Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant and her boyfriend, Roy Rankin, were prosecuted for the death of a six-month-old. The trial court instructed the jury on one count of first-degree criminal abuse as to Defendant, but the instructions covered two different theories of how Defendant allegedly committed the crime. The first instruction allowed the jury to find Defendant guilty if she intentionally abused Cecilia. The second instruction allowed the jury to find Defendant guilty if she had intentionally permitted Rankin to abuse Cecilia. The jury found Defendant guilty under the first instruction. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the Commonwealth's proof was sufficient under at least one theory of first-degree criminal abuse, Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of criminal abuse; (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to direct abuse by Defendant, and the resulting jury verdict under that instruction was erroneous; and (3) Defendant may nevertheless be retried under the alternative theory of permitting the abuse because the jury never reached that question, and Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. View "Acosta v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant, an adult citizen, filed a petition for a declaration of rights seeking a declaration that the statutory and regulatory provisions associated with the Cabinet for Health and Family Services and its sub-unit the Department of Community Based Services' (DCBS) process for investigating allegations of child abuse were unconstitutional. Appellant also challenged the constitutionality of the Cabinet's administrative process. The underlying administrative action was held in abeyance pending the conclusion of the present proceeding. The circuit court denied the petition, finding the challenged processes to be constitutional, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals, holding that the declaratory action was not ripe for review, as the administrative proceedings being held in abeyance were not available to contextualize the operations of the statutory and regulatory process as it functions in day-to-day practice. Remanded with directions that the court hold this action in abeyance until the conclusion of the underlying administrative proceedings. View "W.B. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants Marcus Swan and D'Andre Owens were convicted of multiple crimes related to a violent home invasion they carried out. The Supreme Court affirmed Swan's judgment of conviction and sentence in its entirety, and affirmed in part and reversed in part Owens's judgment, although his overall sentence was unaffected, holding that the trial court (1) correctly admitted into evidence the guns used in the crime; (2) properly failed to dismiss the indictment because of the destruction of other guns found in the victim's house; (3) did not err in failing to hold a hearing on Swan's right to proceed pro se or with hybrid counsel; (4) properly allowed a witness to testify in the penalty phase after having been present in the courtroom during guilt-phase testimony; (5) did not commit reversible error by evaluating the competency of a child witness in a short fashion and in the presence of the jury; (6) erred in failing to give an instruction on second-degree assault as a lesser-included offense; and (7) erred in failing to grant a directed verdict on the charge of first-degree wanton endangerment relating to Latonia Lumpkins. Accordingly, Owens's convictions for first-degree assault and first-degree wanton endangerment of Lumpkins were reversed. Remanded. View "Swan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of wanton murder and initially sentenced to forty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant's sentence and remanded for a new sentencing phase. At Appellant's second sentencing phase trial, Appellant was represented by a public advocacy attorney that had represented Chris Eapmon, who had been jointly indicted with Appellant during his negotiations for a plea deal. Eapmon eventually pled guilty in exchange for his testimony against Appellant. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's twenty-eight year prison sentence, holding (1) Appellant did not suffer any identifiable prejudice arising out of counsel's representation; (2) the successive representation here did not violate Ky. R. Crim. P. 8.30; and (3) Appellant's confrontation rights were not violated at his second sentencing phase due to the use of videotaped testimony from the guilt phase of his trial. View "Steward v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to armed robbery and murder and was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. After Defendant's conviction was affirmed, Defendant filed a pro se motion seeking relief from the circuit court's judgment. The matter was allowed to lie dormant for four years until counsel filed an amendment to Defendant's original motion. The trial court denied the motion, finding that counsel's amendment was untimely and that on the merits the claims in Defendant's original motion were refuted by the record. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, although its reasoning differed from the lower court's, holding that to the extent the amended motion sought to raise a new, factually independent claim, it was subject to dismissal as untimely, and Defendant's timely claims were facially without merit. View "Roach v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to forty years in prison. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred when it allowed into evidence the fact that Appellant owned two guns with the same model number as the weapon used in the murder crime, though neither weapon was used to commit the crime, but the error was harmless; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted hearsay testimony regarding the victim's request to borrow money from his wife, but the error was harmless in the context of this case; and (3) the trial court properly refused to allow Appellant to inform the jury he had already been tried twice for these charges and the prior two juries deadlocked. View "Harris v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee was charged with assault in the fourth degree. Before Appellee was arrested but after an arrest warrant was issued, Appellee's attorney made an ex parte request to a different district court judge from the one who issued the arrest warrant, seeking to set the warrant aside and issue a summons. The warrant was withdrawn and a summons issued instead. The Commonwealth's request for the reinstatement of the arrest warrant was denied. Appellee later pled guilty to the charge. The Supreme Court granted the certification request of the Commonwealth to answer a question of law and answered that Kentucky law does not authorize an ex parte motion by a criminal defendant to vacate or set aside a warrant for his or her arrest with no notice or opportunity for the Commonwealth to be heard. View "Commonwealth v. Minton" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for being a persistent felony offender (PFO) 2. The PFO 2 count was based on an earlier conviction for which Defendant was granted diversion. Defendant was still on diversion when the grand jury indicted him for the later offenses. Upon Defendant's motion, the trial court dismissed the PFO 2 count because Defendant had not been finally sentenced on the previously diverted felony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a conviction for which a defendant is currently on diversion cannot be used to indict that defendant as a PFO 2 when he commits a subsequent felony offense; and (2) the sentence on the prior felony must be imposed at the time the defendant commits the subsequent crime in order for the conviction to support a PFO 2 charge. View "Commonwealth v. Derringer" on Justia Law

A circuit court jury found Appellant guilty of two counts of attempted murder and one count of being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). For these crimes, Appellant received a fifty-year prison sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony identifying Appellant as a former inmate to be presented to the jury; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence that he threatened a prison guard during apprehension to be presented to the jury; (3) the Commonwealth impermissibly exceeded the scope of Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.055 when it told the jury about Appellant's prior convictions, and accordingly, the Court vacated Appellant's sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase; and (4) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the PFO charge. View "Webb v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed from a judgment of the circuit court convicting him of attempted murder, two counts of first-degree assault, one count of first-degree wanton endangerment, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's conviction for first-degree assault, holding (1) in light of the particular facts of this case, Appellant's convictions for both attempted murder and first-degree assault for the same shooting resulted in a double jeopardy violation; and (2) none of Appellant's remaining arguments alleging prosecutorial misconduct established reversible error. Remanded for entry of a new judgment that excluded the reversed conviction. View "Kiper v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law