Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant pled guilty to, among other offenses, five counts of first-degree robbery. First-degree robbery is a "violent offense" under Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401, and under that statute, a person convicted of a violent offense does not become eligible for parole until he has served the lesser of eighty-five percent of the sentence imposed or twenty years. Appellant moved for relief from his guilty plea, claiming he was not apprised of the parole ramifications of his sentence. The trial court summarily denied Appellant's motion, and an unanimous panel of the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) counsel renders deficient assistance under Commonwealth v. Padilla and Strickland v. Washington when his guilty plea advice does not accurately reflect the parole consequences under the violent offender statute; but (2) the deficient performance alleged in this case did not entitle Appellant to relief because it could not have resulted in any prejudice. View "Stiger v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Petitioner's second trial on charges of capital kidnapping, attempted murder, arson, and receiving stolen property ended when the trial court declared a mistrial for the Commonwealth's violation of a pretrial order. Petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from retrying him, arguing that a retrial would violate the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. Although Petitioner would not suffer irreparable injury if the retrial were to proceed, Petitioner argued that the administration of justice would suffer great and irreparable injury if the retrial took place. The Supreme Court declined to issue the writ, holding that the writ of prohibition was not an available remedy, as Petitioner offered nothing to persuade the Court that he would suffer any injury that could not be corrected on appeal. View "St. Clair v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The circuit court sentenced him to thirty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) granting a continuance was a proper exercise of judicial discretion; (2) the trial court did not err by not permitting Appellant to cross-examine the victim regarding her failure to appear on the first trial date; (3) the trial court did not err by permitting the victim to testify concerning her fear of contracting a disease from Appellant; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial; (5) Appellant was correctly found competent to stand trial; (6) no error resulted as a result of the prosecutor's comments; and (7) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excusing a juror for cause. View "Slone v. Commonwealth " on Justia Law

Appellant was tried on two counts of first-degree sodomy and was convicted of one count. The trial court imposed a sentence of forty-five years incarceration. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court erred in denying an independent psychological evaluation or competency hearing of the alleged victim; and (2) the hearing conducted by the trial court to determine if various allegations of prior sexual conduct made by the alleged victim were admissible was insufficient, and the trial court erred in ruling that several of the allegations were not demonstrably false without reviewing all of the evidence. View "Perry v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A jury found Appellant guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The trial court sentenced Appellant to eighteen years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of Appellant's spouse under Ky. R. Evid. 504(c)(2)(A), an exception to the spousal testimonial privilege. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit for different reasons, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony based on the Court's interpretation of Rule 504(c)(2)(A); but (2) the trial court's decision to permit the spouse to testify was harmless error. View "Meyers v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant shot and killed Christopher Tolliver. At trial, the defense argued that Appellant was acting under an extreme emotional disturbance (EED) at the time of the shooting. The trial court ruled that Dr. Peter Shilling, who diagnosed Appellant with PTSD, could not testify unless Appellant testified because his testimony would include Appellant's hearsay statements regarding the EED. Appellant ultimately testified in order to offer Dr. Shilling's testimony. The jury rejected Appellant's claim of EED and found him guilty of intentional murder, first-degree fleeing or evading police, and leaving the scene of an accident. On appeal, Appellant argued that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated by the trial court's ruling with respect to Dr. Shilling. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling that Appellant's testimony was required in order to admit Dr. Shilling's testimony; and (2) the error was not harmless. View "Lasure v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A circuit court jury found Appellant guilty but mentally ill of murder and first-degree assault. Appellant received sentences of life in prison for the murder conviction and twenty years in prison for the assault conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) failing to grant Appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment; (2) instructing the jury that "treatment shall be provided" to a guilty but mentally ill defendant; (3) finding Appellant competent to stand trial; (4) failing to instruct the jury on assault under extreme emotional disturbance; (5) failing to suppress statements made to law enforcement officers; and (6) failing to sever the murder charge from the assault charge. View "Keeling v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to enter an order releasing expert witness funds for an evidentiary hearing regarding his post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel motion. The court of appeals denied the petition. Appellant appealed, arguing that an expert is necessary to prove that prejudice resulted from his trial counsel's failure to have him evaluated for competency. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' order, holding that Appellant failed to satisfy the threshold requirement of showing a lack of adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise necessary for issuance of a writ. View "Jones v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree trafficking in a controlled substance, second or subsequent offense. The circuit court sentenced Appellant to twenty years imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred during the guilt phase of his trial by admitting evidence of other acts of drug trafficking. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) evidence alleging Appellant had committed other acts of drug trafficking was admitted in violation of Ky. R. Evid. 404(b), and the Court could not determine with fair assurance that the error did not substantially sway the verdict; and (2) Appellant waived his right to appellate review of the penalty phase jury instructions. View "Graves v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted discretionary review in two cases to consider related questions concerning the constitutional guarantee to the effective assistance of counsel in light of Padilla v. Kentucky, which held that the guarantee is breached when defense counsel fails to advise his or her noncitizen client that a contemplated guilty plea will subject the client to automatic deportation. The court of appeals held (1) the guarantee is breached when counsel fails to advise her client that the crime to which he is pleading guilty will automatically render him subject to a longer period of parole ineligibility under Kentucky's violent offender statute; and (2) the guarantee is not breached when counsel advises his client of the mandatory sex offender treatment applicable to the crime to which he is pleading but fails to advise him of the effects of that program on parole eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under Padilla, defendants receive ineffective assistance in cases where the defendant's guilty plea was induced by his attorney's misadvice concerning a collateral consequence of the plea sufficiently punitive, grave, and enmeshed with the plea's direct consequences, and so easily determined from the statutes, as to be deemed like deportation. View "Commonwealth v. Pridham" on Justia Law