Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Kentucky Supreme Court
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Jonathan Hardin, a former Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD) officer, was terminated after the Chief of Police found he violated four Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). These violations stemmed from two incidents at a school where Hardin was a resource officer: one involving excessive force against a student and another where he failed to read Miranda rights to a juvenile. Hardin appealed his termination to the Louisville Metro Police Merit Board, which upheld the termination after finding he committed three of the four SOP violations.Hardin then appealed to the Jefferson Circuit Court, arguing that the Merit Board improperly considered expunged materials, violated his due process rights by admitting transcribed witness statements without cross-examination, and wrongfully relied on his arrest and criminal charges without a conviction. The Circuit Court affirmed the Merit Board's decision. Hardin further appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which also affirmed the Circuit Court's ruling.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court held that the expungement statute did not apply to the internal employment records of the LMPD's Professional Standards Unit (PSU). It also found that Hardin's due process rights were not violated by the Merit Board's consideration of sworn, transcribed witness statements, as the statutes allowed for such evidence and provided sufficient procedural safeguards, including the right to subpoena witnesses. Lastly, the Court ruled that the Chief's termination of Hardin was not arbitrary, even though it partially relied on his arrest and criminal charges, as there were other independent bases for the termination. View "HARDIN V. LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT" on Justia Law

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Dezmon Moore, a police officer with the Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD), was terminated after the Chief of Police found he had committed three violations of the department's Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). These violations stemmed from incidents involving domestic altercations with his wife, Bethel Moore, which led to multiple arrests and charges, including assault and violation of a no-contact order. Moore's criminal charges related to these incidents were eventually dismissed or expunged.Moore appealed his termination to the Louisville Metro Police Merit Board, which upheld the termination after finding he had committed two of the three SOP violations. The Jefferson Circuit Court affirmed the Merit Board's decision, and the Court of Appeals also affirmed, though it noted errors in the Merit Board's consideration of expunged materials and transcribed witness statements without cross-examination. However, the Court of Appeals deemed these errors harmless.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case. The Court held that the Merit Board did not violate Moore's statutory or constitutional due process rights by considering transcribed witness statements without live testimony and cross-examination. The Court found that the statutes governing the Merit Board provided sufficient procedural safeguards, including the opportunity for Moore to subpoena witnesses. The Court also determined that the expungement statutes did not apply to the internal employment records of the LMPD's Professional Standards Unit (PSU), and thus, the Merit Board did not err in considering those materials.Finally, the Court held that Moore's termination was not arbitrary, even though it was based on arrests and charges rather than convictions. The Chief's decision was supported by proper evidence, and the Merit Board's affirmation of the termination was justified. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT V. MOORE" on Justia Law

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The case involves Billy Jo Faughn, who was convicted of wanton murder and operating a motor vehicle under the influence of methamphetamine, resulting in a fatal accident. Faughn had left a funeral and visited the home of a known methamphetamine dealer before the accident. An eyewitness saw Faughn driving erratically and at high speed before his vehicle left the road, traveled through a yard, and struck Sarah Barrow, who was tending to her flowers. Barrow died from her injuries. A blood test revealed methamphetamine in Faughn's system. Faughn was sentenced to life imprisonment.Faughn appealed his conviction, raising four claims of error. He argued that the trial court erred by allowing some of the Commonwealth’s witnesses to testify via Zoom, which he claimed violated his right to confront the witnesses. He also claimed prosecutorial misconduct, and argued that the court erred by admitting only a portion of a bodycam video. Lastly, he argued that the cumulative effect of these errors entitled him to a new trial.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the judgment of the Todd Circuit Court. The court found that while the trial court erred in allowing remote testimony, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the overwhelming evidence against Faughn. The court also found no prosecutorial misconduct and ruled that the admission of the bodycam video was also harmless error. The court concluded that the cumulative effect of these errors did not render Faughn’s trial fundamentally unfair. View "Faughn v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Kentucky upheld the conviction of Eric Berry, who was found guilty of first-degree burglary, first-degree sexual assault, two counts of fourth-degree assault, first-degree fleeing or evading, and resisting arrest. The court rejected Berry's appeal that his right to a speedy trial was violated, arguing that delays in his trial were due to valid reasons such as Berry's own actions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and personal reasons of his attorneys. The court also denied Berry's argument that the trial court erred in not giving an intoxication defense instruction, stating that while Berry was intoxicated during the incident, he clearly knew what he was doing and acted deliberately. The court further dismissed Berry's claim that his former testimony from a domestic violence hearing should have been allowed, as the Commonwealth did not have an opportunity to cross-examine him during that hearing. Additionally, the court found no error in the joinder of the April and December incidents for the trial, as Berry failed to demonstrate actual prejudice from the record. Lastly, the court rejected Berry's claim for cumulative error, as they found no error in the other arguments presented. View "BERRY V. COMMONWEALTH" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, intimidating a participant in a legal process, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender and his sentence of twenty years' imprisonment, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the Commonwealth did not improperly comment on Defendant's right to remain silence during voir dire or deprive him of an impartial jury by making a burden-shifting argument to the venire should Defendant have chosen to testify; (2) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to strike two jurors for cause; and (3) no cumulative error occurred because no prejudicial error occurred. View "Finch v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for arson and attempted arson and otherwise affirmed, holding that the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict in Defendant's favor as to the counts for arson in the first degree and attempted arson.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) hearsay statements regarding the victims' fear of Defendant were admissible under Ky. R. Evid. 803(3)'s state-of-mind exception; (2) the trial court did not err in permitting witnesses to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; (3) the trial court properly precluded Defendant from presenting an aaltperp defense; (4) the trial court properly admitted physical evidence; (5) Defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on the charges of first-degree arson and attempted first-degree arson; (6) Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict on the charges for murder; (7) Defendant's burglary convictions did not violate double jeopardy protections; and (8) reversal was not required on grounds of cumulative error. View "Martin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction of one count of possession of synthetic drugs, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence recovered from his backpack.In his motion to suppress, Defendant argued that the warrantless search of his backpack violated the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution and section ten of the state constitution. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the search of Defendant's backpack was lawful as a search incident to his lawful arrest. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the underlying search was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court properly concluded that the search was a lawful search incident to Defendant's arrest. View "Commonwealth v. Bembury" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of twelve counts of possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor and other sex-related offenses and his total sentence of seventy years in prison, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the seizure of his cellphone and password because Defendant voluntary consented to the search; and (2) the trial court did not erroneously instruct the jury as to the effect of Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.110(1)(d) on the jury's discretion to recommend consecutive and concurrent sentences. View "Payne v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for possession of heroin, holding that the court of appeals erred by affirming the trial court's admission of certain evidence and by affirming the trial court's decision allowing a certain witness to testify.Here, the Supreme Court adopted the reasonable test for determining whether the warrantless search of a parolee's vehicle is constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment, as announced in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), and overruled its decision in Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.3d 411 (Ky. 2014) to the extent it held that the conditions of parole imposed by state law are immaterial to the Fourth Amendment analysis. The Court also held that the court of appeals (1) did not err in affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his truck; (2) erred by affirming the trial court's admission of evidence of methamphetamine for which Defendant had been acquitted and evidence of marijuana for which he had been found guilty; and (3) erred in affirming the trial court's decision to allow a witness to testify regarding events he did not perceive in real-time. View "Gasaway v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, second or greater offense and its sentence of twenty-seven years in prison, holding that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him by permitting three witnesses to testify via Zoom and erred by permitting the Commonwealth to join three indictments for trial. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err when it joined the three indictments for trial; and (2) erred when it permitted three witnesses to testify remotely, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Spalding v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law