Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder, first-degree wanton endangerment, first-degree criminal mischief, and driving under the influence. Appellant was sentenced to thirty-five years imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in permitting the Commonwealth to introduce Appellant's entire statement refusing a breathalyzer test, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) did not err by permitting the introduction of an accident scene video; (3) did not err in admitting a 911 recording taken shortly after the collision leading to Appellant's convictions; and (4) may have potentially erred in failing to exclude Appellant's post-collision use of profanity, but any error was harmless. Lastly, the Commonwealth committed a discovery violation by introducing a prior misdemeanor conviction without disclosing to the defense its intent to do so, but the error was not prejudicial. View "Baumia v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a conditional Alford guilty plea to first-degree sexual abuse under Ky. Rev. Stat. 510.110(1)(d) and was sentenced to one year's imprisonment. In accordance with his plea, Appellant admitted he did engage in sexual contact with the complainant but maintained that the act was consensual. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding (1) "lack of consent" was not an element of first-degree sexual abuse under section 510.110(1)(d), and (2) the statute was not vague or overbroad. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) "lack of consent" is an element of first degree sexual abuse under the statute, and it was satisfied by the fact that the complainant was unable to consent; and (2) Appellant lacked standing to make his vagueness and overboard challenges to the statute, and even if he had standing, his arguments would be without merit. View "Stinson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of Class A felony incest and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. Appellant appealed, alleging, among other claims of error, that the trial court issued erroneous jury instructions that denied him a unanimous verdict, and that retrial of the incest charge would violate his rights guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's conviction, holding (1) Appellant was denied his right to a unanimous verdict due to the instruction given to the jury on Defendant's incest charge; and (2) because the jury's conviction of Appellant did not operate as an implied acquittal for Class A felony incest, Appellant's retrial for Class A felony incest was not proscribed by the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. Remanded. View "Rodriguez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree rape, one count of first-degree criminal trespass, and one count of intimidating a participant in a legal proceeding. Appellant was sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly declined Appellant's motion for separate trials; (2) the trial court properly denied Appellant's directed verdict motion; (3) the trial court properly denied Appellant's Batson motion; (4) the trial court did not violate Appellant's constitutional rights by excluding evidence and limiting cross-examination; (5) the prosecutor's voir dire questions and closing argument did not result in palpable error; and (6) the parole restrictions of the violent offender statute applied to Appellant. View "Newcomb v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was a juvenile who admitted giving hydrocodone to another student. Defendant's confession was made directly in answer to questions from the school assistant principal, who was working with a deputy sheriff (School Resource Officer or SRO), also present. The SRO did not read Defendant his Miranda rights before the questioning. Defendant was subsequently charged with possessing and dispensing a controlled substance, a felony, in a juvenile petition. After unsuccessfully filing a motion to suppress, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge. Defendant subsequently appealed the denial of his motion. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a student is entitled to the benefit of the Miranda warnings before being questioned by a school official in conjunction with a law enforcement officer, the SRO, when he is subject to criminal charges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statements Defendant made before law enforcement when he was questioned by the assistant principal must be suppressed because he was in custody and was not given the Miranda warnings. View "N.C. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter, first-degree tampering with physical evidence, third-degree alcohol intoxication, and third-degree criminal trespass and was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions and corresponding sentence, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) failing to suppress statements obtained during an initial interrogation of Appellant at police headquarters; (2) failing to suppress subsequent incriminating statements made by Appellant during his hospitalization; (3) denying Appellant's motion to suppress evidence of hair comparisons and taking judicial notice that hair comparison evidence is scientifically reliable; and (4) summarily imposing a consecutive six-month sentence for criminal contempt of court. View "Meskimen v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of attempted murder, first-degree assault, first-degree wanton endangerment, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant appealed, arguing that his convictions for both attempted murder and first-degree assault for the same shooting constituted a double jeopardy violation. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's conviction for first-degree assault and affirmed the remainder of his convictions, holding that, in light of the particular facts of this case, Appellant's convictions for attempted murder and first-degree assault, both offenses that arose out of a single course of conduct, resulted in a double jeopardy violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 505.020. Remanded. View "Kiper v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of one count of use of a minor under the age of sixteen in a sexual performance and six counts of use of a minor under the age of eighteen in a sexual performance. Appellant was sentenced to a total of twenty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's conviction and sentence for use of a minor under the age of eighteen in a sexual performance as to one of the victims, holding that the jury instruction as to that charge and victim violated Appellant's right to a unanimous verdict; and (2) affirmed the remainder of Appellant's convictions and sentences, holding that the trial court properly denied Appellant's motion for a mistrial. Remanded. View "Kingrey v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the murder and first-degree criminal abuse of her two-year-old son. The Supreme Court affirmed the murder conviction but reversed the abuse conviction, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the abuse conviction; (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error in playing a recorded interview in which a police detective accused the Appellant of not telling the truth nor in allowing that detective to testify that Appellant's story was inconsistent with other testimony; but (3) the jury's verdict as to first-degree criminal abuse deprived Appellant of her right to a unanimous jury verdict. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants were convicted of a 1992 murder based on highly circumstantial evidence. Both were sentenced to life imprisonment. Now represented by The Innocence Project, Appellant sought the release of certain physical evidence recovered from the crime scene - namely, unidentified hairs found in the victim's hand - for DNA testing. The circuit court denied Appellants' request to release the evidence for DNA testing, finding that the evidence would not likely change the outcome of the trial with a reasonable certainty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellants' motion because Appellants had shown the DNA testing might lead to the prosecution and conviction of a person heretofore uncharged and now at large. View "Hardin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law