Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Council on Developmental Disabilities, Inc. filed a request with the Cabinet for Health and Family Services seeking information about the death of Gary Farris, a ward of the Commonwealth who was transferred from an institution to a community residence shortly before his death. The Cabinet denied the Council’s request, concluding that the records were confidential under Ky. Rev. Stat. 209.140 and that the Council did not qualify as an organization exempt from the confidentiality restrictions in that statute. The trial court upheld the denial. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Council was not entitled to the requested information under either the Kentucky Open Records Act or section 209.140(3). View "Council on Developmental Disabilities, Inc. v. Cabinet for Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant was tried and convicted on the handgun charge. After his trial on this charge, Defendant filed a motion to suppress, his second such motion. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant was subsequently tried on the trafficking charge. During trial, the Commonwealth elicited testimony from a police officer about Defendant’s testimony at the second suppression hearing. Defendant did not object to this testimony but elected not to testify in his own defense. Defendant was subsequently convicted on the trafficking charge. The court of appeals reversed the trafficking conviction, concluding that the use of Defendant’s suppression-hearing testimony violated his right not to incriminate himself and that the error was palpable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the requirement of an objection is a substantive aspect of the constitutional rule that bars palpable error review, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in resorting to that review. View "Commonwealth v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter, second-degree manslaughter, and other crimes. Before final sentencing, Appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel and that he relied on erroneous legal advice regarding time served when he entered his guilty plea. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Appellant may have received inaccurate advice from his trial counsel about jail-time credit but that Appellant was not prejudiced by counsel’s mistake. View "Greene v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol (DUI) after being stopped at a police roadblock conducted by the Kentucky State Police (KSP) at a highway intersection. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the evidence leading to Appellant’s conviction was unconstitutionally obtained because the procedures the KSP employed to set up the roadblock failed to comply with the procedures necessary to implement a suspicionless traffic stop. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the KSP did not comply with the factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Buchanon substantially enough to render this roadblock a reasonable seizure performed in the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion. View "Commonwealth v. Cox" on Justia Law

Each of these three consolidated cases originated with the filing of an action in the circuit court asserting claims against nursing home facilities for personal injuries suffered by a nursing home resident, violations of Ky. Rev. Stat. 216.510 et seq., and for wrongful death of the resident. At the time of each resident’s admission to the nursing home, the resident’s attorney-in-fact executed a written document providing that disputes arising out of the relationship between the resident and the nursing home would be submitted to arbitration. When each case was commenced, the defendant nursing home moved the circuit court to compel the parties to submit the claims to a formal arbitration proceeding. The circuit court denied the motion in each case, concluding that the respective power-of-attorney instruments did not authorize the resident’s attorney-in-fact to waive the resident’s right to access to the courts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) without a clear and convincing manifestation of the principal’s intention to do so, delegation to an agent of the authority to waive a trial by jury is not authorized, and the principal’s assent to the waiver is not validly obtained; and (2) the arbitration agreements in these cases were never validly formed. View "Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree sodomy. Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years. The two jury instructions under which Appellant was convicted directed the jury not to consider a specific event but broadly referred to a five-month period. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that, upon application of Johnson v. Commonwealth, Appellant’s constitutional right to a unanimous verdict was violated because (1) at trial, the instructions given to the jury contained no distinguishing descriptions that would fairly apprise the jury of exactly which criminal episode it was charged to consider; and (2) the error was jurisprudentially intolerable. View "Ruiz v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to twenty years in prison. On appeal, Appellant argued that that his incriminating utterance to police during his arrest should have been suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search, seizure, and arrest because the policy unlawfully located and identified him during the course of a protective sweep at a Louisville residence, which led to his unlawful arrest and incriminating statement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that suppression of Appellant’s spontaneous utterance was not required because the police officers’ initial entry into the residence was consensual, the scope of the protective sweep was reasonable, the seizure of Appellant was lawful, and Appellant’s incriminating statement was spontaneous and not the product of custodial interrogation. View "Simpson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellee was found guilty of second-degree arson, second-degree burglary, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The trial court erred in its peremptory strike allocation during voir dire, but Appellee’s counsel failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Appellee subsequently filed a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 to vacate his sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that he would have used the two additional peremptory strikes denied to him by the trial court in striking two jurors. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Appellee’s allegations were not credible. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in relying on Shane v. Commonwealth in reversing the decision of the trial court; and (2) Appellee failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by not being able to strike the two jurors. View "Commonwealth v. Lawson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the use of a weapon of mass destruction in the second degree for and attempted murder for installing a pipe bomb in a car. Appellant was sentenced to forty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s conviction did not violate double jeopardy principles; (2) the trial court did not err in finding that serious physical injury occurred to the victim and in sentencing Appellant as a violent offender; (3) the trial court’s refusal to allow the jurors to use their notes during deliberations was not reversible error; and (4) Appellant was not wrongly denied his motion for directed verdict. View "Biederman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm, of being a convicted felon in possession of a hand gun, and possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a persistent felony offender to thirty-four years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by not instructing the jury on unlawful possession of a methamphetamine precursor as a lesser-included offense of manufacturing methamphetamine; and (2) did not err in denying, without an evidentiary hearing, Appellant’s motion to suppress items seized from his home, as the search was done pursuant to a valid search warrant. View "Rawls v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law