received sentences of life in prison for the murder conviction and twenty years in prison for the assault conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) failing to grant Appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment; (2) instructing the jury that "treatment shall be provided" to a guilty but mentally ill defendant; (3) finding Appellant competent to stand trial; (4) failing to instruct the jury on assault under extreme emotional disturbance; (5) failing to suppress statements made to law enforcement officers; and (6) failing to sever the murder charge from the assault charge. View "Keeling v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law