Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Christopher Hall was charged with aggravated battery, attempted murder in the first-degree, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, murder in the first-degree, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and criminal desecration of a body. The district court initially determined that Hall was incompetent to stand trial, but after a doctor wrote a report determining that Hall was competent, the district judge found Hall competent to stand trial. Hall then pleaded guilty on all counts charged. The district court found Hall competent to enter his plea and found him guilty on all counts. Hall appealed, arguing that the district court judge erred by accepting his guilty plea and by failing to inform him of the maximum penalty that could be imposed for first-degree murder. The Supreme Court (1) dismissed Hall's appeal of his conviction for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Hall surrendered any right he had to appeal his conviction without first attempting to withdraw his plea in the district court; and (2) the district court did not err by finding Hall competent to be sentenced on the first-degree murder charge.

Defendant Ho Duong was convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The district court judge sentenced Duong to sixty-one months in prison and lifetime postrelease supervision with lifetime electronic monitoring. The Supreme Court affirmed Duong's conviction and vacated the electronic monitoring portion of his sentence, holding (1) the prosecutor's comments in closing argument did not deny Duong a fair trial; (2) the district judge's omission of a cautionary eyewitness identification instruction was not clearly erroneous; (3) Duong's objection to the district judge's Allen-type instruction was not specific, and the district court judge did not clearly err in giving the instruction; and (4) the journal entry of judgment ordering lifetime electronic monitoring was in error because the district judge lacked power to impose parole conditions.

Defendant Charles Denmark-Wagner entered into a written plea agreement on a charge of felony first-degree murder, which stated that Defendant's sentence would be life in prison. The district court sentenced Defendant to life in prison with eligibility for parole after twenty years and lifetime postrelease. Defendant was also ordered to register as a violent sex offender. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and vacated the lifetime postrelease and offender registration portions of his sentence, holding (1) the district court judge did not err in refusing to grant Defendant's motion to withdraw the plea as involuntary as any family pressure that existed did not rise to the level of good cause; (2) the district court judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that Defendant understood his plea and likely sentence and did not err in refusing to permit withdrawal of Defendant's plea as unknowingly or unintelligently made; (3) the postrelease supervision portion of Defendant's sentence did not conform to the applicable statute and was illegal; and (4) the lifetime offender registration requirement of Defendant's sentence did not conform to the applicable statute and was illegal. Remanded.

A deputy sheriff stopped Myron Coleman for speeding. While detaining Coleman, the deputy sheriff learned Coleman was on parole. Coleman's parole officer asked the deputy sheriff to detain Coleman for a search. Thirty-five minutes to an hour after the initial stop, the parole officer arrived. Coleman and his car were then searched. The search produced evidence leading to Coleman's charge for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of cocaine without tax stamps, and possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to package a controlled substance for sale. Coleman was convicted of all charges. On appeal, Coleman challenged the detention and search. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) considering the totality of the circumstances, the deputy sheriff had a reasonable suspicion that Coleman was engaging in criminal activity, justifying a temporary detention and allowing further investigation; (2) the deputy sheriff had no reasonable and legal basis for detaining Coleman while waiting for the parole officer to arrive at the scene; and (3) because the detention was of an unlawful duration, the evidence seized as a result of the unlawful arrest must be suppressed.

Jamil Fulton was convicted of first-degree murder and criminal possession of a firearm. Fulton received a hard twenty-five life sentence for the off-grid murder offense and a concurrent eight months' imprisonment for the criminal possession of a firearm conviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the off-grid conviction, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to convict Fulton; (2) the district court did not err in denying Fulton's motion for a new trial; and (3) Fulton was not entitled to a new trial because of his counsel's failure to request that his trial be severed from his codefendant's trial where Fulton pointed to no set of facts that would make the situation extraordinary and prejudice was not apparent as a matter of law by the appellate record.

Yvonne Ward was convicted for fourteen felonies related to four separate cocaine sales. On appeal, Ward (1) argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion for mistrial that she made after witnesses for the prosecution identified two individuals sitting in the courtroom and wearing orange jail jumpsuits as people who were with Ward during one or more of the sales, and (2) challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The court of appeals affirmed. On review, Ward added a new issue, which the Supreme Court declined to address because it was not properly before the Court. The Supreme Court then affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial, and (2) the evidence was sufficient.

Julie Stieben was pulled over by a highway patrol trooper after the trooper watched Stieben's car cross the fog line three times. A jury found Stieben guilty of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court committed reversible error in the way it answered the jury's question about whether Stieben crossed the fog line when she first encountered the trooper, concluding (1) the failure of the trial court to give the jury additional information to clarify a point of fact was prejudicial and denied the defendant a fair trial, and (2) the court intruded on the province of the jury as the factfinder, interfering with Stieben's constitutional right to a trial by jury by not only answering the question, but by answering it incorrectly, possibly prejudicing Stieben's defense.

Kevin Hernandez was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and residential burglary following a jury trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that (1) a comment made by the prosecutor during his closing argument on a matter outside the evidence was in error, but the statement was little more than harmless retrospection that did not contribute to the verdict obtained; and (2) the trial court did not err in concluding there was insufficient evidence to find that Hernandez's mental faculties were so impaired by his consumption of alcohol and marijuana on the night of the murder as to render him unable to form the requisite intent.

Appellant Raymore Levy was convicted for rape of a child under fourteen years of age, aggravated criminal sodomy of a child under fourteen years of age, and aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Levy received three life imprisonment sentences, the third sentence running concurrent with the first two. On appeal, Levy argued (1) his sentence was disproportionate in violation of his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, (2) his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated after a video interview was shown at his preliminary hearing when the child victim was not there to be cross-examined, and (3) both his trial counsel were ineffective, depriving him of a fair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding appellant's first two arguments were not properly preserved for appeal and declining to decide the third issue because it was raised for the first time on appeal.

Louie Martin, a convicted felon, was released on postrelease supervision after incarceration. Shortly after his release, the legislature passed an amendment that impacted Martin's previously imposed postrelease expiration date by extending it nearly eleven years. Martin filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus against the parole board, claiming that the change in his postincarceration supervision discharge date is an unlawful ex post facto law. The district court dissolved Martin's writ of habeas corpus and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) because the period of parole or postrelease supervision is part of the sentence imposed, a change to that period is a change in punishment for ex post facto considerations; (2) because the amendment is retrospective and changes the term of postrelease supervision, the law violates ex post facto protections if it acts to Martin's detriment; and (3) Martin was clearly disadvantaged by the amendment. Therefore, the amendment is an impermissible ex post facto law as applied to Martin.