Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant was indicted for the crimes of murder, wanton endangerment, tampering with physical evidence, and trafficking in marijuana while in possession of a firearm. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the charges and sentenced to twenty-four years imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the trial court (1) did not violate Appellant's constitutional right to counsel by denying Appellant's motion to dismiss the indictments against him; (2) did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress statements he made to police detectives because Appellant did not unambiguously invoke his right to an attorney; (3) did not err in its evidentiary rulings; (4) did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the trafficking in marijuana charge; and (5) did not err by denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial after the Commonwealth failed to redact portions of Appellant's recorded interview with the detectives. View "Brown v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree wanton endangerment, fleeing or evading the police, first-degree illegal possession of a controlled substance, and second-degree criminal mischief. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a persistent felony offender (PFO) to twenty years' incarceration. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) Ky. R. Crim. P. 9.40, which prescribes the number of peremptory challenges in a criminal case, is valid, and the Court has the authority to promulgate that rule and all other rules of practice and procedure in the Commonwealth; and (2) the Commonwealth improperly mischaracterized Appellant's PFO status during closing arguments of the PFO guilt phase trial, but the error was not palpable. View "Glenn v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee, a licensed attorney with experience in the practice of criminal law, was indicted on five counts of failure to file Kentucky tax returns for several years. Prior to trial, Appellee appeared on his own behalf, but one day before jury trial was to begin, Appellee requested a continuance to retain private counsel. The trial judge overruled the motion without holding a formal Faretta hearing. After a jury trial, Appellee was convicted on five counts of failing to file a state tax return. The court of appeals reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the circuit court's judgment, holding that criminal defendants who are experienced criminal trial attorneys are not entitled to a Faretta hearing or inquiry prior to representing themselves. View "Commonwealth v. Ayers" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant filed to sequential motions to suppress evidence, contending that the warrantless search of his mobile home was illegal and that the Commonwealth did not establish the proper chain of custody for the evidence seized from his home. Both motions were denied, and Defendant was found guilty as charged. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the warrantless search of Defendant's mobile home satisfied neither the textual directives of the Fourth Amendment and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution nor the judicially-created exception under Maryland v. Buie. View "Brumley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to second-degree possession of a controlled substance and carrying a concealed deadly weapon. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized upon his arrest because the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe that Appellant had committed a misdemeanor offense by carrying a concealed deadly weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an objectively reasonable police officer would have believed there was probable cause to arrest Appellant for carrying a concealed weapon; and (2) therefore, the search and ultimate seizure of the evidence leading to Appellant's conviction were valid, and the circuit court thus did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress. View "Vega v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several criminal offenses, including first-degree robbery and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant did not suffer prejudice when the trial court's voir dire procedure was not consistent with the applicable statutes and rules, as the procedure employed in this case did not constitute a substantial deviation from the proper method; (2) the trial court's use of Appellant's single prior felony conviction to establish the offense of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and to enhance Appellant's first-degree robbery sentences under the persistent felony offender statute did not constitute double enhancement; and (3) the trial judge properly concluded that a mistrial was not warranted after a juror had contact with a victim-witness. View "Oro-Jimenez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of complicity to murder and first-degree complicity to robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) denying Appellant's motions for mistrial after the Commonwealth repeatedly referenced two of Appellant's three co-indictees' guilty pleas in the presence of the jury; (2) admitting eighteen jail letters written between Appellant and a co-indictee as relevant evidence; (3) holding that Appellant's co-indictee had not waived his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, thus not implicating Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense due to the co-indictee's refusal to testify; and (4) denying Appellant's motion for mistrial after the jury briefly accessed inadmissible evidence during deliberations. View "Mayse v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendants entered conditional guilty pleas to second-degree trafficking in a controlled substance. Defendants' convictions arose from dealing in Suboxone, the trade name of a drug containing buprenorphine. Before the trial court, Defendants challenged the scientific evidence used in classifying buprenorphine as a Schedule III controlled substance. Defendants argued that the Cabinet for Health and Family Services wrongly reclassified buprenorphine in 2002 from a Schedule V to Schedule III controlled substance, which change came about as a result of a change in federal law. The trial court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on a challenge to the Cabinet's scheduling of a controlled substance following federal action. The court of appeals remanded with directions to name the Attorney General and Cabinet as parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did have jurisdiction here, as a trial court may take judicial notice of the federal regulation used by the Cabinet and make a determination whether the findings comport with the requirements of Kentucky law; and (2) the Attorney General and Cabinet were not necessary parties in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery, first-degree sodomy, first-degree rape, kidnapping, and tampering with physical evidence. The trial court sentenced Defendant to terms of imprisonment with the sentences to be served consecutively, not to exceed sixty years. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in ordering his sentences to be served consecutively because they exceeded fifty years in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.110 and 532.080(6)(a). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the only limitation on the aggregate length of consecutive sentences for defendants whose highest class of crime is a Class A or B felony is the seventy-year cap found in section 532.110(1)(c), and because the highest class of crime Defendant was convicted of was a Class B felony, Defendant's sentence was lawful. View "Castle v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of third-degree assault, third-degree criminal mischief, and of being a first-deree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not palpably err in failing to provide the jury with an instruction based upon the voluntary act concept embodied in Ky. Rev. Stat. 501.030(1); (2) palpable error did not occur when the trial court failed to instruct on the burden of proof in relation to Appellant's insanity defense instruction; (3) the final sentencing was fair and did not deny Appellant of the benefit of Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.070; and (4) the persistent felony offender enhanced twenty-year sentence imposed in this case did not violate the Kentucky Constitution. View "Thornton v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law