Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his right to confront witnesses against him by permitting the Commonwealth to introduce incriminating forensic test results at trial through the testimony of an expert witness under a hearsay exception. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court violated the Confrontation Clause by not allowing Defendant to confront the lab analyst who conducted the test. Remanded. View "Manery v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Janet Owen, a former University of Kentucky (UK) employee, filed a claim for discriminatory employment practices based on a physical disability with the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights (KCHR). The KCHR dually filed Owen’s claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The KCHR later dismissed Owen’s claim. The EEOC likewise issued a dismissal and notice of rights, adopting the KCHR’s findings and informing Owen that she had the right to sue under federal law. Rather than seeking judicial review of the KCHR final order or pursuing the EEOC’s federal claim, Owen filed an original action in circuit court under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of UK, concluding that because Owen elected to pursue her claim through the administrative process, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 344.270 acts as an election of remedies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that due to a 1996 amendment to the KCRA, there is nothing remaining in the statute to bar claims filed in circuit court despite final and appealable order dismissing the exact same claim filed in the administrative agency. View "Owen v. University of Kentucky" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with two counts of first degree sexual abuse. Appellant filed a motion to suppress statements he made to police during a custodial interrogation in the absence of his appointed counsel. The trial court initially granted Appellant’s motion to suppress. The trial court reversed itself, however, and denied the motion after the United States Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Montejo v. Louisiana, which overturned long-standing Sixth Amendment precedent. Appellant entered a conditional Alford plea to two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed after declining to apply the Montejo rationale in the context of state right-to-counsel law, holding that the rationale of Linehan v. Commonwealth is the correct manifestation of the right to counsel under Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution. View "Keysor v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a retrial, Defendant was convicted of wanton murder and fourth-degree assault following a car accident in which he was highly intoxicated. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Defendant challenged his convictions under Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42, arguing that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals vacated Defendant’s convictions and remanded for another trial, concluding that Defendant’s counsel had been ineffective in failing to conduct his own investigation into the accident scene and in failing to object to the introduction of an emergency medical report. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in finding reversible ineffective assistance of defense counsel, the Court of Appeals applied the Strickland v. Washington standard incorrectly; and (2) Defendant failed to show a reasonable probability of a different result absent his counsel’s purported errors. View "Commonwealth v. McKee" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a wrongful discrimination claim and a wrongful retaliation claim against his employer (Appellee), alleging that Appellee discriminated against him in an employee disciplinary matter because of his national origin and then retaliated against him when he filed a complaint with the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the discrimination and retaliation claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment upon Appellee’s motion with regard to Appellant’s discrimination and retaliation claims. View "Charalambakis v. Asbury Univ." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder, first-degree burglary, and defacing a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42 motion and a Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 60.02 motion as an alternative to his RCr 11.42 motion. Both motions were joined into a single action. The circuit court denied Defendant’s post-conviction motions. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) there was no error based on trial counsel’s failure to request a renewed competency motion during trial or in trial counsel’s waiving Defendant’s presence during trial; (2) the trial court correctly denied Defendant’s claims that were conclusively disproved through an examination of the record; (3) there was no error in pre-trial counsel’s strategy to permit Defendant to be interviewed by law enforcement; and (4) the circuit court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing concerning Defendant’s claim of error based on pre-trial counsel’s failure to convey a twenty-year plea offer to him. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. McGorman" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with seven counts of first-degree sodomy. All seven counts of the indictment read identically. Appellant was acquitted on two counts and convicted of the other five. Later, the court of appeals vacated Appellant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial, concluding that Appellant’s counsel had been ineffective. On remand, Appellant moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming his re-prosecution was barred by double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant then filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals claiming again that the prohibition on double jeopardy would be violated by retrial. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a new trial in this case raised a substantial risk that Appellant will be tried for crimes for which he has already been acquitted in violation of his double-jeopardy right against successive prosecution. Remanded. View "Dunn v. Hon. Beth Maze" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to charges of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, first-degree possession of drug paraphernalia, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. Appellant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence that was found on his person and in his car following a sniff search by a narcotics-detection dog that was conducted after a routine traffic stop. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the arresting officer prolonged the seizure and conducted the search in violation of Rodrigues and Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights; and (2) therefore, the fruits of that search must be suppressed. View "Davis v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted for being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, and alcohol intoxication in a public place. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the weapon seized at his arrest, arguing that the arresting officer lacked sufficient cause to arrest Appellant for alcohol intoxication and that the ensuing search of his person incident to the improper arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals upheld the validity of the arrest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant’s arrest for alcohol intoxication in a public place was unlawful because the offense was not committed in the presence of the arresting officer; and (2) therefore, the search conducted incident to that arrest was not valid, and the evidence obtained during the search should have been suppressed. View "Maloney v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After she was denied tenure, Plaintiff, a former faculty member of Northern Kentucky University, filed suit, alleging violations of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act for discriminatory employment practices on the basis of her gender. The trial court granted summary judgment for the University, concluding that Plaintiff failed to raise a prima facie claim for gender discrimination because she could not prove she was qualified for tenure and she failed to present evidence that she was treated differently from similarly situated male comparators. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the court of appeals employed an erroneous standard for reviewing Plaintiff’s claim. View "Bd. of Regents of N. Ky. Univ. v. Weickgenannt" on Justia Law