Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to charges of murder, first-degree burglary, and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. After a sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced Defendant to death. Defendant subsequently filed a Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42 motion collaterally attacking his sentence and conviction, claiming that his guilty plea should be set aside as involuntary because he believed the trial judge had agreed to sentence him to life without parole and because his trial counsel bullied him into entering the guilty plea. The trial judge denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing on whether there was judicial interference in the plea process and whether Defendant was coerced by his counsel. After an evidentiary hearing on remand, the trial judge denied Defendant's motion for relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the proof showed no judicial interference in the plea process and that Defendant's counsel did not threaten or otherwise coerce him into pleading guilty. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee, an inmate, allegedly assaulted another inmate. After a disciplinary report was submitted against Appellee, the Adjustment Committee (Committee) determined that Appellee was guilty of the infraction and sentenced Appellee accordingly. Appellee appealed the decision and filed a petition for declaration of rights, arguing that the Committee's reliance on information obtained from confidential informants violated his constitutional due process rights. After a rehearing, the Committee again declared Appellee guilty of the infraction. The trial court ultimately dismissed Appellee's petition, concluding that the Committee did not violate Appellee's due process rights. The court of appeals reversed, determining that there was insufficient evidence of the disciplinary charge against Appellee to pass the "some evidence" standard pronounced in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Wadpole v. Hill. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Committee, relying solely on the confidential informants' information, failed to supply some evidence to support its finding that the confidential informants and their information were credibl; and (2) accordingly, Appellee's due process rights were violated. View "Haney v. Thomas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of tampering with physical evidence, possession of drug paraphernalia, criminal littering, and carrying a concealed deadly weapon. The court of appeals reversed and remanded Defendant's criminal littering conviction but otherwise affirmed. Defendant sought discretionary review, challenging the constitutional validity of the initial traffic stop, the pat-down of his person, and the vehicle search which led to the evidence supporting his convictions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) Defendant was arrested after the officer conducted an unlawful Terry pat-down of his person, resulting in the discovery of a bag of marijuana; and (2) therefore, the vehicle search incident to the unlawful arrest was also unlawful. View "Frazier v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary. Defendant was placed on probation, which was later revoked due to Defendant's noncompliance with the terms of the county's drug court program. Defendant appealed both his burglary conviction and his probation revocation. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's conviction, concluding that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a Faretta v. California hearing to inquire into Defendant's desire to serve as his own attorney. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant did not unequivocally request to dispense with counsel and to proceed pro se, the trial court was under no obligation to engage Defendant in a Faretta colloquy. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Martin" on Justia Law

The City of Fort Thomas, through its police department, denied a request by the Cincinnati Enquirer to inspect and copy the entire police file generated during a homicide investigation. In denying the request, the City relied on the law-enforcement exemption to the Kentucky Open Records Act (Act). The circuit court upheld the City's denial of the Enquirer's request. The court of appeals reversed, thereby rejecting the City's claim of a blanket exemption for its investigatory file, and remanded with instructions that the file be parsed into exempt and non-exempt portions of the investigatory file, with the non-exempt portions to be released to the newspaper. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly determined that the law enforcement exemption does not create a blanket exclusion from the Act's disclosure provisions for all law enforcement records pertinent to a prospective law enforcement action; and (2) to invoke the exemption, the City must show the disclosure of such records would harm or interfere with a prospective enforcement action in some significant and concrete way. Remanded. View "City of Fort Thomas v. Cincinnati Inquirer" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to four counts of complicity to rape (victim under twelve years of age) and one count each of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and first-degree sexual abuse pursuant to a conditional guilty plea. Appellant subsequently appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to a social worker on the grounds that Appellant was not provided with Miranda warnings. The trial court determined that, under the totality of the circumstances, Appellant was not entitled to Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, considering the totality of the circumstances, Appellant was not subjected to custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda, and therefore, the trial court properly denied Appellant's motion to suppress. View "Buster v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree, burglary in the third degree, and of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. Defendant was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in not instructing the jury on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of second-degree burglary, as Defendant did not request a lesser included offense of criminal trespass; and (2) Defendant's argument that the trial court improperly imposed court costs in its oral ruling at sentencing failed because the written order did not impose court costs. View "Brock v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia (PDP), second offense, pursuant to a plea agreement and received a five-year pretrial diversion. At the time Appellant entered into the diversion, the penalty for second offense PDP, a felony, was one to five years in prison. The statute was amended in April 2010, however, making the penalty for a second or subsequent offense of PDP, now a misdemeanor, ninety days to twelve months in jail. Appellant subsequently pled guilty to DUI. At her sentencing hearing, Appellant requested that the trial court continue her diversion, given that second offense PDP was now a misdemeanor, or apply the new sentence for second offense POP. The trial court voided the diversion agreement and sentenced Appellant to felony time in accordance with the prior law. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, (1) when Appellant violated the terms of her diversion agreement, the court was vested with the authority to void the contract in its entirety; but (2) because there was no final judgment entered when Appellant violated the terms of her diversion, any law that had gone into effect that would mitigate Appellant's sentence should have been applied. View "Smith v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to twenty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the post-trial revelation that the victim's wife and one of the jurors were Facebook friends did not establish grounds for a new trial, as the juror did not manifestly give a false answer regarding her Facebook relationship with the victim's wife, and merely being friends on Facebook does not, per se, establish a close relationship from which partiality on the part of a juror may reasonably be presumed; (2) Appellant's argument that the jury improperly considered penalty phase issues during the guilt phase deliberations was without merit; and (3) the trial court's exclusion of certain evidence did not afford Appellant grounds upon which his conviction should be reversed. View "McGaha v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of theft of identity, theft by deception under $500, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Defendant appealed, contending that after he was taken into custody, he was not properly advised of his Miranda rights, and therefore, the trial court erred in admitting the statement he made to police. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) statements made in response to assurances of confidentiality are made in violation of Miranda and must be suppressed; (2) in this case, the officer's agreement that Appellant's statement would be confidential vitiated the previously given Miranda warnings; and (3) therefore, the trial court erred in failing to suppress the statements. Remanded. View "Leger v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law